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ABSTRACT
CULTURAL LEADERSHIP AND PEACE: AN EDUCATIONAL RESPONSE TO
RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE
by
B. David Rowe
This study is a philosophical inquiry into violence as the consequence of
dysfunctional meaning-making processes. It establishes a theory of leadership
development which requires, catalyzes, and sustains a reinvigorated relationship between
education and religion in order to create more pacific ways of making meaning on
interpersonal, organizational, institutional, societal, and global levels.
The inquiry articulates an understanding of leadership as drawing on educative
and religious processes for the deployment of power in order to make meaning with or on
behalf of groups of people at various levels of social complexity. The analysis
demonstrates that leadership is informed by and can inform institutional patterns of
behavior and signification. Examination of leadership style on a developmental
continuum of more and less violent modes of deploying power simultaneously offers
insight into the origin of violent social relationships and into a process for creating more
pacific ways of making meaning. Therefore, providing a path of personal cognitive and
moral development along this continuum for organizational, institutional, societal, and
global leaders offers one approach to influencing the development of social institutions
which, in turn, influence the development of other leaders, along a mutually formative

path toward interpersonal and global peace.
The examination of leadership as energy deployment for the purpose of making
meaning offers an opportunity to consider religion as an institution which encodes
meaning making processes for society and individuals alike and to consider education as
an institution which encodes behavior and norms attendant to the explication of reality.
Rehabilitating religion and education in order to play these respective social roles more
effectively requires more sophisticated leaders who deploy energy in less violent ways.
Conversely, leadership development is constrained and empowered by these institutions
which are in need of such growth themselves.
This philosophical inquiry, therefore, synthesizes a new theory capable of framing
new questions for leadership development and institutional growth with personal,
organizational, societal, and global implications. The theory creates the category of
Cultural Leadership which becomes a model for making meaning in less violent ways
while providing a pathway for personal and social growth toward sustainable peace.

CULTURAL LEADERSHIP AND PEACE:
AN EDUCATIONAL RESPONSE
TO RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE
by
B. David Rowe

A Dissertation

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of Requirements for the
Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in
Educational Policy Studies
in
the Department of Educational Policy Studies
in
the College of Education
Georgia State University

Atlanta, GA
2007

Copyright by
Ben David Rowe
2007

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My wife, Jodi, will quickly correct me when I tell someone that I have been
working toward this degree for seven years. She is keen to remind me that I took my first
doctoral level course in 1997 at Emory University while working at Oxford College as
that school’s director of development. It was not until the Spring of 2000, after joining
the staff of LaGrange College as vice president for advancement, however, that I
embarked on a formal degree-seeking program at Georgia State University which
required a great deal of commitment and sacrifice on the part of countless supporters who
nurtured me and encouraged me along the way.
I am aware of how much has changed in my life over the course of these seven
years and how much has changed in the lives of those upon whom I have depended
during this time. Jodi and I have become parents. She and God blessed me with the two
most wonderful children on the planet, Carter and Philip. They have never known a father
who was not going to school or, in the latter years, working on “daddy’s book.” Raising
them is my deepest joy and one I struggle to express adequately. I am simultaneously
grateful to them and deeply sorrowful each time they grudgingly let me go out the door to
the library or allowed me to sit quietly with my laptop or book in my chair as they played
elsewhere. I pray that I have enough life left for them to cash in all the IOUs I offered in
response to their recurring plea, “but I just want to spend time with you, daddy.”
Starting and raising a family is no passing obligation. Jodi has had to devote more
than her share of creativity, love, and frugality to make up for my physical, mental, and
sometimes emotional absences. Never counting the cost, only investing more of her time,
energy, and deferred personal dreams into my education, Jodi compelled me to persist
during the moments I considered scaling back on the program or abandoning the goal
altogether. Without her, I would not have the privilege of putting these words on paper
right now. I am indebted to her and to her network of family and friends who surrounded
her with love and support, especially when she suddenly and sadly lost her daddy.
Most of the world will never know, and even I may never fully appreciate, what it
took for my family to support me over these years. They were not alone in making this
dissertation possible, however. It was my three-time boss, mentor, and friend, Stuart
Gulley who also served as a role model for me. He embarked on his doctoral program
while we were colleagues at Emory University. He encouraged me to consider starting
the program myself over the years. And then, when he hired me at LaGrange College, he
made it possible for me to actually commit. LaGrange College’s generosity in providing
tuition and fees reimbursement covered most of the financial burden of the program. For
that I am most grateful. Stuart’s patience, tolerance, and first hand understanding of my

ii

experience made him a supportive supervisor who, no doubt more than once, refrained
from adding assignments or expectations that would interfere with my schoolwork and
who surely forgave many oversights and mistakes caused by my dedication to the
program and to this project.
Along with Stuart, I appreciate my other LaGrange College colleagues. In
particular, Lydia Wheitsel, a long time mentor, friend, and former boss, along with Carla
Rhodes, both executive secretaries to the president, helped protect my time and often
directed my attention to pressing priorities. My colleagues on the president’s cabinet,
Quincy Brown, Jay Simmons, Linda Buchanan, Phyllis Whitney, Bob Boozer, and Kim
Myrick offered encouragement and advice along the way. In fact, my student in
seminary, Quincy Brown, became my teacher at LaGrange College. My counselor and
confidant, he guided me emotionally and spiritually even during his own ordeal of
needing and receiving a kidney transplant. Through his experience he showed me the
transformative impact of liminal experiences, which inevitably demand to be appreciated
and used for personal growth. He also served as an intellectual advisor teaching me about
the hold that myth and story have on our lives.
Similarly, I thank Linda Buchanan who on more than one occasion loaned a book
with a spoonful of advice, reminding me that I only had an audience of four committee
members and that when it comes to writing dissertations “done” beats “perfect” any day.
She, along with Stuart, Toni Anderson, and in the latter years, Sharon Livingston, joined
me in forming the core of what is affectionately known as “Philo University.” All of us
are products of the Georgia State University higher education program which, as a result,
has influenced immeasurably the operations of our common employer, LaGrange
College. To varying degrees, we are indebted to Philo Hutcheson for our academic
journeys. Philo has become an intellectual father to me, offering me latitude to explore
topics not traditionally encountered in higher education programs while also instilling in
me an appreciation for rigorous and focused scholarship. He and my other dissertation
committee members, Susan Talburt, Doug Davis, and Thee Smith patiently, and often
skeptically, held me accountable to my discipline while permitting nontraditional
approaches to understanding the intersection of education and religion. Their influence
joins that of Mary Beth Gasman and Ben Baez in helping me gain self-confidence as a
scholar.
Other colleagues also provided invaluable services and encouragement. Catherine
Kostilnik edited my dissertation. Any errors herein result from my failure to correct the
mistakes she and Philo identified. The staff of the Banks Library, especially Arthur
Robinson, who can locate through inter-library loan any volume on the planet, provided a
resource-rich cloister for research, rumination, and writing. Fellow students and friends
Meredith Curtin Siegel and Rodney Lyn helped me formulate my ideas in the earliest
stages. Andy Fleming deepened my understanding of the work of Brian and Elva Hall.
My friend and fellow Oikos co-founder, Mark Davies inspires me to relentlessly believe
all of us can and should work to make this world a better place.

iii

LaGrange College is fortunate to have one of the finest advancement staffs
anywhere. Their dedication and hard work more than compensated for the many times
school, research, and writing rendered me unavailable. They, too, exhibited an immense
amount of understanding and patience. They tolerated early departures from work to
attend class and long absences for research and writing. It is a tribute to their competence
and professionalism that the College’s external relations and fundraising efforts have
flourished during this time period. They gave me confidence to share with them my
leadership responsibilities for the division in ways that transformed my own notions of
management and influenced greatly the chapter in this dissertation I devote to leadership
styles and development. They can attest to the gulf that exists between my theory and my
practice when it comes to my personal and professional inadequacies.
While the entire advancement team made this dissertation possible, I wish to pay
particular tribute to the division’s directors. Tammy Rogers and Martha Pirkle have
endured this process from the beginning. Dean Hartman, and more recently, Shirley
Harrington, have ably led their areas while also allowing me the space and time I needed
to press forward toward completion. Others have come and gone during this time, but, in
their own way made this accomplishment possible. Kristen Brooks, Natalie Shelton,
Pride Hawkins, John Riley, Kathy Pirrman, Jennifer Hull, Renee Ferguson, Pam Barnes,
and Terri Bassett served in various roles over these years offering personal and
professional assistance in this process while my attention was divided among work,
family, and school.
Janet Hughes, however, deserves special mention. Like Einstein’s brain, her
genial disposition, quick wit, patience, understanding, perseverance, and support ought to
be preserved for posterity and examined by scientists in succeeding generations who
might be able to understand what is, at this point in time, inexplicable. Janet devoted a
great deal of time, energy, and knowledge to help me complete this dissertation. She
jealously guarded the hours and days I needed to work for extended periods while not
letting any priorities slip by without my attention. Borrowing time from her family, she
kept me on task and spent hours late at night and on weekends to help me format and edit
the final product. There is no telling what else she has done to make sure that I finish this
program without losing my job, my staff, or my family. Like a compass, Janet always
knows true north, directing (often re-directing) my focus to what is truly important in life
as well as what is most pressing at the moment.
The past seven years make up my formal doctoral program, but my education has
been a lifelong adventure. That reality has become clearer and clearer to me with each
page I have written. My mom and dad, Joyce and Ben Rowe, have provided a living
model of interfaith relations. A Missionary Baptist and Roman Catholic married in 1960,
they showed through their love for one another and for my sister, Jana, and me how to
resolve conflicts that emerge from deeply ingrained differences. Their efforts to educate
Jana and me in both traditions introduced me to early mentors whose influence I feel
today. Gene Wilkes, my youth director while working on his Ph.D., was the first person I
recall knowing who combined ministry and research-based scholarship. Similarly the
Jesuits, who taught me in high school, lived out a model of scholastic ministry.

iv

Clearly this work is, for me at least, an intergenerational product and a
community effort. I inherit a legacy of love and support from many who have surrounded
me recently and throughout my life. Without such a foundation and network, I would not
be in the position today to make this contribution to a world in great need of that same
love and support. Mindful of the footsteps in which I follow, I endeavor to make a path
equally worthy for future generations. It is for this reason, that I dedicate this dissertation
to my closest link to tomorrow, to the two persons whose world I hope to make more
peaceful. To Carter and Philip, with love, I offer this work. For you ground me in joy and
teach me to hope. It is in you and through you I most clearly see the image of God.

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS
List of Figures ................................................................................................................. ix
Preface...............................................................................................................................x
Introduction.......................................................................................................................1
Chapter
1

RELIGION, CULTURES, AND MEANING ...........................................17
The Search for Meaning.............................................................................20
Naked Existence..........................................................................25
Cannibalism ................................................................................26
Deceptive Dreaming ...................................................................28
The Making of Meaning ............................................................................30

2

MEANING, POWER, AND VIOLENCE .................................................37
Institutional Moral Meaning ......................................................................38
Organizational Crisis Raises Institutional Questions..................43
From Is to Ought.........................................................................49
Meaning as Synthesis..................................................................53
University Ritual.............................................................56
Church Ritual ..................................................................56
Shared Ritual...................................................................57
University Ritual Response.............................................57
Society Building and Culture Formation ....................................60
The Multiplicity of Cultural Life ................................................62
Moral Meaning Matrix...............................................................................69

3

RELIGION AND VIOLENCE ..................................................................78
Religion .....................................................................................................81
Western Hegemony....................................................................................83
Religion in the United States .....................................................................85
Christian Violence .....................................................................................88

4

EDUCATION, RELIGION, AND VIOLENCE........................................95
Touching Transcendence ...........................................................................95
Mimesis: Mars and Minerva .......................................................99
Mimesis: Faith and Knowledge ................................................103
From Rivalry to Sacrifice – Faith and Knowledge ...................107
From Rivalry to Sacrifice – Mars and Minerva ........................109

vi

God-making and Integrity at the Dawn of a New Century.......111
Colleges at War........................................................................................115
Universities as Mimetic Rivals .................................................120
Nation-building and Utilitarianism ...........................................122
The Moral Purpose of Education .............................................................126
Chapter
5

LEADERSHIP AS MEANING-MAKING .............................................130
Leadership and Authority ........................................................................131
Routine Charisma.....................................................................................136
Meaningful Leadership ............................................................................142
The Ritual of Meaning Making................................................................144
Communitas and Meaning .......................................................................147
Charisma and Communitas ......................................................................151

6

LEADERSHIP AND VIOLENCE ..........................................................156
Hall’s Taxonomy .....................................................................................157
Leadership and Mimetic Rivalry .............................................................159
Authoritarian as Dominant Rival ..............................................160
Paternalist/Maternalist as Object of Desire...............................162
Manager as Scapegoater ...........................................................163
Facilitator as Victim..................................................................167
Collaborator as Hero .................................................................168
Servant as Transformer .............................................................170
Visionary as Strange Attractor..................................................173

7

CULTURES AS COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS...........................177
The Social Fractal ....................................................................................178
Network and Complexity Theories..........................................................179
Network Theory ........................................................................183
Complexity Theory ...................................................................188
Halachic Learning....................................................................................193
Network Consciousness ...........................................................................196
Learning and Reasoning ...........................................................199
Signification..............................................................................204
Thermodynamics of Closed and Open Systems ......................................206

8

THE VIOLENCE OF CLOSED SYSTEMS ...........................................212
Closed Systems Leadership ....................................................................218
Charismatic Energy..................................................................................225
Scapegoating a Manager ...........................................................232
Cuts that Make Sense....................................................235
Cutting Sensitively........................................................238
Making Sense of the Cuts .............................................239
Dominating a Rival and Elevating a Hero ................................245

vii

Ontological Change ......................................................247
Normative Failure .........................................................250
Ontological Change and Normative Shifts ...................255
Initiated Leaders.......................................................................................258
Chapter
9

10

OPEN SYSTEMS CULTURES ..............................................................262
Education and Religion............................................................................263
Elements of Open Systems Myths ...........................................................267
Coming Together ......................................................................272
Recalling and Sharing ...............................................................275
Transformation..........................................................................276
Inter-subjectivity .......................................................................278
Community ...............................................................................279
Opening Systems .....................................................................................281
CULTIVATING CULTURAL LEADERSHIP.......................................286
Writing Her Ass Off for Peace.................................................................287
Middle East College..................................................................288
Profile of a Prophet .......................................................289
Inter-faith Violence and Education...............................291
Brenda’s Path ............................................................................292
Abuna as Visionary Strange Attractor ......................................294
Attractor as Symbol and Model ....................................297
Writing as Transformative Praxis .................................298
Oikos ...................................................................................................301
Generative Commitment...........................................................307
Activities ...................................................................................310
Content..........................................................................310
Capacity ........................................................................311
Community ...................................................................313
Systemic, Sustainable, and Scalable .........................................314
Cultural Leadership and Peace.................................................................315

Conclusion ....................................................................................................................319
Bibliography .................................................................................................................327

viii

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure

Page

1

Ontological Schema .............................................................................49

2

Normative Schema...............................................................................53

3

Signification Schema ...........................................................................53

4

Meaning Schema..................................................................................60

5

Synthetic Schema.................................................................................60

6

Synthetic Schema with Levels of Social Complexity Identified .........62

7

Synthetic Schema with Levels of Social Complexity Identified .........69

8

Moral Meaning Matrix.........................................................................77

9

Development Map..............................................................................159

10

Moral Meaning Matrix.......................................................................193

11

Leadership Posture Grid ....................................................................219

12

Moral Meaning Matrix as Network ...................................................247

13

Ada Bell’s Protest vs. Business as Usual...........................................249

14

Harvard Hiring Practices vs. Bell’s Protest .......................................252

15

Moral Meaning Matrix as Network ...................................................294

16

Social Institutions as Dimensions of Moral Meaning........................303

v

PREFACE

Religion is at the center of – or wrapped around – many of the world’s most
violent conflicts. Unfortunately this has been true for some time and is true today. The
pervasiveness of religion-related conflicts is illustrated by the fact that seven stories
detailed religious conflicts in the December 2006 issue of The Economist alone. In
Palestine, Islamist Hamas is on the brink of a civil war with secular Fatah. Hamas leader
Ismail Haniyeh pledged that the “Palestinians would ‘continue the jihad [against Israel]
until Jerusalem had been liberated,’” but it is the specter of Islamist and secular
Palestinians spilling each other’s blood that seems to be the most imminent threat.1
Moving East, in an in-depth discussion of Pushtunwali, the tribal code of the Pusthun
people in Pakistan and Afghanistan, the journal distinguishes the tribal code from the
almost equally pervasive sharia or Islamic law. The distinctions fade, however “in times
of duress, when a standard is needed to rally their fractious tribes and sub-tribes: then
they have tended to hoist the flag of jihad.”2
Moving to the west of Palestine in the article “Wars of Religion,” the magazine
details the schism, less bloody than legal, in the “American Episcopal Church over the
ordination of gays and women.”3 Large Virginia parishes occupying expensive property

1

Unknown Author, “The Palestinians: How Not to Win a State” and “Palestine: The Spectre of Civil War,”
The Economist, December 23, 2006, 14, 65.
2
Unknown Author, “Pushtunwali: Honour, Murder and an Ancient Tribal Code,” The Economist,
December 23, 2006, 38.
3
Unknown Author, “Episcopalians: Wars of Religion,” The Economist, December 23, 2006, 43.
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and with rich historic ties to the founding of the United States are seeking communion
with Anglican bishops in the developing world, especially Africa, who have “taken to
ordaining American bishops in order to lead the Episcopal church back to its ‘biblical
foundations.’”4
For all of the conflict it seems to engender, religion as a social phenomenon is not
going away, according to The Economist. In “Christianity Reborn,” Peter Berger, to
whom the magazine refers as the “dean of sociologists of religion” draws on Max
Weber’s observations about the links between Protestantism and capitalism to explain the
role of emerging Pentecostalism particularly in the southern hemisphere.5
“Pentecostalism, like Puritanism before it, is an instrument of modernization,” claims the
magazine.6 Churches “teach people to speak in public, organize meetings and as they
become more successful manage large organizations. The bookshops in the mega
churches are full of tomes on management.”7
A force of modernization, perhaps, but religion holds and conveys deep mysteries
as well – mysteries only truly understood by believers and often incredible to nonbelievers. Take the phenomenon of jinn, for instance, as described in The Economist’s
article, “Born of Fire.”8 Descriptions of jinn or genies range from shape-shifting spiritual
beings to whispers of thought. Real or not the effects of the belief in jinn are palpable.
In August [2006], for instance, Muslims in the Kikandwa district of
central Uganda grew feverish over reports of jinn haunting and raping
women in the district. So when a young woman stumbled out of the forest
one day, unkempt and deranged, she was denounced as jinn. Villagers beat
her to death. Police finished the job with six bullets at close range. The
4

Ibid.
Unknown Author, “Pentecostals: Christianity Reborn,” The Economist, December 23, 2006, 50.
6
Ibid.
7
Ibid.
8
Unknown Author, “Jinn: Born of Fire,” The Economist, December 23, 2006, 63.
5

xi

young woman called out for her children in her last moments. An
investigation revealed her to be from a neighboring district. She had spent
days without food or water, searching for her missing husband.9
In this instance, at least, the connection between religious belief and bloodshed is clear.
But it is only an example of the numerous local and global correlations between religion
and violence, but there seems to be another factor involved as well, education.
The article which demonstrates a link between religion and violence also
correlates belief in jinn with education levels. Comparing Somalia and Afghanistan, the
correspondent reports that “jinn belief is strong in both countries” which are “warravaged and have rudimentary education systems.”10 The article suggests that “illiterate
rural women are more open to jinn” while “to more scholarly clerics jinn are little more
than energy, a pulse form of quantum physics perhaps.”11
This interplay among religion, violence, and education has at least an anecdototal
correlation with global wars as well. The Economist asserts that “factions in Somalia and
Afghanistan have accused their enemies of being backed not only by the CIA but by
malevolent jinn” while a Pakistani jihadist cleric claims that United States missiles “will
be misdirected by jinn.”12 Similarly, “Ahmed Shah Masoud, the commander of
Afghanistan’s Northern Alliance … [who was] assassinated by Al Qaeda operatives on
September 9, 2001” was said to have “jinn on his side” thus making Osama bin Laden an
enemy of jinn in the eyes of many of Masoud’s followers.13
This one issue of one magazine is only one example of the pervasiveness of the
apparent relationship between religion and violence in the world. Further, is there, as The
9

Ibid.
Ibid.
11
Ibid, 63-4.
12
Ibid., 64.
13
Ibid., 64.
10
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Economist suggests, a causal relationship between religion, coupled with its potentially
violent effects, and education? This dissertation attempts to answer that question, moving
from the anecdotal to the analytical in hopes of charting a path away from violence and
toward deploying the rich resources of religion and education for the purpose of creating
a more peaceful world.

xiii

INTRODUCTION

Religion, Violence, and Education
What is it about religion that places it so squarely in the company of conflict and
violence? Answering this question requires an examination of the nature of religion and
the way it functions in societies. In order to do this, I must separate the notion of religion,
at least temporarily, from theological content and examine it functionally as a component
of any society, even a society for which secularism, patriotism, or some sort of civil
tolerance of multiple faiths serves this function. Similarly I will look at education
functionally and the role it plays in societies and how education functions relative to
religion. Understanding the functional relationship between education and religion will
allow me to ask whether religion is the problem generally, or whether it is theology that
is the problem. In other words, is it that people believe or what people believe or some
combination of both that creates such a strong correlation between religion and violence?
Further, is there a problem with education relative to religion? Can education have an
effect on religion that minimizes its correlation with conflict? If so, is it how education
functions that is important, what is being taught and learned that is important or, again,
some of both?

1

2
To get at the relationship between education and religion and how they interact
with respect to violence, I must develop a thorough understanding of the role of religion
and education in societies. My research reveals that analyzing religion, education, and
society requires that I develop a theory of culture against which to examine religion and
education in functional terms.
Once understood in the terms I will establish, cultures, as conveyors of meaning,
avail themselves to the influence of leaders as meaning makers who, in turn, are shaped
by the culture. Understanding this mutually constitutive relationship of leaders and
cultures is key to an understanding of social change that begins to map a vector away
from violence by deploying the best tools that religion and education have to offer. So the
second project of this dissertation is to develop a theory of leadership, and specifically a
theory of leadership development, that demonstrates its interrelatedness to my theory of
culture.
The theories of leadership and culture, when taken together, raise questions about
how groups of people make meaning. This exercise of signification processes requires a
type of cultural energy that I will explore more fully. The third part of this dissertation,
therefore, establishes the theoretical underpinnings for appropriating physical science for
social analysis by developing a theory of thermodynamics of culture and leadership.
These three theories permit a new construct, one I term Cultural Leadership. It is a
self-aware, socially aware, intentionally developing cultural leader that will understand
his or her role in the social construction of cultures and societies. This self-understanding
permits, if not requires, an awareness of the ways in which cultures and leaders become
or remain violent. Cultural Leadership provides the theoretical framework and the tools
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to reverse violent trends and engage in the creation and sustaining of peaceful social
arrangements.

Method
My development of Cultural Leadership as a theoretical model on the
organizational, institutional, societal, and global levels will draw on theoretical constructs
in the fields of anthropology, sociology, theology, literary criticism, human development
theory, education theory, leadership theory, network theory, physics, and complexity
theory. The questions I am posing are broad-reaching and require an interdisciplinary
approach.1 My presupposition is that asking the questions I am posing against any one of
these theoretical frameworks alone would reveal the respective inadequacies of each
discipline to understand, let alone answer, these questions. As philosopher Michael
Scriven notes, echoing Ludwig Wittgenstein’s admonition, “when you get to the
foundations of the subject, you cannot use the methodology of that subject, since you
haven’t yet established the legitimacy of the subject or the methodology.”2 Therefore I
use philosophical inquiry to synthesize a new theory capable of framing new questions
with implications for social change as well as personal growth. The very absence of such
a frame necessitates its exploration and development prior to investigation by any other
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means.3 My approach to argumentation throughout this dissertation takes a rather
positivist approach. I assemble empirical evidence to support my claims and to identify
causal relationships between and among various social phenomena.

Culture
One of the relationships I examine in this dissertation is that between religion and
violence. I do so in multiple ways. In chapter one I start with Samuel Huntington’s
analysis of the role that religion plays in exacerbating violence in the world.4
Huntington’s work suggests that the reason religion is often identified so closely with
violent conflict is that it offers those persons in conflict a meaningful identity to
differentiate one group from its enemy while generating alliances that transcend other
lines of identity and distinction such as national boundaries. Huntington’s claim that
religion can offer shared meaning among people who do not share the same nationality,
for instance, raises questions about the relationship between meaningful identity and
culture. Clifford Geertz offers a framework in which to understand culture in terms of
shared and transmitted meaning.5 Huntington and Geertz, when taken together, suggest
the possibility that persons can operate in multiple cultural contexts at the same time.
While nationality may be a prerequisite for culture in one sense of the term, Huntington’s
“civilizations” imply the existence of (at least nascent or provisional) cultures that
transcend nationality as well as divide people from one another within nations.
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Thinking of cultures in the plural and as scalable and thinking of cultures
fundamentally as having to do with meaning will lead me next into an analytical
reflection on the nature of meaning and the ways persons and groups of persons make
meaning. Viktor Frankl’s account of perilous survival in Nazi concentration camps offers
a vivid description of meaning-making on the personal level. When placed in
conversation with Peter Berger, Frankl’s account also offers images of how groups of
people make meaning in ways that are consistent with the meaning-making mechanism
Geertz describes. Geertz suggests that making meaning is simply reconciling the way
things are with the way things ought to be.6
This reconciliation seems to occur on large and small scales. Huntington suggests
that religion functions to create those shared meanings both within and beyond national
boundaries, for instance, creating what he calls civilizations. If shared meaning
constitutes culture in Geertz’s terms, then on some level Huntington’s proposition
suggests the emergence of cultures within cultures. This seems to be borne out by the
example of the dual Pushtun allegiance to Pushtunwali and sharia described above.
Likewise, reading Frankl and Berger in light of Geertz’s framework demonstrates
relationships between the personal and collective enterprises of making, preserving, and
transmitting meaning.
Geertz’s meaning-making mechanism, a synthesis between the ontological (the
way things are) with the normative (the way things ought to be), then can be thought of as
scalable from the personal accounts of Frankl to the global analysis of Huntington. In
order to test the scalability of Geertz’s proposition, in chapter two I will examine an
organizational decision-making crisis about two men requesting the use of a campus
6
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chapel for their wedding at Emory University. My analysis will allow me to elaborate
how Geertz’s mechanism works for various levels of social complexity. My investigation
into the Emory crisis also will reveal how social institutions, as described broadly by
Robert Bellah and his co-authors of the Good Society (particularly education, religion,
and the government in this case), create different meaning-making paradigms for people
involved in the same crisis. In addition, my examination of the way these institutions
influence how actors make sense out of this ordeal illustrates another property of social
institutions. Namely, institutions mediate the scalability of Geertz’s mechanism. That is,
they form a bridge between personal meaning-making processes and collective meaningmaking processes. I will illustrate the way meaning making (or signification) occurs at
the various levels of social complexity in a table I call the Moral Meaning Matrix. As a
theoretical model, this table offers a functional description of the ways persons and
groups of persons reconcile the normative and the ontological from the personal to the
societal. It interpolates arbitrary levels of complexity in between those levels in order to
demonstrate the mediating role of social institutions. It also extrapolates beyond the
societal level, indicating the potential that societies can project their socially-constructed
meanings into claims of universal truth. This universal projection is particularly useful
when thinking about the functional role that religion plays. Note that throughout the
dissertation the term universal refers to such a projection. The idea that anything can be
described as universal is certainly a contested notion. I do not intend to make claims of
universal fact or truth or to articulate a particular theology or metaphysics, but I do claim
that through the process of social construction of reality and knowledge, described in
greater detail below, societies create, share, and respond to a projection and perception of

7
realities (or of reality) that transcend(s) the most complex levels of social organization
comprehensible to the projecting and perceiving group.
Once I establish the relational arrangements among various social institutions and
demonstrate their roles in meaning making which is an important component of culture
creation, I will begin to look at the role that energy plays in the signification processes
that form, perpetuate, and transmit cultures. Understanding how energy is deployed as
power in order to create culture at various levels of social complexity as illustrated in the
Moral Meaning Matrix begins to illuminate the relationship between culture formation
and violence. Paolo Freire’s descriptions of oppression and liberation illustrate the
insidious ways power is used to oppress people by exporting norms from one social
context and imposing them on another. Those who transfer norms in this way must have
power in order to impose those foreign norms. The imposition of the norms preserves and
advances that power. This is violence in Freire’s terms even if blood is not shed. As
Freire points out it is often the revolutionary reactions to that initial violence which are
bloody, but the initial violence was already in place via the imposition of non-native
norms in what might be described as an imperialistic or colonizing signification or
enculturation effort.
With the link between meaning making or culture creation and violence
established and with a glimpse at the role that social institutions play in the signification
process, I will turn, in chapter three, to an in-depth discussion of the function of social
institutions in US society in terms described by Robert Bellah and his coauthors of The
Good Society. Institutions play a dual role. They mediate between the personal and
collective levels of social complexity and, as the Emory case demonstrates, they preserve
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and transmit different meanings even in the same society. With this dual function of
social institutions as a backdrop, I will examine religion as a social institution in the
United States in particular detail. Aside from the primacy Huntington has placed on
religion in violent global conflicts, both Geertz’s description of culture and Berger’s
analysis of the creation of society give religion a third role in the maintenance of
societies. They both identify religion itself with signification or meaning. Religion on the
broader societal scale functions as the social institution which prescribes how societies
arrange the synthesis of the normative and the ontological. In that way it encodes the
culturally-proper relationship between the is and the ought for other social institutions. If
a culture’s religion, functionally speaking, privileges the normative over the ontological,
for instance, which Freire demonstrates is oppressive, then education, law, and economy,
for instance, will follow suit. Since each social institution will have a different set of
norms, each will be capable of making a different sense out of reality than the other
institutions, but the normative privilege will be the same for all to the extent that the
functional religion of the society influences them in that way.
The extent of that influence is questionable, however. Bellah et al.’s observation
is that religion in the United States, at least, has been relegated to what they call the
private sphere. This diminishes its relationship with other social institutions and inhibits
religion’s ability to be a robust public participant in the meaning-making processes of
society. This confounding problem of the institution which encodes signification being
distanced from the other institutions’ processes of meaning-making leaves religion
stagnant as a social force, if not in a state of atrophy while at the same time leaving the
other social institutions dependent on an ailing signification code for cues as to how the
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normative and the ontological ought to relate in a society that purports to cohere. So my
argument calls for a revival of the role of religion in public life. Such a revival, however,
is not without potentially violent consequences.
To understand fully and more explicitly the potentially violent consequences and
to offer a case upon which to test the effects of this functional understanding of religion, I
will depart the functionalist framework and look at a particular theology or belief system.
Christianity, as broadly understood and practiced in the United States and Western
Europe, influences these societies' meaning-making processes in ways that create and, in
a sense sacralize violence according to René Girard’s theory of mimetic rivalry and
sacrificial violence. Girard judges that contemporary Christian theology, broadly
speaking, represents a misreading of the Christian Gospel. This misreading encodes
violent modes of meaning-making. So to the extent that meaning-making processes of the
other social institutions in the United States and Western Europe are indirectly (and
sometimes directly) dependent upon this misreading of the Gospel then meaning-making
processes in these globally influential societies will continue to find violent ways to use
power for the sake of forming, maintaining and transmitting culture. So reviving
religion’s role in public life, or at least Christianity’s role in US society, could have
(some would say even more) devastating consequences not only on United States society,
but on the world. It is also possible, however, that Christianity, is in fact already
influencing these violent modes of signification and the so-called privatization of religion
is only a one-way shield, allowing religion’s influence to pervade society without
accepting any influential shaping from other social processes. So my call for the revival
of religion in public life is much more about a revival of discourse about religion and a
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more open and critical engagement of the meaning-making processes it encodes for other
social institutions.
Chapter four examines the relationships among the various social institutions in
detailed case studies. Carol Gruber’s analysis of colleges and universities during World
War I illuminates Girard’s thesis on an institutional scale. Dysfunctional relationships
among education, religion, and government contributed to major changes in institutional
identity and those changes, in turn, contributed to what could arguably be described as
uncritical and hyper-bellicose attitudes among educational and religious leaders.
I will also examine more recent events at three universities in the Middle East.
These studies also demonstrate how education allowing itself to be co-opted for
economic and governmental ends can directly lead to the involvement in violent conflict.
Chapter four concludes with a call for education to re-examine and rehabilitate its own
sense of moral purpose outside those freely assigned to it by economic and governmental
influences. Religion can function to help education make meaning in its own terms and to
begin that process of rehabilitating its moral purpose, but religion needs education to
reverse its devolution into violent meaning-making patterns.
This is a call for a religious and educational reformation, and the agents upon
whom I call for this reformation are a group I term, broadly, as leaders, not religious
leaders alone, but leaders of groups large and small who influence the various social
institutions in societies.
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Leadership
So what constitutes a leader? Because of the way in which we as modern humans,
particularly in the United States and Western Europe, have divided up functions in an
attempt to create efficiencies or, at least, loci of control, we have organized our
relationships with one another into groups of persons acting together ostensibly for
common purposes. Within these organizations, there is often a person or group of persons
who relate to the entire group or to a large portion of the group at once. Often we call this
person or group a leader or leadership team. Classically, Max Weber establishes
categories for analysis for leadership. His ideal types prove useful in understanding the
ways authority is regarded as legitimate by groups of persons. In chapter five, I will turn
to Weber as a starting point in developing my theory of leadership.
Various notions of leadership have surfaced over the centuries. Perspectives
which influence the study of leadership are closely tied with the way one understands
reality in general and how people know what is real and what is not real. On one end of a
continuum of these notions of leadership is that “leadership is ‘real;’ it can be measured
in a relatively objective manner and has generalizable and law-like relationships waiting
to be discovered.”7 On the other end of the continuum is an understanding of reality as
socially constructed, an understanding I will develop out more with the help of Peter
Berger and others. This understanding views “reality as a projection of human
imagination, with a transcendental metaphor.”8 From this perspective, “leadership reality
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is a projection of individual consciousness and may be accessible only through
phenomenological modes of insight.”9
No matter how problematic it is to settle on a fixed notion of leadership and even
if leadership is understood as only a socially-constructed reality, the concept of
leadership itself is useful if only to aid in the identification of what is wrong with the
acquisition and use of power by particular individuals or groups of individuals. It also
may serve to identify myths about the use of power, myths that reinforce power
differences - myths that need to be exposed, understood and managed. Even if our object
is to deconstruct the nature of leadership, to do away with the concept altogether, or to
reveal its utility for harm or for good, it would serve us well to be more specific about the
meanings of the terms leadership and leader. Chapter five explores multiple examples
and discussions of leadership and concludes that leadership is fundamentally a meaningmaking activity and, therefore, a fundamentally cultural activity.
I appropriate Weber’s and subsequent analysts’ development of the concept of
charisma to describe how leaders actually facilitate the meaning-making process for
groups. Charisma enables leaders to evoke a willingness of others to move beyond the
security of the status quo through an uncertain middle state and into a new set of
structures and norms. But charisma is more than the ability to persuade others to endure
such transitions; it is the ability to establish a new order on the other side of those
transitions. Victor Turner’s research in liminality and communitas provides a language
for describing this meaning-making process.
As a cultural activity in the United States and in Western Europe, at least,
leadership is informed by the institution of religion insofar as Christianity functions to
9
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encode the processes of meaning-making. As such leadership as meaning-making activity
is subject to the same rivalry and violence embedded in the misreading of the Christian
Gospel described by Girard.
A theory which suggests a path for the development of leaders toward using
charisma to make meaning in ways that are less violent is essential at all levels of social
complexity. Unfortunately, pacific leaders on the organizational level will be inhibited by
the lack of pacific patterns allowed within a particular organization’s institutional
framework. Likewise, the institutional framework is unlikely to have the capacity for
such patterns if the society is incapable of legitimating such ways of interacting.
Developed leadership, then, at the societal, institutional and organizational levels is
important to effect the mutual transformation of institutions and organizations as well as
that of institutions and society.
Developmental theories focus primarily on the personal, interpersonal and,
increasingly, on the organizational level. But few, if any, have answered the call of The
Good Society to examine institutional development in a way that effects changes at the
societal level.10 To that end, I propose to use this framework to create a theory of how
leadership development can effect the growth of social institutions.
In chapter six, I will construct such a theory on the basis of the developmental
work done by Brian Hall by reading his leadership styles in light of the relationship
Girard establishes between religion and violence. In so doing, I will illustrate that most of
Hall’s leadership styles exhibit some degree of violence in the way they deploy energy
and use power to synthesize the normative and the ontological. In fact my argument will
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demonstrate alignment between the leadership styles and the violent Christian myth that
Girard exposes. Girard’s call for a transformative re-reading of the Gospel narrative is
embodied in only the two most developed of Hall’s seven leadership styles.

Thermodynamics of Culture and Leadership
While Hall’s work deals primarily with organizational leaders, my examination of
Hall’s theories in light of Girard’s framework is an inquiry about leadership in general.
So how do leaders effect society beyond the group they lead? This requires a re-thinking
of the way the levels of social complexity represented within the Moral Meaning Matrix
relate to one another. In chapter seven, I will look at the simultaneous interconnectedness
of multiple levels of social complexity using the emerging ideas of chaos, network, and
complexity theories. These theories open up the Moral Meaning Matrix into a more fluid
and evolving framework that belies its rigid structural representation. The fluidity, I will
demonstrate, is more in keeping with the actual ways signification processes change and
adapt over time thereby converting the Moral Meaning Matrix from a descriptive model
demonstrating the various relationships among components of signification processes
into a model of a dynamic learning system. Theologian Richard Voyles’s adaptation of
halacha or Jewish Law to a Christian context offers a paradigm for understanding the
importance of the contextual and ontological portions of the matrix as entry ways for new
data that will be synthesized as meaningful at various levels of social complexity.
The interjection of chaos, network, and complexity theories will reveal more than
a contrast between a structural model and a dynamic model. More importantly it
illuminates the difference between leadership models which deploy energy as if social
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systems are closed and insulated from external influences and leadership models which
tap into a freely available energy that Mark Taylor terms negentropy. The latter approach
openly embraces new experiences and relationships for the sake of constantly reforming
and re-shaping signification processes. This contrast will give us the language to speak in
developmental terms about something as large and amorphous as a social institution.
Comprehending social institutions as learning systems suggests that social institutions
grow and learn as well as regress and retrench. My analysis will show that the
disintegration of Bellah et al.’s social institutions and particularly the diminution of
religion and education relative to the market economy and the state cause the institution
of religion, which encodes signification mechanisms for societies, to regress, at least in
the United States. This regression subsequently encodes less and less developed modes of
signification which ultimately privilege past meanings made over new information, new
data, and new meanings. This developmentally regressive cycle, complexity theory
demonstrates, can feed on itself until the system fails altogether, exhausting all past
meanings, creating a real sense of meaninglessness for entire societies. Mapping the
developmental regression in Girard’s terms, the modes of signification become
increasingly violent. The more the sense of meaninglessness is perceived, the more social
institutions will turn to violence to thwart it.
The authors of The Good Society call for “a third democratic transformation…to
renew a serious public conversation and to strengthen the institutions that nurture and
extend it.”11 In light of my analysis, Chapters nine and ten detail what that transformation
might look like. As Bellah at al. indicate:
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We need clear standards to help us regain our environmental health, and
we also need clear standards to regain our institutional health: indeed, we
cannot repair the damaged environment unless we also repair our damaged
social ecology.12
Any set of standards for this transformation that takes my assessment seriously
must be educational in nature. That is it must think of itself as an open learning system,
always changing and adapting, privileging contextual reality over generalized norms in
order to remain vital, progressive and, ultimately, non-violent. The set of standards I
propose reconnects social institutions and provides the tools within which leaders can
grow beyond the mythical constraints of regressive meaning-making systems, in order to
participate in the creation of new signification processes. I argue for a new way to think
about culture generally and cultures specifically and a way to understand how persons
and groups of persons create, sustain and transmit those cultures. More than that, it is a
way to de-alienate persons from the signification processes in which they participate but
which they often see as reified factuality acting upon them. The re-enfranchised actors
who take responsibility for these constantly reforming meaning-making processes are, by
definition, leaders of a very specific type. They are cultural leaders.

institutional framework of the such a democratic transformation might look like. The first two democratic
transformations refer to the democratization of the Greek city-states and the assertion and protection of
individual rights in the US republic respectively.
12
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CHAPTER ONE
RELIGION, CULTURES, AND MEANING

On the heels of the attacks of September 11, 2001, Edward Said, in The Nation,
excoriated the seemingly prescient thesis put forward five years prior by Samuel
Huntington in The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order that religion
plays a role in creating and delineating emerging lines of demarcation among broad
transnational entities, which Huntington describes as civilizations.13 While nation-states
persist in shaping civilizations, conflict between or among geographically defined
political jurisdictions is less of a concern for Huntington than the divisions and wars that
occur between and among these larger global factions which are held together by
significant internally coherent affinities.
A civilization is the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest
level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes
humans from other species. It is defined by common objective elements,
such as language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the
subjective self-identification of people.14
Huntington identifies six and possibly seven “major contemporary civilizations:” Sinic,
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Japanese, Hindu, Islamic, Western, Latin American, and African (possibly).15 “Religion
is a central defining characteristic of civilizations….Of [social theorist Max] Weber’s
five ‘world religions,’ four – Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and Confucianism – are
associated with major civilizations.”16 The centrality of religion for civilizations is not
inconsequential for the divisions which distinguish one civilization from another,
especially when a division escalates to the level of violent conflict.
In the course of war, multiple identities fade and the identity most
meaningful in relation to the conflict comes to dominate. That identity
almost always is defined by religion. Psychologically, religion provides
the most reassuring and supportive justification for struggle against
“godless” forces which are seen as threatening. Practically, its religious or
civilizational community is the broadest community to which the local
group involved in the conflict can appeal for support. If in a local war
between two African tribes, one tribe can define itself as Muslim and the
other as Christian, the former can hope to be bolstered by Saudi money,
Afghan mujahedeen, and Iranian weapons and military advisers, while the
latter can look for Western economic and humanitarian aid and political
and diplomatic support from Western governments.17
For Huntington, then, religion is the most meaningful identity in global groupings
defined by what he terms cultural identity. Said rebuffs Huntington for using overly
broad categories to describe millions of people with complex and intertwined histories in
monolithic terms for the sake of drawing convenient distinctions or, more insidiously as
Said and others would argue, for the sake of naming and identifying post cold-war
15
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enemies only to shore up or preserve an artificially constructed identity labeled
“Western.”18 Yet even in his critique, Said demonstrates at least part of Huntington’s
thesis as he retreats to the ease of generalities himself when distinguishing between
Westerners and Muslims and when discussing conflicts among Muslims, Christians and
Jews:
There is still no decent history or demystification of the many-sided
contest among these three followers—not one of them by any means a
monolithic, unified camp—of the most jealous of all gods, even though
the bloody modern convergence on Palestine furnishes a rich secular
instance of what has been so tragically irreconcilable about them.19
In a 1993 article which pre-dates Said’s criticism of 2001, Huntington challenges
his critics to explain the complexity of global relations in a world without competing
superpowers. He rejects as unreal a “one-world paradigm that a universal civilization
now exists or is likely to exist in the coming years” because there is no centralized
universal power. Likewise he dismisses the suggestion that states be regarded as
controlling civilizations. Lacking an alternative to belonging to spheres of influence
during the cold war, states are increasingly identifying with civilizations - not the other
way around, according to Huntington.20 Huntington defends his position with an
emphasis on religion as key to forming the cultural identity which links transnational
civilizations. “What ultimately counts for people is not political ideology or economic
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interest. Faith and family, blood and belief, are what people identify with and what they
will fight and die for.”21
Such an identity is powerful so its nature needs to be better understood. What,
then, would make a religious identity a cultural identity, and what would make such an
identity meaningful to individuals and to large groups? To pursue these questions about
culture and meaning, I turn to cultural anthropologist Clifford Geertz in The
Interpretation of Cultures. Culture, for Geertz is “an historically transmitted pattern of
meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic
forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge
about and attitudes toward life.”22 Geertz’s understanding of culture is a “semiotic one.
Believing with Max Weber, that man is an animal suspended in webs of significance that
he himself has spun, [Geertz takes] culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be
therefore not an experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one in search of
meaning.”23

The Search for Meaning
Cultures are webs of significance and the analysis of cultures is a search for
meaning. If cultures, as Huntington suggests, can both transcend nationalities and divide
persons from one another within nations, then cultures must exist at various levels of
social complexity from interpersonal relationships to Huntington’s global civilizations.
Therefore my analysis of cultures, that is the search for meaning, must take place intimate
and broad scales alike. It will start with the former and move to the latter. For a look at
21
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cultures on the interpersonal scale, I turn to the work of psychiatrist Viktor Frankl, in his
aptly titled book Man’s Search for Meaning, which chronicles his experiences as a
prisoner in Nazi concentration camps for three years and articulates his resultant theory,
which he calls logotherapy.24 His account and reflection give detail to the search for
meaning, and thereby contribute to a richer understanding of the project of cultural
analysis and of culture itself. Although his book is highly personal in nature, I will break
down his search for meaning as a process that I will later apply to broader cultural scales
as well.
In reflecting on his own experiences and in his observations of others during and
beyond those three years, Frankl suggests that “three phases of an inmate’s reaction to
camp life become apparent: the period following his admission; the period when he is
well-entrenched in camp routine and the period following his release and liberation.”25
For each phase, Frankl identifies a characteristic “symptom.”26 The symptom of the first
phase is shock; the second, apathy, and the third, depersonalization.27
Recounting his arrival at Auschwitz, Frankl describes the hurried set of
instructions he followed and the instantaneous decisions that guards made, which he later
learned literally carried the weight of his fate. He and his fellow inmates suffered from a
sense of delusion, he recalls, that at some point they would gain reprieve and be
reacquainted with their lives which had been so starkly interrupted. His delusion came to
an end when he realized that he would have to surrender the manuscript of his book,
which he had smuggled into the camp at great risk. The shock of the first phase, perhaps,
24
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is the surprise at how quickly a person can be dissociated from any semblance of life as
he or she knew it, but perhaps more profoundly, the astonishment comes at the value of
what is left even when everything else was gone. After the relief of verifying that the
showerheads in the buildings to which he was initially led dripped water and did not
effuse deadly gas, Frankl took note of his and his fellow inmates’ crowded surroundings
as well as of his own quickly and profoundly altered state, physically and existentially:
While we were waiting for the shower, our nakedness was brought home
to us: we really had nothing except our bare bodies-even minus hair; all
we possessed, literally, was our naked existence. What else remained for
us as a material link with our former lives? For me there were my glasses
and my belt; the latter I had to exchange later for a piece of bread.28
Frankl’s first phase, characterized by shock, delineates in stark terms the disruption of
status quo for an individual or for entire classes of persons at once.
Soon horror at the horrors of the camps gave way to the emotional blunting of the
second phase. No longer surprised or even moved enough by the incessant and
unjustifiable scourges of fellow inmates, for instance, the prisoners, and Frankl among
them, began giving over their lives to the fate which seemed to control them. Focused on
survival, they were content to surrender any responsibility for decision-making or the
consequences of their actions and let destiny takes its course. Frankl discloses that toward
that end, he answered all questions posed of him truthfully, not knowing how to outwit
the system to survive one moment to the next. Whatever the consequences of his
responses may have been, he was prepared to endure them.29
The apathy was deepened by a sense that people were no longer people but
numbers. Names, professions, and even states of health became unimportant as
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accountant-like guards and privileged inmates were only concerned with the numbers of
prisoners being transported from one place to the next, for instance, and whether or not
the prisoners’ assigned numbers matched the specific numbers on the accompanying
manifest.30
The lack of personal responsibility, primal self-preservation, and dehumanization
compounded the apathy into an utter disregard for self and others. As Frankl discovered,
he narrowly escaped the consequences of such a profound lack of feeling.
Months after, after liberation, I met a friend from the old camp. He related
to me how he, as camp policeman, had searched for a piece of human flesh
that was missing from a pile of corpses. He confiscated it from a pot in
which he found it cooking. Cannibalism had broken out. I had left just in
time.31
Frankl’s second phase, marked by apathy, demonstrates the consequences of a cultivated
lack of feeling. He attributes the insensitivity to the survival instinct of the prisoners. It
was, he contends, “a very necessary protective shell.”32
Liberation, Frankl’s third phase, constituted a separation of a different sort. A
reversal of the excision from society made in the first phase, the day the camp gates
opened, thousands of prisoners (re-)entered yet another wholly unfamiliar environment.
As Frankl noted about his and his fellow prisoners’ first unforced steps beyond the
fences, “We did not yet belong to this world.”33 Comparing the release of the “mental
pressure” of incarceration to the ascension of caisson workers whose bodies undergo
enormous changes upon returning to the surface too quickly, Frankl suggests that rapid
attempts to acclimate to the outside world could cause the psychological equivalent of the
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“bends.”34 Such rapid release of pressure caused a “moral deformity” in some who
wished to oppress others in the way they had been oppressed as well as bitterness and
disillusionment.35 The disillusionment was both the cause and the symptom of the
depersonalization. Dreams had served a specific anesthetizing role in camp. Now the
dreams-come-true were difficult to grasp.
“Freedom”- we repeated to ourselves, and yet we could not grasp it. We
had said this word so often during all the years we dreamed about it, that it
had lost its meaning. Its reality did not penetrate into our consciousness;
we could not grasp the fact that freedom was ours.
Lack of belief that a dream was real was less injurious than the reverse, discovering that a
dream would never come true.
When we spoke about attempts to give a man in camp mental courage, we
said that he had to be shown something to look forward to in the
future….Woe to him who found that the person whose memory had given
him courage in camp did not exist any more! Woe to him who, when the
day of his dreams came, found it so different than all he had longed for!36
Depersonalization, the symptom of the third phase, consists of a lack of continuity
between one’s dreams and reality. Whether unable to distinguish reality from dream or
confronted with the dissonance between reality and dream, the lack of continuity between
the two makes dreams in this phase deceptive.
From naked existence to cannibalism to deceptive dreams, Frankl chronicles the
bleak psychological journey he and millions of other camp prisoners endured. Yet his
book and my analysis are about the search for meaning, and Frankl provides a path for
discovering personal meaning even in these most primal of circumstances. But the
personal process is applicable to larger scales. Peter Berger theorizes about meaning and
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religion on a broader societal scale. Reading Frankl’s journey in light of the work Peter
Berger has done on how entire societies make meaning begins to show the similarities
between personal and collective meaning-making processes.

Naked Existence
Not only was Frankl standing unclothed in the bath house with other prisoners, in
Berger’s terms Frankl’s abrupt removal from the world he had come to know and help
create likely created another sense of profound vulnerability. He argues,
To be separated from society exposes the individual to a multiplicity of
dangers with which he is unable to cope by himself, in the extreme case to
the danger of imminent extinction. Separation from society also inflicts
unbearable psychological tensions upon the individual, tensions that are
grounded in the root anthropological fact of sociality. The ultimate danger
of such separation, however, is the danger of meaninglessness.37
Berger, who draws on both Max Weber and Emile Durkheim to describe
explicitly the relationships among religion, society, and meaning-making, understands
society as “the guardian of order and meaning.”38 It establishes what Berger terms a
“nomos” that creates and secures this sense of order and meaning. The separation from,
or the breakdown of, the nomos results in what Berger refers to, in an Anglicization of
Durkheim’s term, as “anomy.”39 The prisoners’ abrupt confrontation of their naked
existence and the shock they experienced at the senseless acts of power and brutality they
witnessed correspond to Berger’s appropriation of the concept of “anomic terror.”
Anomy is unbearable to the point where the individual may seek death in
preference to it. Conversely, existence within the anomic world may be
sought at the cost of all sorts of sacrifice and suffering-and even the cost
37

Peter L. Berger, The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion (New York: Anchor
Books, 1967, 1969, 1990), 22.
38
Ibid., 21.
39
Ibid., 21.

26
of life itself, if the individual believes that this ultimate sacrifice has
nomic significance.40
Even Frankl, who contemplated suicide along with his fellow inmates, understood
the preference of death over life. He chose not to “run into the wire” of the electrified
fence not because it was not preferable but because there was no “point” in it – no
meaning. He calculated the odds, and he was just as likely to be spared the trouble of
committing suicide by the rate at which prisoners were dying or being killed anyway.41

Cannibalism
Humans will fight anomy, according to Berger. In fact this is the genesis of
society, which he describes as a human product that acts back on its producer.42 In the
face of anomic terror and, especially in the cases in which the persons experiencing such
terror have very little perceived or actual control such as in the concentration camps,
humans will create social constructs which enable them to deny or disclaim their
participation in that very social construction. The dialectical relationship between human
being and society is denied. The world is seen as objective fact acting on the individual.43
This process, “whereby the dialectical relationship between the individual and his world
is lost to consciousness” is “alienation.”44
In the stark realties of the concentration camp, one could argue that the inmates
had very little role in or responsibility for the world around them. In fact, this was very
much the case. Others created the environment into which these persons found
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themselves involuntarily thrust. However, even Frankl acknowledges a sense of agency
over small matters with consequences of significance. One such story contrasts one
prisoner-cook with others:
He was the only cook who did not look at the men whose bowls he was
filling; the only cook who dealt out the soup equally, regardless of
recipient, and who did not make favorites of his personal friends and
countrymen, picking out the potatoes for them, while the others got watery
soup skimmed from the top.45
Even given the facts which were beyond their control, the prisoners still participated in
creating a world within a world. Reaction to the realities with which they were
confronted was in fact their participation in social construction.
Nevertheless, Frankl’s description of the second phase of camp life is rich with
description of fate taking its course and of prisoners allowing it to do so. Frankl himself
refused to try to interject his own agency, choice, or preferences into the mix of variables
which could, from day to day, determine whether he lived or died. This surrender to a
force greater than oneself and beyond one’s control caused Frankl and others to lose
emotion as well as any sense of culpability for the horrors that surrounded them or in
which they participated. He reports,
After [a typhus patient] had just died, I watched without any emotional
upset the scene that followed, which was repeated over and over again
with each death. One by one the prisoners approached the still warm body.
One grabbed the remains of a messy meal of potatoes; another decided
that the corpse’s wooden shoes were an improvement over his own, and
exchanged them. A third man did the same with the dead man’s coat, and
another was glad to be able to secure some-just imagine-genuine string.46
Beyond alienation, the perfunctory approach to one’s actions and the moral decay,
which Frankl observed at its depth in the account of cannibalism can also be attributed to
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what Berger terms “bad faith.”47 This is a disruption of personal awareness of the
dialectical tension, not with the outside world, but with the inside world, the social
realities which the actor had, over time, internalized. So a prisoner or any person for that
matter, experiencing both alienation and bad faith is isolated by a “false consciousness”
from society and socialization.48 Berger illustrates this isolation with the observation that
“the faithful executioner may tell himself that he has ‘no choice’ but to follow the
‘program’ of head-chopping, suppressing both emotional and moral inhibitions
(compassion and scruples say) to this course of action, which he posits as inexorable
necessity for himself qua executioner.”49 In the alienated/bad faith world of the apathetic
second phase of camp life, cannibalism is a possibility, perhaps one even legitimated by a
provisional social order in which the social actors are able to distance themselves from
their roles in world-creation and from their socialized selves.

Deceptive Dreaming
The distancing from roles of the prisoners’ lives in the world joined another
distancing – a distancing from the role of the world in their lives. In part attributable to
the task of enduring the plight of a concentration camp prisoner, Frankl emphasized the
importance of the freedom of the imagination,
I did not know whether my wife was alive, and I had no means of finding
out…but at that moment [while digging a ditch under duress in frozen
soil] it ceased to matter. There was no need for me to know; nothing could
touch the strength of my love, my thoughts, and the image of my beloved.
Had I known then that my wife was dead, I think that I would still have
given myself, undisturbed by that knowledge, to the contemplation of her
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image, and that my mental conversation with her would have been just as
vivid and just as satisfying.50
The deception of the dream was useful to at least distract Frankl from the harsh realities
he faced. Even the deceptive quality of the content of the dream itself, if known, would
not have interrupted the efficacy of the dream. The deception was intentional, and the
illusory was preferable to the real. Upon liberation, the dream world which had replaced
or become contiguous with reality confronted reality for which the dream’s service was
no longer needed or no longer effective. Again moving from one social reality to another,
the released prisoners experienced an anomic situation. Dreary as it was, camp life had
formed its own nomos, in Berger’s terms. And now that that nomos was disrupted by
liberation; the inmates experienced anomy once again.
The dreams were temporarily contiguous with reality in prison, because they had
been reality – a reality socially constructed by each prisoner individually and the
prisoners collectively. Their false consciousness – bad faith and alienation – was exposed
upon release. The alienated bad faith which served to stave off the previously
encountered anomy was no longer sufficient to comprehend the new world, but perhaps
for the first time its usefulness could be fully understood as an artifact of camp life.
Such alienation can be a most effective barrier against anomy. Once the
false unity of the self is established, and as long as it remains plausible, it
is likely to be a source of inner strength. Ambivalences are removed.
Contingencies become certainties. There is no more hesitation between
alternative possibilities of conduct. The individual “knows who he is”- a
psychologically most satisfactory condition…the individual who seeks to
divest himself of bad faith institutionalized in his situation in society is
likely to suffer psychologically and in his “conscience” quite apart from
the external difficulties he will probably encounter as a result of such
“unprogrammed” ventures.51
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Frankl’s stages, which I have named Naked Existence, Cannibalism, and
Deceptive Dreaming, are characterized by the symptoms, in his terms, of shock, apathy,
and depersonalization respectively. Berger’s social analysis explains the root cause of
these symptoms as anomy, alienation, and bad faith respectively.

The Making of Meaning
Having named Frankl’s stages, their symptoms, and their root causes, I will now
turn to the project of examining meaning making in each stage, respectively, in order to
gain purchase on the nature of signification processes generally. Each of Frankl’s stages
presented a different challenge to Frankl and his fellow inmates as they struggled with
what Frankl identifies as a human’s “primary motivation,” that is “a search for
meaning.”52 The shock of naked existence resulted from the anomy of the prisoners being
dislodged from a social existence in which they were able to make sense of the conditions
of most realities which they had previously encountered. The current situation, most
dramatically illustrated by the initial shower in the camp, had no referent in social sensemaking. The situation was so radically different from anything the prisoners had
experienced before, there was no way to comprehend what was going on. The reality,
which the soldiers imposed on the prisoners, was so different than what any of the
prisoners thought life ought to be that many, in shock, denied the reality of the reality.
Clinging to his latest written volume, Frankl did the same. It was not until Frankl realized
how out of place his book was and how life-threatening his possession of it was, that he
truly accepted the new reality in which he found himself. And it was not until he
awakened to the harshness of his new reality that he was able to begin making meaning
52
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again. He held onto and hid his book in the shower, a meaningless act. His notion of what
ought to be was located in a past life, a society that was not operative in the prison camp.
His choice, then, was to deny the new reality, his new existence, or his new is, in Geertz’s
terms, in favor of living as if the former ought would never permit such an existence, or
to accept that his new life, his new is was so different that making sense of it in terms of
his old life was impossible.53
Meaninglessness in the Naked Existence stage of Frankl’s journey emerged from
an inability to accept the new reality. Meaning came with an acceptance of the new life.
Frankl and the prisoners who found meaning resisted the temptation to equate the
thought, “this shouldn’t be” with “this isn’t really happening.” Meaning was found in
recognizing that something that should not be happening truly was happening. While the
is and the ought of Frankl’s new life and his old society were in conflict, meaning came
from identifying the tension, the very strained tension between his is and his ought.
Meaninglessness would have persisted had he failed to clearly identify the
incompatibility of the two by denying the reality of his new reality. So the anomy of
Naked Existence is made meaningful by an acknowledgement of the tension between the
is and the ought and by accepting the new is as real.
The interplay between the is and the ought is of interest for meaning-making in
understanding the alienation of the apathetic Cannibalism stage as well. In Naked
Existence, prisoners were more acquainted with old norms than new realities and the
temptation was to deny the new realities. After the reality of camp life set in,
comprehension of old norms began to fade away. In fact, for most prisoners, norms
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altogether evaporated. There was no ought by which to judge any particular is. Behavior
was driven by a survival instinct that eventually had very little regard for the dignity of
other persons. With no ought to counterbalance or make sense of the is, life was
meaningless.
Meaning-making in the Cannibalism stage emerged for Frankl and/or for the cook
in the story of the ethic of soup-serving. Whether or not the cook actually had developed
and followed an ethic of fairness in the way he did not favor his friends with more than
just the watery portions, we do not really know. He could have just been suffering from
apathy in the extreme – not even caring about his friends and countrymen. In some ways,
however, the cook’s disposition is irrelevant. The fact that Frankl imputed upon the
cook’s actions a value of fairness indicates that at least Frankl had begun to develop, or
had managed to adapt, a normative referent that helped camp life make sense. In other
words, after all norms were stripped in the Naked Existence stage, meaning could only
re-emerge as prisoners were able to reconstruct camp norms, that is some relevant ought
with which to hold their awful is in tension. By so doing, Frankl and the other prisoners
who managed to make meaning resisted the pervasive alienation by reclaiming
responsibility for their behavior and their sense-making processes. They did not abdicate
the power of social construction to their captors but retained it, at least to some degree,
for themselves.
This kind of norm-referencing behavior matured over time in the camp. In fact it
outgrew the reality in which the prisoners found themselves. It did so in the stage and the
process I refer to as Deceptive Dreaming. For the prisoners, alienated from the collective
process of shared meaning-making, personal dreams and illusions served in place of a
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shared set of values or ethics. Meaninglessness was derived in the Naked Existence stage
by a discontinuity between the present is and the past ought. Meaninglessness in the
Cannibalism stage resulted in a discontinuity between the present is and the (nonexistent) present ought. The Deceptive Dreaming stage created a future ought that was
incongruous with the new (liberated) is.
Deceptive Dreaming seemed, in Frankl’s account, serviceable for survival right
up until the camp gates opened for the final time. Upon re-entry into the outside world
the dreams dreamed by the prisoners were tested against the unexpectedly harsh realities
of the return to non-prison life. When daydreams and illusions failed to stand up to the
veracity of outside life, meaninglessness set in from a different direction. This time, the
prisoners, lost in their imaginations, were almost entirely influenced by a necessarily
well-developed ought or ideal (even if imagined) state of affairs that allowed them to
deny or ignore the harshness of the camp-life is. When confronted with a new reality, the
prisoners were simultaneously challenged by the uselessness and irrelevance of their
personal concept of what life ought to be like. Clinging to that ought, in fact, was
damaging. So meaninglessness upon release came as a result of being consumed by an
ought that was in no way relevant to the current is. In many ways, it was the same
phenomenon of Naked Existence, in that the provisional nomos of camp life was
inadequate to make sense of life outside the fences of the prison. In Naked Existence,
however, the nomos that Frankl and the others left at the door of the shower was the
collectively-constructed nomos of a society many shared. The dreams of freedom
prisoners carried with them beyond the gates were highly personalized illusions that
served as much to deny reality as make sense of it. To remain lost in such dreams would
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have been to remain anesthetized to life. What was needed for the re-establishment of
personal and collective meaning was a shedding of the bad faith, a rejection of alienation,
and a re-engagement in the collective work of producing shared norms in a post-war
recovering society.
The shock of anomy produced the meaninglessness of Naked Existence by
dissociating society’s ought from the camp life is. Meaning making resulted from
acceptance of the new is and seeing the radical discontinuity between it and everything
the new prisoners knew to be normal. Acceptance of the is and forgetting one’s role and
responsibility for meaning making led to the apathy of Cannibalism which thwarted
meaning making by failing to provide an adequate ought with which to make sense of the
is. Finally, the Deceptive Dreaming produced a sense of depersonalization as privately
constructed oughts, created in bad faith to cope with harsh prison life, were tested against
shared meaning-making processes beyond the camp walls. Meaning re-emerged for those
able to discard the personal illusions and re-engage the public process of meaningmaking in society. Whether an ought was in need of an is, an is in need of an ought, or a
private ought was in need of a shared ought, meaninglessness resulted from the
dissociation of the ought and the is, and meaning was found only when the tension
between the two was enlivened and engaged. Frankl’s search for meaning was a search
for different components of society-making at different times. In times when he was
stripped of social moorings, meaning-making became more of a private act. As he
integrated and re-integrated into camp life and Austrian life respectively, he located that
meaning-making process in the context of shared norms. In Berger’s terms, society-
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creation is a shared act and Frankl’s dislocation from shared sociality created the various
levels of private angst discussed above.
However, whether on a private scale or shared scale, it was always a search for
reconciling reality with a set of norms that could make sense of that reality, and it was a
search for a reality that could give life to and ground a relevant set of norms as well. If
successful in the quest, the search for meaning creates a vibrant tension between reality
as experienced and shared norms. It seeks a dialectical tension between and synthesis of
the is and the ought on a continuum, marked in Frankl’s case and Berger’s analysis of
private and shared meaning respectively.
Frankl and Berger bear out Geertz’s description of meaning-making process as
the synthesis of the “is” and the “ought.” In Geertz’s terms, the meanings resulting from
those syntheses, to the extent that those meanings are shared, constitute cultures which
pattern and transmit those meanings. In Huntington’s terms civilizations are cultural, that
is transnational groups that make meaning together. They make sense of the way things
are relative to the way things ought to be in similar and shared ways. Religion,
Huntington claims, offers the common identity that unites the signification processes.
Religious identity is powerful enough, apparently, to unite meaning-making processes
across geographic boundaries and to disrupt other commonalities that, say, warring
factions might otherwise share. Differences in the way religions offer meaning to large
groups seem significant enough to defend with life and impose with murder.
From Frankl to Huntington, the same process of making - apparently very
precious - meaning obtains. The meanings made constitute cultures on large and small
scales to the extent the meanings are shared. Religion causes those cultural meanings to
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cohere, even across global expanses. To understand why and how that occurs, I must first
establish a model through which to understand the link between the personal and the
global, so I will probe in further detail how cultures are scalable and therefore how the
synthesis of the is and the ought occurs at various levels of social complexity. Further, I
will examine what the implications of that scalable mechanism are for the willingness of
human beings to advance and defend with violence one version of meaningful life over
another.

CHAPTER TWO
MEANING, POWER, AND VIOLENCE

As Frankl, Berger, and Geertz demonstrate, meaning is found in the synthesis of
the is and the ought, i.e. the ontological and the normative.54 While Frankl offers insight
into meaning making on a personal level, Berger’s analysis begins to show the
implications of the search for and creation of meaning on a societal level as well. More
complex than persons and less complex than an entire society is the organization. I turn
now to this intermediate level and examine an organizational crisis of meaning-making
which is analogous to, but not equal in severity to, Frankl’s crisis. Nevertheless, this
crisis offers additional insight into meaning making on an intermediate level of social
complexity. I look at an organizational crisis, however, not so much to ask a question
about how organizations mean, but rather to ask a more fundamental question. Namely,
upon what sources do organizations draw when making sense of reality? I will suggest
that social institutions are influential on organizational meaning making. This particular
organizational crisis offers a window into the signification processes of the more socially
complex level of institutions as well as into the specific meaning-making processes of the
persons and groups of persons within or related to the organization itself. As a window
into more and less complex levels of society (institutions and persons), this example
gives me the analytical language to elaborate Geertz’s model of meaning making or
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culture creation on at least three levels of social complexity and to explicate how culture
creation occurs on large and small scales. Once I establish a vocabulary for discussing
culture-creation processes at various levels of social complexity, I will be able to examine
the appropriation of energy at those various levels, energy that fuels the culture-creation
process. Understanding how energy is appropriated as power for culture formation will
provide a framework to begin discussing the connection between culture creation and
violence in greater detail. In subsequent chapters, I will examine the role of social
institutions in preserving and transmitting the link between violence and culture creation,
so this present investigation into institutional meaning making is foundational.

Institutional Moral Meaning
Can social institutions participate in the meaning-making process described by
Frankl, Berger, and Geertz? What would it mean to say “Institutions mean?” The authors
of The Good Society define institution as “a pattern of expected actions of individuals or
groups enforced by social sanction, both positive and negative.”55 When activities are
organized or patterned they can be made to work toward some purpose thereby giving
meaning to the pattern as well as to each activity. When or if the activities are organized
simply for their own sake or for the sake of the pattern, the activities, although
institutionalized, are meaning-less unless of course they derive some meaning
intrinsically or extrinsically - perhaps from some other institutions of which they may
simultaneously be a part. So to say that one of the things that institutions do is to mean, is
to say that institutions are capable of organizing activity for purposes greater than
themselves. To the extent that the purposes of institutions can be characterized
55
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normatively, that meaning is moral in nature. The term, moral, is not a normative
assessment of institutions generally or an institution particularly. That is, I do not mean
that one institution is qualitatively right and another wrong – moral or immoral. Rather
the influence institutions have on the lives of persons is moral in nature. That is they
convey a set of socially-constructed norms and standards that help form character and
expectations about what is right and what is wrong. As Bellah at al. clarify,
Institutions are patterns of social activity that give shape to collective and
individual experience. An institution is a complex whole that guides and
sustains individual identity, as a family gives sense and purpose to the
lives of its members, enabling them to realize themselves as spouses,
parents, and children. Institutions form individuals by making possible or
impossible certain ways of behaving and relating to others. They shape
character by assigning responsibility, demanding accountability, and
providing the standards in terms of which each person recognizes the
excellence of his or her achievements.56
Institutions must claim or define and continually reclaim or redefine their
purposes so as not to lose moral meaning. Institutions themselves are abstractions and
they exist insofar as their activities are real and their patterns are perceived by and
embodied in actors. The inter-action of actors, then, creates and re-creates the institution.
Once actors have created an institution, the institution then can act back upon the actors
who, in the first place, gave the institution the wherewithal to enforce sanctions. As
Bellah et al. argue,
In short, we are not self-created atoms manipulating or being manipulated
by objective institutions. We form institutions and they form us every time
we engage in a conversation that matters, and certainly every time we act
as a parent or child, student or teacher, citizen or official, in each case
calling on models and metaphors for the rightness or wrongness of action.
Institutions are not only constraining but enabling. They are the substantial
forms through which we understand our own identity and the identity of
others as we seek cooperatively to achieve a decent society.57
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Actors are not necessarily limited to navigating the context of only one institution.
In fact the division of labor has created an institutionally differentiated modern society in
which actors often navigate the contexts of more than one institution. Because actors
navigate more than one institutional context they develop over time an understanding of
how various institutions pattern activity, enforce sanctions, and mean.
While this free movement between and among various institutional contexts lines
is inevitable and provides rich resources for making meaning, there is a risk to navigating
multiple meaning-making contexts. Emile Durkheim described that risk when he
observed that the increased fragmentation of society that coincides with an increased
division of labor. Without a moral glue, he suggests, to hold the fabric of society together
he feared it would deteriorate into a highly fragmented anomic culture. What Durkheim
called organic solidarity, which he initially hypothesized would arise spontaneously from
an increasingly complex economic order once the actors realized their fundamental
interdependence with one another, would be that glue.58
With that understanding in mind, it easy to comprehend how individuals can
move between and among various institutions coherently. But what happens when that
glue does not hold or does not spontaneously arise?59 What happens when understanding
turns into con-fusion, i.e., two or more moral understandings fused with one another?
Extrapolating Durkheim’s argument in light of Berger’s process of the social construction
of reality leads to the conclusion that in the case of the confusion described above, actors
are no longer able to discern one institutional context from another and thereby no longer
know what activity to expect of themselves or others. They become alienated from
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conscious participation in and thereby the re-creation of the institution and also from the
understanding of the purpose of the activity patterning. That is they become alienated
from the meaning.
If enough actors have fused understandings of otherwise differentiated
institutional contexts and act therefore in a confused manner within any given institution,
then the institution itself, which after all is a socially constructed product of the confused
activity and disintegrating expectations, begins to lose patterning, and it dissociates from
its original meaning or from meaning altogether.
In Habits of the Heart, Robert Bellah and his co-authors discuss the moral
confusion that makes it difficult for individuals to relate themselves to one another and to
institutions. Indeed the authors of Habits found not only a growing distance between
individuals and between social classes but they also noted a tendency to overlook that
growing disparity by using a moral language that occluded the problem of modernization
presenting problems with which individuals, alone and collectively, had to deal, and the
primary tool at their disposal was the understanding of the individual as the actor of
primary concern. The individual understood himself or herself as atomized and unrelated
in any meaningful way to the other actors around him or her.60
Habits of the Heart diagnosed the gulf between atomized individuals and larger
social bonds or patterns, and The Good Society attempts to offer a way forward, a
theoretical model for understanding individuals as fundamentally connected in and
through social institutions. The authors describe the symptoms of the gulf between
individuals and social institutions as a “malaise [which] is palpable: a loss of meaning in
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the family and job, a distrust of politics, [and] a disillusion with organized religion.”61 Is
this evidence of the disintegration that Durkheim feared? If so, the salvation from this
disintegration is a new moral paradigm that can act as the glue which holds together this
highly divided and diverse culture. That paradigm, claim the authors of The Good
Society, is one of “cultivation.”62 It should replace the current moral paradigm available
to most individuals and institutions, namely an inherited transmission of Lockean
individualism.
The Good Society develops the need for a new paradigm by looking at four central
institutions against the backdrop of this pervasive moral paradigm of individualism, the
progress of modernity, the concomitant division of labor, and the peculiar circumstances
of United States history. The four institutions are, in the authors’ terms, Education, the
Political Economy, Government, Law, and Politics, and The Public Church.
In Habits of the Heart, the authors show the pervasiveness of individualism, both
utilitarian and expressive in the formation of self-understanding.63 In The Good Society,
they parlay that understanding into a diagnosis of the problem leading to a crisis in the
relationship between individuals and institutions, stating that
the culture of individualism makes the very idea of institutions inaccessible to
many of us…Americans often think of individuals as pitted against institutions. It
is hard for us to think of institutions as affording us the necessary context within
which we become individuals; of institutions as not just restraining but enabling
us; of institutions not as an arena where our character is tested but an
indispensable source from which character is formed.64
The inability to understand the role of institutions and the relationships between
institutions and self creates a crisis of meaning or moral confusion, hampering
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individuals’ quests to make sense of their lives. When something goes wrong, it is
interpreted as a failing of the individual or as institutional constraints on individual
liberty. I will now turn to an example of a crisis involving two of the institutions
described above, I will show the role that moral confusion plays in preventing actors
from clearly being able to differentiate between two different social institutions. They
thereby fail to understand the way others involved in the same crisis make meaning in
this context.

Organizational Crisis Raises Institutional Questions
In April of 1997, an employee of Oxford College of Emory University reserved
the Day Prayer Chapel on the Oxford Campus for a wedding.65 When the dean of the
college learned that the reservation was for a wedding of two men, he consulted the
president and general counsel of the university. He asked whether or not the university’s
equal opportunity policy would cover the issue at hand. He was told no.66 His
consultations resulted in his letter to the employee, which, in part, read:
Your request for the use of our facilities for this ceremony has raised weighty
questions for this institution to consider. You must know that unions between
persons of the same gender are not recognized by the United Methodist Church67
as holy marriages, they are not given legal status as marriages in this state and are
uncommon in our local community and on this campus. To break with
convention on this sensitive matter by permitting this ceremony to occur would
require much conversation, engaging individuals in our community with various
65
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perspectives and ensuring that issues of justice and freedom were considered
alongside of theology and tradition.68
Pending further discussion, the dean refunded the employee’s money and
canceled his reservation for the chapel and the reception hall. The dean felt the need to
act. His choice was between permitting the ceremony to go forward as planned or not.
The dean’s letter recounts his search for a precedent which might inform his activity. He
found none, and he listed the possibilities he had considered. His letter did not evaluate
the employee’s request as absolutely out of order; it simply declared a lack of precedent
thereby highlighting a moral dilemma at the level of practice or activity, i.e., what to do.
The letter even goes further to acknowledge the significance of any activity on the dean’s
part, “I trust that you expect us as an institution to set precedent and policy on important
matters only after due consideration.”69 It also states what would be necessary to permit
the wedding to occur: “I would need to undertake deliberations with others in the College
and the University with an interest in policies governing campus facilities use.”70
It is possible to extract from this letter some necessary ingredients to moral
decision making on the level of practice. I will show that precedent is important to
making decisions about new activity. Think about precedents as being organized into
categories by the actor in question. In this case, the category of marriage between two
men in the context of the United Methodist Church, the law, and on the campus had no
precedent. What would the precedent search have yielded if the operative category was
not wedding or marriage? What if the president and general counsel had indeed advised
the dean to use the category of equal opportunity instead? In the richness of this crisis, we
68
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have the answer to that question when the president, without acknowledging his
conversation to the contrary with the dean, reversed his private position on this point
upon releasing this public statement.
Owing to an unfortunate misunderstanding of the meaning and authority of the
University’s Equal Opportunity Policy (formally adopted by the Board of
Trustees in 1993) a member of the Emory employee community and his partner
were recently denied, inappropriately, the use of a university facility on the
Oxford campus in which they had sought to solemnize their commitment which
they deemed a marital one, to each other.71
In the public statement, the president was, after all, asserting equal opportunity as the
operative category, and the precedents are the various previous usages of facilities by
employees. The idea of a marital ceremony is subordinated as a facilities use within the
category of equal opportunity.
Here we see the importance of category in selecting precedents to bring to bear on
a particular situation. Different categories call upon different precedents and therefore
lead to different outcomes.
Another example of the same type of precedent search is offered by the authors of
The Good Society. They discuss the decision that school district administrators had to
make about whether or not to allow a child with AIDS to attend school in the district. The
question was resolved to allow the child to attend school when they found “the right
metaphor, seeing the child primarily as a human being in need of special compassion
[rather than] primarily as a source of dangerous contamination.”72 What the authors call
“metaphor,” I call category. Both children in need and health threats are metaphors or
categories available in the school district’s vocabulary, but the outcome in this case
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depended upon the choice of one over the other. There were precedents for caring for
children and for isolating health risks. The authors go on to quote Mary Douglas, “’the
most profound decisions about justice are not made by individuals as such but by
individuals thinking within and on behalf of institutions.’”73
Category selection, then, is institutionally prescribed, but wedding is a category
defined by Religion (or Public Church) in the Emory case. It was understood as holy
matrimony as opposed to civil marriage. Equal opportunity is a term borrowed right out
of civil rights legislation or Government/Law/Politics as an institution. How is it that
these two categories were selected for a debate within an educational organization?
Emory was founded by the Methodist Church and is religiously affiliated.
Likewise it exists as a publicly chartered corporation under the laws of the State of
Georgia and thereby the United States. I will draw on organizational theorists to help
understand the relationship between organizations and institutions. DiMaggio and Powell
theorize three mechanisms for what they call institutional isomorphism: coercive
isomorphism, mimetic processes, and normative pressures.74 I will focus on the first as a
potential mechanism for confusing the dialogue at Emory in this case.
“Coercive Isomorphism results from both formal and informal pressures exerted
by other organizations upon which [organizations are] dependent and by cultural
expectations in the society within which organizations function.”75 In this case, the
United Methodist Church has control over the approval of trustees and provides a
relatively significant amount of financial support for Oxford College. Likewise, it could
73

Ibid.
Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, “The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and
Collective Rationality in Organization Fields,” The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis,
Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 67-70.
75
Ibid, 67.
74

47
be argued that founding an organization creates a dependency akin to that between parent
and child. Similarly, the university operates with an extraordinary amount of government
funding for research and must comply with restrictions such as Title IX and procedures
for recording income and expenses.
So, if the university were to appropriate, or indeed incorporate, into its vocabulary
the categories from other institutions, the theory of coercive isomorphism helps explain
why the categories of religious and political/legal institutions might be likely candidates.
However, remember that the individuals involved in making the decisions, the
constituents, internal and external to the university but related to it, also navigate in other
institutional realms as well as religious and political. The ways of operating in those
arenas have, over time, been imported to the arena of education as embodied at Emory.
So, institutions select the categories which order precedents and inform decision
making on the level of practice. Institutions also, however, reflect a worldview beyond
the institution itself. Organizational theorists Roger Friedland and Robert Alford posit
this as one of the principles of their New Institutionalism. “Institutions must be
reconceptualized as simultaneously material and ideal, systems of signs and symbols,
rational and transrational.”76 Clifford Geertz identified the ontological assumptions of a
culture as “worldview.”77 Emory’s president articulated the category of equal opportunity
and a corresponding worldview as mediated through the institution of education and the
institutionalized organization of Emory:
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we endeavor to make Emory a just and good place.
In so doing we recognize that a university is a place within the larger
society that does not seek to purge differences but seeks to live among them. For
that reason, adherence to our policy of equal opportunity is an obligation to be
met by all of us for reasons rising from the very nature of educational aspirations
that ultimately bind us together.78
A resolution proposed by the Bishop’s cabinet of the North Georgia Conference
of the United Methodist Church connected the religious category of wedding within the
context of the church with the Church’s corresponding worldview. In their own terms,
they affirmed “the sanctity of the marriage covenant that is expressed in love, mutual
support, personal commitment, and shared fidelity between a man and a woman.”79
While not as all-encompassing as the worldview articulated by the president, it does offer
an ideal type for marriage and hints at the centrality of covenant in the Christian
understanding of ultimate reality and the conception of Church. But unlike the president’s
remarks, it forgoes linking education in this case as an institution that embodies some
portion of what ultimately exists.
So, in acting, institutional actors draw upon precedents ordered by an appropriate
category prescribed by the laws or nomos of that institution. The nomos, in turn, reflects
a given worldview. I represent the ontological components of scalable meaning making it
what I call the Is dimension of the signification process as the Ontological Schema in
Figure 1. My use of the word “Is” is not meant to convey a notion of universal truth about
reality or to suggest that such a universal truth can exist, although in a socially
constructed reality a group of people may regard or perceive a particular understanding of
reality (or the Is) as universally true. This dimension, which Geertz’s analysis will cause
78
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me later to put in conversation with a corresponding normative (or ought) schema, begins
to form the building blocks of culture creation on various levels of social complexity. In
the present form it offers insight into the Emory decision-making process. To the extent
the decisions were made inductively, the figure shows the relationship among the
components from right to left as Activity, Precedent, Category, Nomos, and Worldview.
When read from left to right, the schema shows relationally how activity can be deduced
from worldview through Nomos, Category, and Precedent.
Figure 1: Ontological Schema
Is

Worldview

Nomos

Category

Precedent

Activity

From Is to Ought
Geertz understands that “worldview,” represented in Figure 1 as a part of the
ontological schema, complements what he calls “ethos” or the normative aspects of a
culture. “The ethos is made intellectually reasonable by being shown to represent a way
of life implied by the actual state of affairs which the worldview describes, and the
worldview is made emotionally acceptable by being presented as an image of an actual
state of affairs of which such a way of life is an authentic expression.”80 Institutions are
normative in that they select categories that, through precedent, allow, prescribe, and
proscribe certain activities. Since, however, activities in institutions are patterned and, if
an institution is to have meaning, then, it must be patterning activity toward an end or a
purpose. This meaning, in Geertz’s terms is “stored” in symbols.81 For Friedland and
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Alford, institutions “have non-observable, transrational referents.”82 Symbols in
“institutionalized organizations” may be as straightforward as the “formal organization”
of a corporation or as mystical as a cross or a crescent in religious organizations.83 In a
corporation, the “formal organization” informs how the corporation ought to act or ought
to appear to act.84 The nature of the content of symbols, then, is normative.
In the Emory case, the important symbols for the position that the president
articulated were, among others, employee - conceived as a member of the Emory
community, and chapel - conceived as multi-purpose space. The term multi-purpose
space is disarming in its reflection of utility. Nevertheless, it has moral content. Multipurpose space is the place where various kinds of activity are permitted. This concept is a
key to the president’s position, and the meaning of the term unfolds in a document
prepared by the Emory trustees as they began to grapple with this crisis.85
The trustees also develop the symbol of consecrated or sacred space in an attempt
to characterize the church’s understanding of church building and chapel. For the church,
then, chapel as sacred space or at least worship space is a symbol as was marriage conceived sacramentally.
As the trustees, president, and church officials talked about this crisis, they
attempted to relate their symbols to the crisis. The parties were unable to talk with one
another, in large part, because their relevant symbol sets were different. The president
and trustees, for instance, began with and grounded their arguments in the university’s
82

Friedland and Alford, 249.
John W. Meyer and Brian Rowan, “Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and
Ceremony,” The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio
ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 53; Geertz, 127.
84
Meyer and Rowan, 53.
85
Bradley Currey, Jr., “Statement from Bradley Currey, Jr., Chairman, Emory University Board of
Trustees,” June 19, 1997: Public statement in my possession and available upon request.
83

51
equal opportunity policy whereas the church began with and grounded its arguments in
the nature of marriage. So when they spoke with one another they were fundamentally
speaking different languages. Sociologist and The Good Society co-author Steven Tipton
discusses the two languages operative here: republicanism and biblical religion. He calls
these languages traditions. In conversation with Jeffrey Stout and Ralph Potter, he agrees
that there are four moral languages seeking to “interrelate self, society, the natural order
and ultimate reality.”86
Each moral tradition does indeed make an effort to encompass selfhood,
society, nature, and ultimate reality in its own terms as Potter contends. Each
moral tradition has a holistic, universalizing nature.
…Thus for example, the biblical tradition enables us to envision how to
love and obey God not just in worship but in business, politics, and family life.
So these activities, too become worship in their fundamental meaning, and the
church becomes the central institution in the believer’s life if not in the society’s
structure. The republican tradition enables us to extend principled concern for the
common good and reasoned dialogue regarding it to the whole of life seen as a
forum, not just the academy and the town hall.87
Thus, equal opportunity and marriage enter this crisis as categories from different
moral languages. Equal opportunity is a category found in the vocabulary of civic
republicanism and marriage from that of biblical religion. The American understanding
of equal opportunity as a category (not as policy) is as a pre-condition for freedom. Free
markets, free inquiry, free speech, and academic freedom depend upon actors who are
free to participate.
From the New Testament image of Christ being the bridegroom of the church to
the marriage of Abraham and Sarah, Christian and Jews alike have understood marriage
as a covenantal relationship upon which the fulfillment of God’s promises depends. The
early church also sets aside marriage as a means by which God dispensed grace.
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Although the strict meaning of sacrament was modified or rejected by the various
Protestant reformations, marriage was at least understood as means by which one could
experience or participate in the grace of God. In the biblical tradition, a wedding, if not
marriage itself, is considered to be worship of God.
The category of wedding or marriage can be found in civic republicanism as a
civil ceremony sealing the covenantal or contractual relationship of marriage. Similarly,
categories like equal opportunity can be found in the language of biblical religion in
theological articulations such as “the priesthood of all believers” or “God’s grace freely
given to all.” This exemplifies the kinship of these two languages. In linguistic terms the
similarities can be thought of as cognates, evidence that individuals may use parts or all
of both languages and import vocabulary from one to another. But in different
institutional contexts the cognates take on different meanings.
Tipton’s conversation partner on the notion of moral languages, Jeffrey Stout
points out that the multiplicity of languages and the variable meanings of seemingly
similar categories do not disrupt cultural coherence:
The languages of morals in our discourse are many and they have remarkably
diverse historical origins, but they do not float in air and their name is not chaos.
They are embedded in specific social practices and institutions - religious,
political, artistic, athletic, economic and so on. We need many different moral
concepts because there are many different linguistic threads woven into any fabric
of practices and institutions as rich as ours.88
Languages such as biblical religion and republicanism arise out of and are
perpetuated by shared experiences. In the stories of lives lived together, the recounting of
named practices, people piece together narratives that contain a history. The history is
constructed only when practices are understood in relationship to one another and
88
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practices can only be understood and identified when they are named. Here the normative
stream of our understanding meets the lived experience of the ontological stream. In
every day life, that which ought to be is reconciled with that which is through words.
So, in naming actions with words, actors draw upon shared stories or narratives
which are structured and organized by a language communicated in a symbol system
which reflects an overarching ethos. This constitutes the normative component, or Ought
dimension of the signification process which, in Figure 2, shows the inductive
relationship, from right to left, of Word, Narrative, Language, Symbol, and Ethos and,
which when read from left to right shows relationally how Word can be deduced from
Ethos through Symbol, Language, and Narrative.
Figure 2: Normative Schema
Ought
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Symbol

Language

Narrative
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Juxtaposing Figure 1 and Figure 2 in Figure 3 illustrates the rudiments of the
signification process which I now have scaled from the general, represented by ethos and
worldview, to the particular, represented by word and activity.

Figure 3: Signification Schema
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Meaning as Synthesis
As discussed above, it is in the union of the Is and the Ought that creates meaning,
generally and particularly and at every point in between. While Figure 3 separates the is
from the ought to isolate the components, in meaningful life the two are intertwined. In
the Emory president’s letter to the community, the normative and the ontological
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synthesis is represented in his statement that he and his colleagues seek to “do good.” He
did not separate the two by seeking to do something that may or may not lead to a good.89
The is-ought combination at the level of word-activity particularity can have moral
content. Stout calls this moral content “internal goods…that can be realized only by
participating in the activity well, as judged by its standards of excellence….One can
know little about internal goods without acquiring experience and linguistic competence
in the relevant activity.”90 Here Stout underscores the role of moral language as well as
that of experience or precedent. The ontological and the normative are intertwined in
meaning. Figure 3 demonstrates the elements that are intertwined at various levels along
the general to particular continuum.
My earlier investigation of meaning-making, however, suggests that there is more
than a juxtaposition of the ontological and the normative along this continuum. There is,
in fact, a synthesis of the is and the ought. In order to name the syntheses at each point
along the continuum, I posit a new vocabulary that distinguishes the synthesis from its
constituent elements. This new schema names the meaningful activity to which Stout
refers above. It is neither simply reality nor simply value. It is both together. In short, this
new schema describes what is meaningful about life on the continuum from general to
particular and as such offers a glimpse into what conveys, expresses, and creates cultures
at each of those levels. I turn to Geertz again to help me establish this vocabulary. I will
begin with the often conflated terms of ritual, myth, and symbol and make distinctions
among them because I wish to use them in slightly different ways from within the schema
that I am developing. The distinctions, I draw however, I draw in Geertz’s own terms.
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Meanings can be “stored” in symbols: a cross, a crescent or a feathered
serpent. Such religious symbols, dramatized in rituals or related in myths,
are felt somehow to sum up, for those whom they are resonant, what is
known about the way the world is, the quality of the emotional life it
supports, and the way one ought to behave while in it.91
Geertz goes on to say that symbols relate the normative and ontological to one another.
This leads me to conclude that he understands ritual and myth as types of symbols. The
distinction I wish to draw in his terms, however, is an understanding of myth as relating
symbols, and rituals as dramas using the symbols. In this sense, normative symbols relate
to the ontological and the normative when mediated through myth and ritual.
Again, I turn to organizational theorists. Meyer and Rowan explain how myths
can express general notions of structure that frame organizational rituals. Myths, they
claim, are “rationalized and impersonal prescriptions that identify various social purposes
as technical ones.” They take on such importance that they are presupposed as legitimate
and are not evaluated by their effect on work output.92 When such an organization
experiences a conflict between the prevailing myth and production, it dissociates the two
by “decoupling” structure from activity, by looking the other way and handling
responsibilities informally. Attempts to reconcile production with formal structure expose
the inefficiency.93
Myth, then, in Myer and Rowan’s neo-institutionalist94 framework translates an
ideal type organization as normative. Institutionalized organizations with such myths,
then, must work to reconcile the myth with reality especially in the face of inefficiency
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and conflict. This is accomplished through ritual, and in Meyer and Rowan’s terms, the
“rituals of confidence and good faith.” The examples they give are “delegation,
professionalization, goal ambiguity, elimination of output data, and maintenance of
face.”95
The Emory chapels dispute was a debate over category selection. This was
symptomatic of the president and the church invoking two different moral languages in
order to choose the appropriate category. The languages relate to different symbol
systems, reflecting different normative convictions as illustrated in the two relevant
myths, the story of God’s relationship with the world and the story of improvement of
individual participation in common life. Each of these myths have corresponding rituals
which had to be followed in this case if the outcomes were to be perceived as legitimate.
Here I will sum up the prelude of activity that conformed to mythologically legitimated
and institutionally necessary ritual. This prelude led up to what I think is the most
exemplary ritual activity in this conflict - the chaplain’s process.

University Ritual
1. The Oxford dean consulted with legal counsel and the president before acting.
2. The dean used ambiguous language in his letter reflecting the internal moral confusion
while maintaining the legitimacy and authority of the university.
3. The president issued a public letter articulating equal opportunity and the myth of
higher education. Despite the reversal of an administrative decision, the letter contains
language that attempts to make sense of the inconsistency and attempts to offer facesaving shelter for the dean.
Church Ritual
1. The bishop drafted a resolution which was endorsed by his cabinet and submitted for
consideration at Annual Conference.
2. After passing through conversation, debate and limited revision in the Committee on
Resolutions, it was sent to the conference floor.
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3. The conference delegation, one-half lay and one-half clergy, debated the issue
according to parliamentary procedures and passed the resolution calling on the trustees to
reverse the president’s decision.96
Shared Ritual
1. The president’s letter refers to the connection with the United Methodist Church but
subordinates its importance in determining university policy to that of the president and
trustees. It also makes a point to expose the church’s own division on issues related to
homosexuality.
2. The UMC resolution used language from the university’s charter and leveraged the
bishop’s position as trustee in an attempt to redefine the university in terms of the
language of the church.
University Ritual Response
1. The trustees’ statement of June 19, 1997 asserted the final authority of the trustees in
making decisions regarding university policy.
2. Before distinguishing between the two United Methodist Churches owned by Emory
and the campus chapels, the trustees affirmed anew their commitment to both the Equal
Opportunity policy and the relationship with the United Methodist Church. They used
conciliatory language and legal references to make their points. They sought to legitimate
their argument within the context of the church, the university, and the law.
The trustees’ first statement laid out an agenda for work. The chairman of the
Board appointed the university chaplain and the Oxford College chaplain to work out a
policy governing use of the chapels. What they came up with was different from what the
church, president, and trustees each had called for. So how was it unanimously accepted
by the Board?
The answer was in the legitimating power of ritual, germane to the university’s
governing myths as well as those of the church. The operative processes were input and,
to a lesser extent, research. Never did the chaplains evaluate the policy with regard to
technical efficiency or production. Those measures were apparently irrelevant. In
recounting the process, the chaplains describe the hundreds of conversations they had
with various groups including the Council of Bishops of the United Methodist Church,
96
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the research they did into the history of the relationship of the two institutions, and the
letters and petitions they received. Finally they summed up the all-important qualitative
aspects of the process with these words:
This process has been comprehensive and open. Integrity and honesty
have undergirded this process because of the character of those involved.
We have appreciated coming to know the community in a deeper way.
The covenantal relationship between the University and the Church has
been more deeply understood and respected. We are grateful for having
been given this task, which has enhanced campus wide respect and
understanding.97
Who could argue with integrity, honesty, respect, understanding, and covenant using
republican or biblical language? No one. The process was legitimate in both worlds. That
legitimacy would inhere, then, in their proposal. Even if they had come up with an
objectionable proposal, at this point, critics would have to indict the process and maybe
even the judgment or integrity of the chaplains in order to challenge the product.
Organizations engage the meaning stored in symbol sets by enacting ritual
legitimated by the institutional myth. In order to be cogent, however, the ritual must
engage the particular realities of the actors, participants, and organization members.
These realties are described and characterized in a particular moral language. The
chaplains skillfully used vocabulary from each operative moral language. Consider the
use of the word covenant. This choice of words deploys the power, rather than trips over
the inadequacy, of cognates. Biblical language tells the story of covenant. The story is
recorded in the Bible but also in the codes of the church. Likewise, republicanism records
its covenantal story in United States history, the constitution, philosophy, and law,
forming a grand narrative tradition. Tradition of this sort unites language and category. It
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is in the transmission and recording of stories, codified and informal, that the moral
language links available categories into coherent meaningful units. The way the tradition
is understood and deployed, how it orders and values the categories, influences category
choice and subsequently precedent selection.
Tradition emerges straight from the collective memory of individuals and,
collectively from community customs. In communities where minority opinion is valued
and preserved, categories can recall precedents even if they have been rarely used. Even
rare precedents can be given legitimacy in the memory of the community. Custom, as
collective memory, then, holds together personal and communal narrative and precedent.
The act of remembering stores precedent in narrative.
The narrative itself, of course, is made up of words which name activity.
Unreflective activity can go unnamed and un-enacted words never materialize. This
reflective activity I, and others, call praxis. Friedland and Alford show how Mary
Douglas uses this term to describe the whole set of relationships I have been describing,
even though I will locate it in the emerging schema on the level of activity and word.
Douglas argues that both rational and irrational decisions are influenced by the
“hold that institutions have on our processes of classifying and recognizing”
(1986:3). Society is thought as it is enacted, and social solidarity depends upon
the extent to which “classifications, logical operation and guiding metaphors” are
held in common. Douglas argues that institutions require a cognitive base that
naturalizes and rationalizes the conventions which constitute the institution. Thus
systems of classification are forms of social praxis.98
At all levels, the Is and the Ought are synthesized as Geertz said was necessary for
meaning making. When the ontological is compatible with the normative, actions are
meaningful.
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So, in named action or praxis, actors draw upon storied precedents or custom
which are structured and organized by a lexicon of tradition, enacted by the ritual drama
between the nomos and symbol, which enlivens an all-encompassing myth. This
constitutes the meaning component, or Synopsis dimension, that is the is and the ought
are seen together, of the signification process which in Figure 4 shows the inductive
relationship, from right to left, of Praxis, Custom, Tradition, Ritual, and Myth and, which
when read from left to right shows relationally how Praxis can be deduced from Myth
through Ritual, Tradition, and Custom.

Figure 4: Meaning Schema
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In order to demonstrate the synthetic nature of culture, I place the schema represented in
Figure 4 between the Normative and Ontological schema in Figure 5.
Figure 5: Synthetic Schema
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Society Building and Culture Formation
The horizontal continuum represented in the Synthetic Schema, Figure 5, is more
than the span from general (left) to particular (right). It can also represent the levels of
social complexity along which cultures are able to scale. The synthesis of ethos and
worldview to create myth is not only a way to generalize about what happens with
multiple rituals (or symbol-nomos syntheses) and on down the line, it also represents the
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degree to which meaning-making is shared among a broad grouping of social actors. The
group that shares myth is broader than the group that shares ritual and that group broader
than the one that shares tradition, custom, and praxis respectively.
Reading the schema from right to left corresponds more closely to the process of
world-construction in which humans are engaged. Persons interact on a daily basis. To
the extent that interaction is named and made meaningful, the interaction is praxis. As
multiple people begin to interact and engage in multiple, sometimes conflicting praxes,
customs develop to record the praxes. These customs are a shared store of precedents
which the group makes sense of using common stories or an overarching narrative. As
customs develop among even broader groups, the multiple customs form traditions as
relations become more organized; precedents are categorized and made intelligible in a
shared language. Multiple traditions created in and through multiple organizational
contexts give life to ritual patterns which interpret the grounded traditions in light of
universalized truths by relating the ordered categories to shared symbol. The ritual
patterns create myth that offers a coherent sense of meaning for societies which share the
same worldview and ethos together.
Praxis, then, constitutes culture on an interpersonal level; custom, group level;
tradition, organization level; ritual, institution level, and myth on the level of society.
Societies use their myth to project an understanding of universal meaning by exhibiting
synoptic reconciliation of the is and the ought. This is the role of religion, according to
Berger in The Sacred Canopy:
Religion is the enterprise by which a sacred cosmos is
established….Religion implies the farthest reach of man’s selfexternalization, of his infusion of reality with his own meanings. Religion
implies that human order is projected into the totality of being. Put
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differently, religion is the audacious attempt to conceive of the entire
universe as being humanly relevant.99
Cultures form at each of these levels of social complexity. As Berger points out, both
society and culture are products of human (or social) construction of what we perceive as
real. Society is an artifact of culture, but society is also the necessary condition for
structuring and maintaining culture.100
This articulation identifies the columns across the schema as levels of social
complexity and the rows as dimensions of reality. This additional level of organization is
demonstrated in Figure 6.

Figure 6: Synthetic Schema with Levels of Social Complexity Identified
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The Multiplicity of Cultural Life
Figure 6 shows our moral meaning framework, as persons and as institutions. This
schema can be read from left to right or right to left. An example of the former in
religious terms would be to understand that God created and then humans acted. An
example of the latter would be to understand that humans acted and created a projection
of God. What matters, in this example from religion, is God’s relatedness to human
activity and human activity’s relatedness to God. The two are in a dialectical relationship
of mutual formation according to Figure 6. Of course, we are not simply religious persons
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in the modern world. We are political, social, working, consuming, and educated persons
as well. We live in multiple institutional environments. Navigating the various
institutional contexts gives us a repertoire of understandings and tools to approach new
and challenging situations. We can import and export symbols, categories, or languages
across institutional lines and can do so in a way that actively and consciously construct
new social realities without devolving into anomic alienation as long as we are able to
distinguish among the various institutions influencing us and avoid the moral confusion
described above by Durkheim and Habits of the Heart. In fact, Friedland and Alford
attribute a good degree of institutional change to this ability to act as subjects in multiple
institutional contexts, carrying along with us the cultural tools of other institutional
contexts. In conflict, people reinforce and defend symbols as well as use symbols from
other contexts to transform institutions.101
The framework described in Figure 6 is a web. The content of one cell cannot
change without affecting other cells. This interconnectedness and the lack of awareness
of the significance of that interconnectedness is the fundamental problem outlined in The
Good Society. The most pervasive and destructive example the authors of The Good
Society offer of this problem is the aforementioned affinity for the moral language of
Lockean individualism. Like all moral languages, this one had an institutional context. It
became separated from that context - namely its theological framework and its
institutional supports such as education, local participation in politics, and an agrarian
economy. The language survived, however, and began to take on life within institutions
which history had transformed. The result was a massive bureaucratic state infused with a
political ethic of utilitarian individualism. Our moral discourse about political as well as
101
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economic institutions revolves around Lockean understandings of the individual, yet the
Economy and the Government have grown so far away from direct democratic control
that they are indeed most un-Lockean.102
We have the illusion that we can control our fate because individual
economic opportunity is indeed considerable, especially if one starts with
middle-class advantages; and our political life is formally free. Yet
powerful forces affecting the lives of all of us are not operating under the
norm of democratic consent. In particular, the private governments of the
great corporations make decisions on the basis of their own advantage, not
of the public good; and even the government agencies that are supposed to
regulate them are usually ineffective or in collusion with those they are
supposed to regulate. The federal government has enormously increased in
power, especially in the form of the military-industrial complex, in ways
that are almost invulnerable to citizen knowledge, much less control, on
the grounds of national defense. We have gotten the strong state that the
Jeffersonians opposed on the basis not of Hamiltonian design but of
national security. The private rewards and the formal freedoms have
obscured from us how much we have lost in genuine democratic control of
the society we live in.103
When languages, such as the dislodged Lockeanism described above, live long
enough in an organization, they become symbolic and take on formal normative
characteristics in our institutions. The ethos of the society begins to change and the
mythology which holds the ethos and worldview together may require re-engineering.
Normative persistence such as this, however, is no more influential than
ontological persistence. The ontological circumstance of slavery, for instance, was a fact
with which slaves had to live. Over time, we see the development of normative theologies
of freedom, spiritual and physical. This translates today into liberation theologies of all
sorts which have affinities with individualism to be sure, but which are at least as much
attributable to ontological circumstance as normative language. Over time norms can be
dislodged from reality only to influence or make sense of other unrelated realities as
102
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symbols. Likewise, realities can become dislodged from their normative framework and
give life to nomoi or understandings of the way reality is ordered. These nomoi, in turn,
give life to new symbol systems and make sense of other unrelated realities. These nomoi
and symbols are embodied in social institutions.
While Stout and Tipton as well as Tipton and his co-authors of Habits of the
Heart and The Good Society focus on the influential effects of language and tradition,
The Good Society, neo-institutionalists, and Stout discuss the influences that institutions
have on one another. They think about one another and with one another because they
share constituents who move among institutions and who must maintain moral coherence
themselves. All underscore the role persons play as participants in institutions and
thereby in the construction of culture. Likewise, they all call for conscious engagement in
that co-creation.
Because institutions think about one another, the symbol systems, nomoi and
rituals they embody are contingent in some manner on a larger social ordering which
permits multiple institutions to make sense of life in myriad ways without disrupting the
coherence of a society. For instance, United States society, Stout claims, requires a
provisional telos which subordinates any concepts of the good that would dominate any
other concept of the good. This provisional telos moves us to reach for the “highest good
achievable under the circumstances.”104 In terms of my framework, he is talking about
the myth or myths that make symbol systems and thereby multiple co-existing institutions
possible. Myths about teloi that claim singular dominance threaten social cohesion. The
content of the provisional telos myth amounts to what many term civil religion which
calls for religious civility or tolerance of many faiths. It is both civil and religious but it
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allows, ultimately, for the dominance of no one religion any more than any one civil
authority. It formally builds into the US Constitution disestablishment and free exercise
of religion alongside checks and balances among the three branches of government.
Projects to shore up, save, create, or strengthen social cohesion depend upon a
myth that allows for various institutions, but the institutional languages have to be similar
enough to allow for inter-institutional communication. Moral languages inform activity.
Conversely, shared activity is equally formative of shared customs, traditions, and,
ultimately, languages.
It is in part a consequence of the division of labor that Emory and the United
Methodist Church had to struggle to find a common category in the crisis under scrutiny
here. The rift is symptomatic of a lack of discourse and a lack of shared activity between
the two. The policy proposed by the chaplains and adopted unanimously by the Board of
Trustees takes a step in the direction of creating a shared language as well as providing
for shared activity in the future. The solution uses religious language but in an
educational context. It leaves intact the competing institutional identities and their related
symbol systems. It focuses on practice.
Drawing on United Methodism’s own tradition, it finds categories of ecumenism
and campus ministry. Drawing from Emory’s parlance, it asserts the category of religious
group. The chaplains fuse the categories of worship and activity into “religious activity.”
They give authority to campus ministers and chaplains which is legitimate in both
traditions and give jurisdiction over their activities to the respective ordaining church
judicatories. However, the university, in the end, has jurisdiction over the approval of
religious groups.
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Under these circumstances, the categories mentioned above engage a number of
precedents of religious practices that violate Methodist polity. Roman Catholics celebrate
Mass in campus chapels without communing Methodists. Jewish worshipers have prayed
for the first coming of the Messiah in these places of worship. These precedents can be
characterized as activities approved by the religious institutions who have extension
organizations with credentialed clergy on campus. It follows, then, that if an approved
organization’s related church allows same sex marriages - just as it might allow closed
communion - then a same-sex marriage would be permitted.105
Those, including, perhaps, the president, who had argued for “equal opportunity”
as a category, have found disappointment in the fact that this category was not engaged
here although same-sex ceremonies are not prohibited per se under this policy. Churchrelated opponents to same-sex marriages are disappointed in the possibility that a samesex ceremony might occur.106 To object to the outcome, however, would require ignoring
or arguing against parts of one’s own moral language(s). Neither Methodists nor
members of the Emory community have to agree with the chaplains. That is not what I
am arguing. Nevertheless, the chaplains did skillfully constructed a way forward that
prescribed activity that would be legitimate in the language of an educational
organization and a religious organization. To take issue with the decision would require
more than asserting the outcome was illegitimate; it would take equally skilful
deployment of the respective moral languages in order to attempt to socially delegitimize
the conclusions the chaplains drew.
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Subsequent to the crisis, the representatives of the two institutions engaged in
mending the torn fabric. They are joining again in the enterprise of culture building
through their own institutions, by interpreting the other institution relative to their own.
They import each other’s language. In their words:
Emory University is a highly complex, multicultural institution of higher learning.
The faculty and students represent values and traditions from the global
community. Emory University is not the church and is more diverse than most of
our congregations. Many in the university community have significant
disagreement with our United Methodist position on homosexuality.
-Bishop G. Lindsey Davis107
Emory is related to the United Methodist Church through the Southeastern
Jurisdictional Conference. The church through the conference has a legitimate
and appropriate interest in the character of Emory as an institution expressing the
values and principles of the church.
-Emory Board of Trustees Chairman Bradley Currey, Jr.108
A deeper crisis would have been if these two institutions did not care enough about their
purposes or each other’s purposes and meanings to debate this issue, or if the hegemony
of one institution disallowed debate and discourse altogether. This particular moral
dilemma was one of differing languages and traditions. The organizations had to re-visit
their respective institutional self-understandings and their understandings of the other to
make sense of it and in order to know how to act. Institutions can mean; they mean
differently, yet they mean together and that meaning is tied intimately to what
organizations do and how they do it.
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Moral Meaning Matrix
Institutional meaning making holds a central place in the synthetic schema I have
been discussing. The Emory example demonstrates the way a single organization can
draw on multiple institutional referents to make meaning. Further, it demonstrates the
scalability of the processes Frankl and Berger outlined. I attempt to represent that
scalability along the horizontal axis of the schema. Interpersonal and shared meaning
making is represented in its various dimensions of reality and levels of social complexity
by Figure 7 below (a reproduction of figure 6 above) which is an artificial construct
intended to aid understanding and social analysis. The first row is made up of column
headings which become increasingly complex from right to left. These headings represent
levels of social complexity. The first column represents the dimensions of reality which
weave together to form culture at each level of social complexity.
Figure 7: Synthetic Schema with Levels of Social Complexity Identified
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The normative dimension (Ought in Figure 7) describes human and cultural
values. Generally this refers to what we think, know, or feel we ought to do or ought to
be at the interpersonal, group, organizational, institutional, and societal levels. The
ontological dimension (Is in Figure 7) refers to the way things are from what we
experience in daily life to what we project to be true about the way the universe works.
The latter exposes our worldview. The meaning dimension (Synopsis in Figure 7)
represents the ways we synthesize meaning in the world and make meaning in our lives.
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This is an extrapolation of Geertz’s proposition that meaning-making is the result of such
a synthesis.109 It is also an extrapolation of educator Paolo Freire’s model of praxis,
discussed below. While Geertz speaks of the ontological and normative in general terms,
on the levels I call Universe and Society, Freire’s model focuses more on the primacy and
particularity of context and interpersonal relationships. The figure attempts to fill in the
gaps between the levels described as Universe and Interpersonal. This span also
demonstrates the mutually informative and constitutive relationship between private and
shared meaning as discussed above.
Leaving the horizontal axis for a moment, I will now discuss the vertical
relationships in the schema. Geertz explains the relationship between the ontological and
the normative in his discussion of the double sense of the word model. A model can be a
model “of ‘reality’” or a model “for ‘reality.’”110 He explores symbols and theories as
models in the example of how a theory of hydraulics can describe how a dam works. The
theory is the symbolic system which describes the non-symbolic reality of water flow
(model of). Yet the symbolic or theoretical can be deployed to construct a new dam in a
new context. The symbolic can be used to manipulate another non-symbolic reality
(model for). He translates the phenomenon into social terms:
For psychological and social systems, and for cultural models that we
would not ordinarily refer to as “theories,” but rather as “doctrines,”
“melodies,” or “rites,” the case is in no way different. Unlike genes, and
other non-symbolic information sources, which are only models for and
not models of, culture patterns have an intrinsic double aspect: they give
meaning, that is, objective conceptual form to social and psychological
reality both by shaping to it and by shaping it to themselves.111
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While Geertz understands symbols as storing meaning and as relating an
“ontology or cosmology to an aesthetics and a morality,” I locate symbol in the
normative rather than the meaning dimension of my matrix because the meaning can only
be expressed or realized when mediated, when “dramatized in rituals or related in
myths.”112 In the same way that words describe actions, symbols describe a fundamental
order of reality. Geertz describes the relationship between symbol and order in Paul
Radin’s case study of how the Oglala regard the circle. Everything “good” in nature, the
sun, the moon, and the earth are circles.113 The observable world is “named” in a sense by
the circle. Because of its association with good phenomena in the observable world, it
takes on a moral dimension. The circular form, then, becomes the basis of ritual,
celebrating the relationship between the observable and the moral. The world is given
moral meaning in such rituals, and moral meaning is connected with an empirically
verifiable reality in the same rituals. This normative-ontological connection and
expression is powerful. The model of becomes the model for. Tipis and other structures
are built as circles, not for practical reasons, but for meaningful ones. The ordinary
participates in the synthesis or synopsis (i.e. they are seen together) of the normative and
ontological.114 For Geertz,
ethos [the normative] is made intellectually reasonable by being shown to
represent a way of life implied by the actual state of affairs which the
world view [ontological] describes, and the world view is made
emotionally acceptable by being presented as an actual state of affairs of
which such a way of life is an authentic expression.115
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This vertical relationship among the components of the schema operates at all
levels of social complexity represented by the horizontal axis of the schema. While
Geertz discusses the way particular circumstances are given universal significance,
represented on the left side of the schema, Freire’s Pedagogy of the Oppressed
concentrates on efforts described by the right side of the schema demonstrating how
universal conceptions can be imposed on particular realities. It is important to keep
separate the operation of the two axes of the matrix, one distinguishing the universal from
the contextual or particular (left to right) and the other distinguishing between the
normative and the ontological (top to bottom). The struggle for liberation, in Freire's
analysis, is contextual and involves action and reflection. The oppressed’s “discovery [of
oppression] cannot be purely intellectual but must involve action; nor can it be limited to
mere activism, but must include serious reflection: only then will it be a praxis.”116 Freire
underscores the necessity of praxis in emancipatory education.
The insistence that the oppressed engage in reflection on their concrete
situation is not a call to armchair revolution. On the contrary, reflectiontrue reflection-leads to action. On the other hand, when the situation calls
for action, that action will constitute an authentic praxis only if its
consequences become the object of critical reflection.117
As noted above, action without reflection for Freire is pure “activism.” Similarly, words
without action is pure “verbalism.”118 Rather than making the sharp distinctions between
ontological and normative as I attempt to do in my schema, Freire coins the term “true
word” which is work and reflection at the same time and which when spoken is
tantamount to transforming the world.119 In the Synthetic Schema, I isolate the reflective
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element in a term I call “word” and the work in my term, “activity.” Conceptually, words
can exist for Freire without action, thus verbalism, so the synonym for Freire’s “true
word” is praxis both in Freire’s work and in my Synthetic Schema.120
Freire holds praxis out not simply as a theoretical construct to be considered but
as a pedagogical method to be employed in order to begin seeing that reality is
constructed by humans and that all people, even – and especially for Freire – the
oppressed have a role in constructing that reality. This critical consideration of reality is
one way of understanding Freire’s concept of “critical consciousness.”121
Freire describes what he calls the “banking model of education” as a contrast to
praxis. The banking model regards reality as a static objective reality which must be
transmitted from teacher to student and which perpetuates a single notion of what reality
is. This, ultimately, is dehumanizing, according to Freire.122 This process moves against
people’s “ontological vocation to be more fully human.”123 Praxis, then, illuminates
“reality as a process” and is thereby humanizing and liberating.124 Practically, praxis
requires teachers and students to inquire together rather than participate in the falsely
conceived relationship of a knowledgeable teacher transferring knowledge to the emptyvessel student.125 The role of the teacher is not dispensable, however. Freire is not
arguing for independent learning, but for mutuality between the student and the teacher.
Freire insists that students cannot be self-taught, but that praxis, and therefore learning,
occurs in relationships.126
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This reveals the need for a new dimension to the schema – a dimension of reality I
refer to as the dynamic. The normative-ontological synthesis necessary for meaningmaking and culture construction at every level of complexity is a dialectical relationship.
The two poles held in tension with one another require a source of energy. Relationships
provide the energy that holds together word and action to give life to praxis. When
energy is balanced between the two poles, then the energy exchange is in a state of
equilibrium. If, however, the normative is imposed upon the ontological, then the
equilibrium of the dialectic is disrupted. In contrast to the balanced dialectic, the
imposition of the normative on the ontological is endothermic. The process requires
energy to be put into the system. In other words it takes work to shape the “what is” into
the “what ought to be.” On the interpersonal level, the energy required is an unbalanced
relationship. One person has the power and is able to conflate one description of reality
with reality itself.
This is the problem with the banking model of education, as described by Freire.
He elucidates the power cooption that must go on for a teacher’s words to be allowed to
be the only understanding of what reality is. Freire advocates, therefore, an equal
relationship between teacher and student, terming it: “teacher-student with studentsteachers.”127 Learning, or meaning-making, takes place as a “co-intentional”
enterprise.128
Understanding the power dynamics in pedagogical and social relationships is at
the heart of Freire’s work. Undoing the power structure which maintains an oppressive
order is the goal of emancipatory education. Those who hold and wield the power to
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oppress may understand emancipation and liberation as an upsetting of equilibrium, but
Freire reproves those who would confuse status quo with equilibrium. Liberation and
emancipation are often associated with violent revolution, for instance. Freire points out
that a revolution of freedom is not the initiation of violence; it is the response to it. “Any
situation in which some individuals prevent others from engaging in the process of
inquiry is violence.”129 This is a tough charge to levy on traditional notions of pedagogy
and on social power relationships on a grander scale. Exhibiting the principles of the
conservation of energy discussed above, Freire posits that “consciously or unconsciously,
the act of rebellion by the oppressed [is] (an act which is always, or nearly always, as
violent as the initial violence of the oppressors).”130 Rebellion, emancipation, and
liberation are exothermic processes. Energy is released. Furthermore, the more energy
pumped into the unequal relationship to shape reality in terms of one normative
viewpoint - namely that of the dominant class - the more energy that will be released
when emancipation occurs. But Freire’s goal is not a re-imposition of a new power
structure but the establishment of equality or equilibrium. Revolution for the sake of
seizing power over the original oppressors is simply activism which may release energy
that will eventually have to be returned to the system when the oppressed and oppressors
change roles and a new static notion of single-normed reality is forced into place.131 This
can happen at any level of social complexity. Myths, for instance, identify power sources
for entire societies.
Such a monopoly [over all ultimate definitions of reality] means that a
single symbolic tradition maintains the universe in question. To be in the
society then implies acceptance of this tradition....In such a situation the
129
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monopolistic tradition and its expert administrators are sustained by a
unified power structure. Those who occupy the decisive power positions
are ready to use their power to impose traditional definitions of reality on
the population under their authority. Potentially competitive
conceptualizations of the universe are liquidated as soon as they appeareither physically destroyed…or integrated within the tradition itself.132
Within societies, institutions define and appropriate jurisdiction as described in the
Emory disagreement; tradition builds up and legitimates authority as the chaplain’s
decision demonstrated; custom accounts for an accumulation of cultural and other
resources in the way that it stores precedents in narrative, and, as Freire demonstrates,
reality is lived in and through relationships. Taking into account the role this energy plays
in synthesizing the normative and the ontological leads me to add one more dimension to
the Synthetic Schema. I call this new dimension the dynamic dimension. Note the
relationship between the dynamic and meaning dimensions of reality. They are mutually
constitutive. Meaning defines what is and is not powerful in a society’s culture and power
preserves and protects a particular set of meanings made.
The ways energy is manifested in the dynamic dimension of reality at the various
levels of social complexity, when integrated into the synthetic schema, completes the
model for society building and culture formation in a figure that details signification at
various levels of complexity. I call this figure the Moral Meaning Matrix.
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Figure 8: Moral Meaning Matrix133
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My analysis suggests, especially after the introduction of the dynamic dimension,
that the very process of meaning-making at any level of social complexity, from Universe
to the Interpersonal, has the capacity to be oppressive or emancipatory but in each case
violent. Paying attention to the role of power in signification or culture-building
processes reveals that the process of synthesizing the normative and the ontological in
and of itself can make meaning at the expense of peace, justice, and life.
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CHAPTER THREE
RELIGION AND VIOLENCE

The Moral Meaning Matrix makes possible an analysis of meaning making at
various levels. Further, it draws into focus the relationship between meaning making and
the use of energy to make that meaning. So the Moral Meaning Matrix becomes a tool for
analyzing the violent use of energy to make meaning at the various levels of social
complexity. Societies and interpersonal relationships have a common mechanism for
meaning-making, the synthesis of the ontological with the normative. That meaningmaking process can be, by the mechanism demonstrated in chapter two, inherently
violent. Societies and interpersonal relationships also share in the influence of a particular
level of social complexity that mediates the relationship between the general and the
particular. This level of social complexity is the level described in the Moral Meaning
matrix (Figure 8) as institution.
I have already discussed the significant influence of institutions on organizations
in the Emory example, now I will deepen and broaden the analysis of the nature of that
influence. Institutions play a significant role along each axis of the Moral Meaning
Matrix. They are represented in one level of social complexity, like any other, seeking
vertical integration of the dimensions of reality in the matrix, but it is also a level which
can offer horizontal integration of the matrix as well, connecting the universe with the
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interpersonal. This integrative function demands a more thorough examination of the way
in which I am using the term institution.
Social institutions, which the authors of The Good Society define as “normative
patterns embedded in and enforced by laws and mores (informal customs and
practices),”134 mediate the connections between interpersonal relationships and global
social arrangements. With this understanding of institutions they examine the impact of
modernity and increasing individualism on four institutions in the United States: The
Political Economy; Government, Law, and Politics; Education, and the Public Church.135
Noting that the social sciences have methods for studying individuals and
organizations, The Good Society authors ask,
But how does one study institutions? Simply studying organizations is not
enough. It runs the risk of confusing the organizations with institutional
patterns that define their purpose and meaning….A social science with a
commitment to address institutions would be a substantial contribution to
a renewed public philosophy.136
Bellah et al.’s understanding of institutions as patterns thereby distinguishes them
from organizations which are discrete manifestations of those more pervasive and
enduring patterned expectations. Institutions, in other words, define what organizations
are, or what they can be in the first place.137 Common understandings of the term
institution often overplay the role of small and large organizations which operate in
broader institutional contexts as described by Bellah et al. Conversely, common
references to expected patterns of behavior often downplay their significance by referring
to them as custom or tradition without acknowledging the pervasive influence of the
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myriad tacit rules which govern behavior within any given society. Lack of clarity about
the influence of institutions, particularly in the United States, leads to a lack of
appreciation of their role and to inattention to the relationship between the health of
institutions and the health of interpersonal (and inter-civilizational) relationships.
Given the increasingly dominant role of the United States in the world, our
society and the health of United States social institutions will inevitably influence not
only Western societies or “civilization,” in Huntington’s terms, but also the other patterns
of expected behavior in other societies throughout the world.138 As the United States has
grown, some of its social institutions have grown with it, but growth is not always
healthy and positive. In fact Bellah et al. attribute a good deal of our confusion about the
role of social institutions in our lives to the fact that “some of our institutions have indeed
grown out of control and beyond our comprehension. But the answer is to change them,
for it is illusory to imagine that we can escape them.”139
So horizontally on the matrix, institutions connect the personal with the global as
“patterns of social activity which give shape to collective and individual experience.”140
Vertically in the matrix, particular institutions such as the ones described and discussed
by Bellah et al. each convey meaning. As patterns, it is possible to understand institutions
as influencing the shape of the societies we construct because they define how the
particular is connected to the general. They also are patterns which are meaningful in
their own right too. They influence the shape of cultures by conveying patterns for the
meaning-making activity itself to constituent organizations and beyond just as education,
religion and government/law/politics all influenced Emory as an organization. In this
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double role, institutions both define societies and participate in the project of culture
creation.

Religion
With an understanding of institutions as meaning makers which influence
meaning making on large and small scales, it is now possible to take a closer look at the
role and function of the social institution with which I initially associated the problems of
conflict and global violence. In order to investigate this institution in greater detail, I will
look at its function in the United States. Beyond the functional analysis, though I will
also examine Christian theology in particular because of its pervasiveness in the United
States. Limiting my investigation in this way still offers the opportunity to look at the
issue of religious violence on a global scale because of the influence of Christianity in the
United States and the influence and, transitively, because of the United States in the
world. I will examine later the mechanism by which that influence is translated into
larger and smaller contexts.
Bellah et al. identify Public Church as a US social institution, and Huntington
observes that religion is the one of the most tenacious of cultural identities relative to
war. So when it comes to the phenomenon of global violence, the conversation that I
have constructed among Geertz, Bellah et al., and Huntington gives religion the
distinction of being the most meaningful meaning-making institution, pervasively
influencing the ways people and groups make meaning on large and small scales.
What is it about religion that distinguishes it from other institutions? Like other
social institutions, it has the double role of making meaning and influencing broader
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patterns of meaning making, yet I want to suggest a third role for religion which
differentiates it from other social institutions. In terms of the Moral Meaning Matrix, it is
the meaning dimension. Praxis, Custom, Tradition, Ritual, Myth, and Synopsis describe
the activity of religion at various levels of social complexity. This is not to suggest that a
particular religion or religious denomination or its theological content suffices to describe
what occurs in this dimension of reality, nor is it to suggest – and I shall show later that
such is not the case in the United States at least – that religion always (if ever) succeeds
in balancing syntheses of the normative and ontological, but this is to suggest that in
societies meaning is made by seeing the is and the ought as combined into one. This
gives coherent meaning to shared life in a way that we can describe generally as
religious. Such a concept of the term religious is a functional one. It implies no particular
theology or religious practice, not even a god. It simply identifies the meaning dimension
of reality with the activity of making sense of the normative and the ontological together.
A fully developed meaning system or religion would project universal claims (this is
where theology would re-enter) as well as deepen contextual commitments (this is where
religious practice would re-enter), thus connecting the general with the particular. As
Geertz argues,
The religious perspective differs from the common-sensical in that, as
already pointed out, it moves beyond the realities of everyday life to wider
ones which correct and complete them, and its defining concern is not
action upon those wider realities but acceptance of them, faith in them. It
differs from the scientific perspective in that it questions the realities of
everyday life not out of an institutionalized skepticism which dissolves the
world’s givenness into a swirl of probabilistic hypotheses, but in terms of
what it takes to be wider, non-hypothetical truths. Rather than detachment,
its watchword is commitment; rather than analysis, encounter. And it
differs from art in that instead of effecting a disengagement from the
whole question of factuality, deliberately manufacturing an air of
semblance and illusion, it deepens the concern with fact and seeks to
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create an aura of utter actuality. It is this sense of the “really real” upon
which the religious perspective rests and which symbolic activities of
religion as a cultural system are devoted to producing, intensifying, and so
far as possible, rendering inviolable by the discordant revelations of
secular experience.141
While other perspectives explicate one cultural dimension, religion is concerned with all
dimensions of culture and in holding them together with integrity, synoptically. It
endeavors to make meaning out of otherwise unrelated or even contradictory experiences
and knowledge. Religion is meaning making and meaning making is religion. I use
religion, here, in a functional way. This is not to imply that a theology per se is necessary
for meaning, but insofar as the ontological and the normative are synthesized into
something meaningful, that synthesis, even if expressed as atheism, functions as a
religion functions. Insofar as other institutions in a society engage in meaning making in
the manner discussed above, they engage in a religious practice of sorts. As an institution,
religion, then, encodes meaning-making for societies. Through its myth, it encodes the
meaning-making patterns for other social institutions in those respective societies. These
religious patterns, therefore, influence thoroughly the degree to which meaning-making
activity in a society’s constituent cultures are endothermic or exothermic; oppressive or
emancipatory; violent or pacific.

Western Hegemony
In an apparent contradiction of the claims I just set forth, only two of
Huntington’s seven contemporary civilizations are named for world religions: Hindu and
Islamic. Despite the role he suggests religion plays in civilizational conflict, there are
other characteristics which distinguish civilizations from each other. Although
141
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Huntington does not discount the role that Christianity has played in defining the
civilization he terms the West and the role that Christianity has played historically, and in
recent times, in wars with non-Christians, particularly with Muslims, he also describes a
macro scale conflict between the West and the rest of the world whose causation, on the
surface, depends very little on Christian identity. 142 “The West, and especially the United
States, which has always been a missionary nation, believe that the non-Western peoples
should commit themselves to the Western values of democracy, free markets, limited
government, human rights, individualism, the rule of law, and should embody these
values in their institutions.”143 In short the West is attempting to impose its norms on
other societies around the globe. In terms of the Moral Meaning Matrix, the West is
trying to make meaning globally by imposing its notions of the universally normative in
foreign contexts, that is on various and particular incarnations of the ontological. This is
the global version of what Freire fought in the banking model of education. It is
endothermic. It requires energy to be pumped into the system and is oppressive. It is
experienced by non-Western societies as “imperialism,” according to Huntington.144 This
sort of imposition of the normative on the ontological is only possible with sufficient
resources in the dynamic dimension of the matrix. In this case, the power is economic.
The West is, for instance, attempting to integrate the economies of nonWestern societies into a global economic system which it dominates.
Through the IMF (International Monetary Fund) and other international
economic institutions, the West promotes its economic interests and
imposes on other nations the economic policies it thinks appropriate. The
lethal extension of economic power and this zeal to impose norms, or
resist such imperialism, is the proliferation of “nuclear, biological, and
chemical weapons and the means to deliver them….The diffusion of
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military capabilities is the consequence of global economic and social
development.145
On the surface, this discussion of economics, political values, and military might
seems to contradict the definitive role of religion in global inter-civilizational conflict.
But if religion is the process of meaning making itself, then it is incumbent upon us to dig
a little deeper and ask the question, what is it about conflicts between the West and the
balance of the globe that is similar to conflicts which are more obviously defined by
religious difference? What has happened in the West, particularly in the United States,
one of the core states of the West, to create a society with a culture prone to conflict, if
not violence?146

Religion in The United States
The answer (or part of it at least) rests in the relationship between religion and the
other dominant institutions in the United States. The authors of The Good Society suggest
that the welfare state and the market economy have grown to overshadow other
institutions in the United States. What they see in the relationship among these four
institutions in the Untied States may be akin to what sociologist Emile Durkheim feared
from modernity’s push toward a division of labor. The developing complexity he saw in
the economic and social order could deteriorate into a fragmented anomic culture if an
“organic solidarity” does not arise spontaneously for persons when they realize their
fundamental interdependence with one another.147 This fragmentation, Bellah et al.
suggest, arises because people in the Untied States are profoundly influenced by an
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eighteenth century interpretation of John Locke’s notion of individual freedom and
autonomy.148 The incongruity between the Lockean language and ideals on the one hand
with the reality of our un-Lockean social institutions on the other creates institutions that
have grown to the point to which they no longer connect individuals, but seem, rather, to
stand apart from and exist independently of individuals and interpersonal relationships.
This, they suggest, is the source of a cultural “impasse.”149 We are “trying to live by the
Lockean language of individualism in an institutional world it can no longer describe, and
yet the Lockean language still seduces us at every turn.”150
As a result, the authors of The Good Society observe that religion has become
increasingly individualized or privatized and, therefore, devoid of engagement in public
life. For Bellah et al., “‘public’ in their discussion of the Public Church does not mean
governmental but is a contrast term to it.”151 With the disestablishment of religion in the
United States, the distinction between public and government is at once easy to
comprehend and hard to develop as a concept. It is easier to comprehend because the
United States takes great pains not to privilege or create disadvantages for particular
religious groups by explicit use of law. It is harder to develop this concept of religion as
public, however, for precisely the same reason. Public and governmental are often
conflated. Reacting to the desire to preserve disestablishment and free exercise, religion
is often relegated to the realm of the private. Religion also has succumbed to the
“Lockean consensus” that “led to an expressive individualism that complements rather
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than questions the dominant utilitarian mood.”152 The authors ask whether religion “can
offer a genuine alternative to tendencies that we have argued are deeply destructive in our
current patterns of institutions, or whether religious institutions are simply one more
instance of the problem.”153 As far as these authors are concerned, in order for religion to
be part of the solution rather than the problem, it must “contribute to the search for the
common good,” and it will only be able to do that insofar as it is able to “understand and
respect different-faith communities in our pluralistic society.”154 In general, the authors
see the potential of religion assuming a transcendental role in overcoming the problem of
increasing fragmentation and individualization by “orient(ing) the quest to create a world
community in which individual dignity can be realized and not crushed by military,
political or market forces.”155
But The Good Society’s current diagnosis is that religion in the United States
disorients society, contributes to destructive tendencies, and reinforces utilitarianism. In
their analysis, religion in the United States is a destructive, rather than constructive force.
Though it has the potential to be constructive, it is not currently behaving relative to the
other social institutions in a way that builds up society. Functionally destructive is not
necessarily the same as violent. In order to investigate the potentially violent dimensions
of religion in the United States, I turn to the particular example of Christian theology, not
that it represents religion in its entirety in the United States, but that it offers us one lens
through which to understand how theology and religious practice combine with social
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functionality to have an even more profound impact on culture. For this discussion of
Christian theology, I turn to French literary critic René Girard.

Christian Violence
Girard’s observations about human nature and social order are informed by his
work in the field of literary criticism.156 Positing that recurring themes in great works of
literature, especially in religious myth, both reflect (model of) and inform (model for)
human social relationships, Girard detects a mechanism that shapes relations between and
among individuals and within entire societies. This mechanism goes largely undetected,
and, in fact, elements of it must be imperceptible or at least misinterpreted if they are to
be effective.157
The basic premise of this mechanism is that humans imitate one another. This is
fundamental to our learning processes and to our development of interpersonal
relationships. Girard uses the term mimesis to describe this process in a manner that
dissociates it from the idea of one-sided mimicry. In so doing he underscores the
reciprocity and mutuality of the imitation.158 In the simplest case, mimesis involves two
individuals who are imitating one another. They even imitate the mutual imitation, so
“each becomes the imitator of his [or her] own imitator and the model of his [or her] own
model.”159
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Mimesis, in and of itself, is not problematic for Girard. In fact, one can
understand the process as one which creates an intimacy between two parties. In the
extreme, knowing oneself is knowing the other, and knowing the other is knowing
oneself. Girard complicates mimesis and theories of imitation by interjecting the notion
of acquisition or appropriation.160 If one of the parties caught up in the mimetic process
desires to acquire or appropriate a particular object, his or her imitator will then also
reflect that desire. Mimesis intensifies the desire to appropriate that object simultaneously
and reciprocally in both parties, who are now trading roles as model and imitator for one
another. Eventually the urge to appropriate the object develops into the need to prevent
the other from acquiring that object. “Violence,” says Girard, “is the process itself when
two or more partners try to prevent one another from appropriating the object they all
desire through physical or other means.”161 Girard refers to the “partners” as “rivals” and
the process as “mimetic rivalry.” Similarly, he refers to the imitated and modeled desire
for an object as “mimetic desire.”162
The intensity of the rivalry which develops between and among people leads, if
left unchecked, to the ultimate action of preventing another actor from acquiring the
desired object. That ultimate action is murder of the rival. According to Girard, in order
to avoid mutual (imitated) murder, the rivals will channel their violent energy to a third
party, to which they will assign all the guilt and aspersions otherwise assigned by one
rival to the other. The sacrifice or scapegoating of the third party (victim/scapegoat), or
scapegoat, relieves the violent desires of the relationship and re-establishes order. At that
point the previous rivals recognize the sacrificed victim as being responsible for re160
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establishing order, and they celebrate the power that the victim wields to create unity and
social stability.163
A closer look at what Huntington identifies as the predominant religion of the
West, Christianity, in light of Girard’s thesis offers insight into how this meaning-making
institution makes meaning and establishes violent patterns of meaning-making. While
Girard contends that Christianity, as presented in the Gospel in particular, actually
contradicts the mythic mechanism of scapegoating and sacrifice as a way to diffuse
violence, he acknowledges that a classic misreading of the Gospel in terms of these
greater and longer enduring myths of humanity is possible and, indeed prevalent.164 The
misinterpretation involves understanding Christ’s death as sacrificial and, therefore, a
perpetuation of the myth and a reinforcement of social acceptance that avoiding violence
requires a sacrifice. While Girard claims that the Gospel in fact disrupts the myth in
several important ways, such as making explicit the innocence of the victim, in this case
Christ, he laments theology which understands Christ as taking away sin (and thereby
violence) with his death. Girard argues that the Gospel and Christ rather than taking away
sin through sacrifice, actually expose the sin of sacrifices altogether.165
So in spite of itself, according to Girard, Christianity actually conflates into and
conforms with the great myths of humanity that not only prescribe scapegoating and
sacrifice as a way to mitigate interpersonal and collective violence, but it goes a step
further. It makes such sacrifice and scapegoating a holy act.
This discussion foreshadows a consideration of religion – and Christianity in
particular – as having the capacity to reinterpret itself in a way that Girard sees as more
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authentic and non-sacrificial. But the need for such a reinterpretation demonstrates
precisely that Christianity actually makes meaning in sacrificial and violent ways.
So Christianity, as an expression of religion or Public Church in the United States
or the West, actually makes meaning for itself in a violent way. Since religion is the
meaning-making institution which encodes meaning-making patterns for other social
institutions, this sacrificial interpretation of Christianity informs the meaning-making
processes of US society generally and thereby each of the other three institutions more
particularly.
Reading The Good Society against a Girardian backdrop reveals on the level of
society that market patterns thrive on mimetic rivalry and state policies channel the
inevitable violence by legitimating forms of scapegoating and sacrifice. Further, and on
an institutional level, education’s subordination generally places it in service to the
market economy, inculcating and perpetuating patterns of rivalry while the increasingly
privatized church, in Bellah et al.’s terms, simultaneously exhibits and sanctifies the
scapegoating practices of the welfare state.166
The diminution of religion, which perhaps legitimated its own scapegoating on a
societal level, in the United States could very well explain both why Huntington
describes Western influence in secular terms and why the West’s conflicts with the rest of
the world are as stark as those more marked by religious identities. The market economy
and the political ideals actually make meaning in ways which are informed wholly by a
particular interpretation of Christianity, even if that interpretation no longer requires a
fully participatory religious institution on the societal or global scene. So the economic
influences in the West seek to engage more of the world in a mimetic rivalry – a rivalry
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which it now dominates, while the political institutions legitimate and celebrate acts of
scapegoating, such as sacrificial military engagements. The post September 11, 2001 USled strikes in Afghanistan, for example, exhibited mimetic rivalry to the extent they were
retaliatory, and the hunt for Osama bin Laden was an elaborate exercise that had the same
unifying effect of rallying a large disparate group at the expense of a scapegoat even
though bin Laden’s admissions and other evidence would disqualify him as a scapegoat
which is otherwise presumed to be innocent. The unsatisfactory (lack of sacrificial)
resolution of that hunt helped energize the war against, and later the search for, capture,
and execution of Saddam Hussein in Iraq.167
Religion, the institution of meaning, has encoded its fellow institutions with a
pattern of meaning-making which legitimates mimetic rivalry and scapegoating. The
Public Church, Education, The Political Economy, and Government/Law/Politics make
meaning in sacrificial ways as they shape the webs of significance that constitute the
cultures of society in the Untied States. Western civilization is greatly influenced by these
webs, and US citizens are surrounded by them, with few other, if any, resources for
synthesizing the is and the ought to make life meaningful.
Individuals are disconnected from one another not because of the lack of social
institutions to connect them, but because social institutions have grown so big that they
dwarf individuals and communal life. The meaning-making patterns embedded by the
sacrificial web of significance finds a victim-rich society of Lockean-defined mimetic
rivals. Finally, the most devastating symptom of this syndrome is the absence of religion
in public life. Without religion or a Public Church there is no place in which to engage in
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a common conversation about reconstituting the meaning-making processes themselves.
Since religious discourse is marginalized, then, public conversation about the meaningmaking processes it encodes are taboo subjects or at best private matters. There is no
public forum in which to question or reformulate the meaning-making patterns
themselves. Rivalry and sacrifice seem permanently encoded.
So Christianity in the United States makes meaning in violent ways. As a major
religion in the Untied States it functions to encode violent meaning-making mechanisms
in other social institutions. It can have this effect on other social institutions but because
of the private place to which religion has enabled United States society to relegate it, the
influence is not reciprocal. Public discourse about religion is minimized in United States
society, leaving other social institutions to synthesize meaning according to patterns that
are seemingly beyond the reach of reform. The role of social institutions in defining
interpersonal and global relationships makes this circumstance particularly toxic in the
United States and, given the role of the United States, in the world. The condition creates
a global environment in which the violence of sacrifice and scapegoating, even if
germane to other cultures as well, takes on hegemonic proportions. Reviving public
discourse about religion (at least in the United States), it would seem, is a pre-condition
for understanding and reforming a violent global culture. Until such a discourse takes
place, religion will continue to influence other institutions with its violent patterns for
meaning making. One of the institutions it influences is education. It is also education, as
a social institution which can provide the means to revive public discourse about religion.
In chapter four I will examine the way religion influences education and the way the two
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institutions are related historically and currently. In chapter five and beyond I explore
how the interdependence of education and religion illuminates a path for mutual revival.

CHAPTER FOUR
EDUCATION, RELIGION, AND VIOLENCE

One of the social institutions that religion’s apparently regressive and increasingly
violent patterns continue to influence is that of education. But specifically how and what
are the consequences of that influence? To investigate the mechanism by which religion
can influence education and education, in turn, global violence, I offer two examples
from the turn of two different centuries. By counter-example, these case studies suggest a
particular moral purpose for education in the milieu of social institutions. These studies
also simultaneously offer insight into why religion and education have had little to do
with one another in the US since World War I and why it is imperative to bridge that gulf
as we move into the twenty-first century.

Touching Transcendence
In Mars and Minerva: World War I and the Uses of Higher Learning in
America,168 Carol Gruber describes what, on the surface, seems to be a struggle for the
right relationship between Minerva, the Roman goddess of wisdom and Mars, the Roman
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god of war for US academics.169 However, I investigate the possibility that Gruber’s
account of higher education during World War I in fact demonstrates the advent of the
broad celebration of the values each of these deities represents in American life rather
than an Olympian feud. Gruber’s account reveals the monsters and giants that were
created by the commingling of gods and mortals by showing how the otherwise
transcendent ideal of service to society was conflated by academics with the relatively
truncated telos of serving the state.
In her book, Gruber uses the crisis of World War I as a window into the
increasingly close relationship between academic institutions in the United States and the
United States government. The changing nature of this relationship influences and is
influenced by the way academics regarded their roles and the role of scholarship in
society. Her analysis traces what she judges to be a compromise in academic integrity as
scholars increasingly devote their work to the needs of the government as a wartime
exigency with lasting implications for the relationship of the academy and the state
In a pursuit Gruber casts as a seemingly desperate search for relevance, scholars
in the United States struggled to realize (make real) the ideal of service to society and, to
the extent they were successful, they indeed touched the transcendent, bringing the
normative to bear on the ontological.170 A precept valued because of its ability to outlast
any particular historical circumstance, institution or individual, the ideal of service in
American higher education ceased to be a transcendent goal. In the grasp of academics,
the notion of society was artificially limited to the notion of state, and service became an
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instrument deployed by the academic community and, thereby, the government, to
achieve ends largely unrelated to the purposes of the academy.171
The reduction of academic purpose extended beyond the notion of service. This
same time period saw a movement away from inquiry for its own sake toward the
application of knowledge. This transition was as evident in the realm of the sciences as
anywhere. While the post-Civil War period saw a sharp increase in the value of “pure
science,” historian Laurence Veysey points out that the years immediately leading up to
World War I saw a reversal of this trend. “The Progressive Era brought with it the
expectation of prominently displayed altruistic motives in all lines of endeavor. As a
result, first-rate scientists began to produce numerous statements linking their work to
practical social benefit.”172 While this phenomenon frames Veysey’s theory about the rise
in prominence of all sorts of research, it also provided the backdrop for the development
of what Dorothy Ross calls a “scientific view of the world [which was] an essential
element in the increasingly rational character of modern society” in the nineteenth
century.173 Ross discusses the development of the social sciences after the Civil War and
points to the founding of the Social Sciences Research Council after World War I as the
symbol of the emergence of the social sciences professions and their respective
independent academic disciplines. However social scientists, especially those she terms
the “heterodox,” found expression, legitimacy, and “refuge” in the founding of the New
School for Social Research in 1918 just after the war had begun.174
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Just as the social sciences were applying the technical expertise of empirical
investigation to social problems, liberal Protestant theologians were grappling with a
Christian faith that had increasingly become intellectually untenable in the face of the
rapid advances in the sciences and the increasingly prominent role of science in society.
Darwinism particularly challenged previously held beliefs about the nature of creation
(and the creation of nature), and participated in the dissociation of seeking truth from
seeking the divine.175 In their own struggle for relevance, liberal Protestants applied
theology and the newfound tools of the social sciences to the troubling problems of the
day in a movement whose theology became known as the Social Gospel.176
While the scholars Gruber describes nationalized the ideal of service to society,
social scientists applied empirical inquiry, and Protestant theologians took deliberate
steps toward establishing the kingdom of God on earth, particularly in the United
States.177 In each case, the pure had mingled with the practical. By touching
transcendence, the scholars, social scientists, and theologians unleashed unforeseen
powers while diminishing the potency of enduring educational and religious purposes by
fashioning them into provisional and temporal tools.
In order to understand the effects of the power which was unleashed by three
interdependent moves toward utility, I wish to consider not how the reduction of the ideal
to the practical was, in of itself, operative, but how that reduction functioned to create and
sustain relationships between and among social actors, including groups of individuals
and institutions. The relationships I wish to examine are between US intellectuals and
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German academics, United States scholars, and the United States Government, and,
finally, social scientists and liberal Protestants.
Each of these paired relationships can be characterized as mimetic rivalries.
Girard’s theory of mimetic relationships explains the apparent contradictions of these
unlikely partnerships such as the adoption of language and practices native to one
institutional context by another seemingly unrelated, and often competitive, institutional
context. Such rivalrous relationships reduce conflict between the actors whether they are
individuals or institutions but do so at the expense of a victim, the sacrifice of which,
brings unity between (or among) the rivals. The act of sacrifice, however, actually
elevates the victim as a god whose immolation brought unity to a relationship (or
multiple relationships) which otherwise may have been headed toward the mutual
destruction of the parties involved.178

Mimesis: Mars and Minerva
I read Gruber’s account not as one demonstrating how the power of the ideal of
service to society was deployed on behalf of Mars or Minerva at the expense of the other.
Rather, it illustrates how service became the mechanism for mediating relationships
between United States scholars and their German intellectual parents, on the one hand,
and between US academics and the United States government on the other.179 Rather than
read Gruber’s work as an account of the struggle between the forces of Mars and
Minerva, I believe it is possible to read her book as a record of the metaphorical birth of
both deities in the twentieth century United States.
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The relationship between US scholars and their German counterparts as well as
the relationship between these same US educators and the United States government can
be understood in terms of mimetic rivalry. Doing so brings consistency to the apparent
contradiction between the US educators’ indebtedness to German scholarship and their
willingness to indict Germans as militaristic and imperialistic.180 Mimetic rivalry also
offers a coherent explanation for the willingness with which otherwise independent
academic institutions freely gave over facilities and faculties to the state for the war
fighting effort.181
Gruber outlines the relationship between German scholars and US scholars in the
latter part of the nineteenth century and the early part of the twentieth century. That this
relationship was mimetic is illustrated by the degree to which United States colleges and
universities adapted the German model of higher education to the US context.182 She also
lays out the indebtedness German scholars expected their US students and colleagues to
feel when many of the former took it upon themselves to become apologists for the
Kaiser’s cause.183 United States scholars responded to the German defense with ridicule,
criticizing their German colleagues of abandoning their commitment to objectivity to
which they had been so dedicated and which they had imbued in their US students.
Nevertheless, the balance of the book, Mars and Minerva, demonstrates how keenly US
scholars continued to learn from their German tutors even if the lesson was, as Gruber’s
argument demonstrates, how to lay objectivity aside for the needs of the state.184
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The transatlantic criticism continued and intensified throughout the war,
according to Gruber, as the two intellectual communities vied for the position of being
interpreters of the truth about the war. Though not a tangible object, the authoritative role
for interpreting the “facts” surrounding the war became the object of mutual desire for the
two communities whose relationship was reinforced with frequent communication and
professional association.185
In their competing attempts to frame the war intellectually, academics sacrificed
the prized goal of objective and dispassionate scholarship. The sacrifice redirected their
increasing hostility for one another toward the ideal that lay at the foundation upon which
the integrity of the emerging profession depended, namely the objective search for
truth.186
At the same time that United States scholars were in relationship with their
German counterparts, they were also trying to find the right relationship with those in
power within the United States government, especially the president and the military.187
US higher education had long associated its purposes with the project of building up
democratic society. In fact, the project of civilizing the new world had been the province
of education just as administering that society was the project of government.188 The
events leading up to World War I beckoned the US out of its isolationist posture and,
perhaps, for the first time opened up the question of exporting the US project by creating
and promoting a United States style democratic society beyond US shores. As President
Wilson increasingly framed resistance to the Kaiser’s expansionism as the promotion of

185

The debate and communication are most clearly laid out in her chapter “Neutrality Years.” Ibid., 46-80.
Ibid., 35-41.
187
Ibid., 118-62.
188
Ibid., 12.
186

102
democratic ideals, the two institutions involved in the creation and sustaining of
democracy vied for jurisdiction over the project of central European democracy.189 US
higher education and US government were involved in a mimetic relationship that drew
them closer and closer to one another. In fact, the two institutions began to look more and
more alike as the mutual imitation intensified.190 In competing for the role of
democratizing Germany, the two joined forces in denouncing what Gruber identified as
German militarism.191 While the rivalry faded to the background in this relationship more
so than the rivalry between German and US scholars, the dynamic was no different. The
effects of the dynamic were most clearly identified by Gruber in her chapter, “Colleges
and Commandants.”192
Gruber marvels at the ease with which United States intellectuals handed over
their institutions and their talents to the needs of the government. It seems that the
transfer of power was one-way. She does not note as much of a compromise by the
government as she does on the part of the academy. However, as she points out, the
military chose to forgo immediate conscription of much needed young men in order to
work with the academic institutions and keep them afloat during an otherwise disastrous
economic circumstance.193 At the very least, the decision to use the colleges as training
grounds, if you will, could be read as the government giving in to the needs of higher
education in a way that mimicked higher education’s giving in to increasing government
control of schools.
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Mimesis: Faith and Knowledge
These mimetic relationships were evolving against another institutional backdrop
which was shifting as well. Notably, the relationship between the US social institutions of
education and religion was transforming by a similar mechanism. This shift precedes the
analysis of The Good Society and may have been a significant condition for the state of
religion (as privatized) and education (as subordinate to the state) in the US later in the
twentieth century even though the two institutions, by mimesis grew very close together
during World War I itself. This qualitatively influenced the nature of the US academy
which was in turn mimicking and being mimicked by the state and, likewise, by the
German academy.
The years leading up to the extremely close wartime relationship between
colleges and the military were marked by a great deal of curricular change and identity
shifts for institutions of higher learning, especially insofar as it relates to the place of
religion in education. James Turner contrasts colleges before and after the Civil War by
noting the loss of the unified understanding of knowledge provided by the Bible and the
consequential coherent structuring of the curriculum around the epistemological
supremacy of sacred revelation.194 There were several attempts to restore a sense of
integrity to a more secularized curriculum and, Turner suggests that, at least for awhile,
the notion of liberal culture provided a substantive unifying principle.195 Veysey echoes
this assessment and chronicles the diminished role of religion in the curriculum as well as
the easing of compulsory religious practices at colleges and universities of all sizes.196
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While there were many colleges and universities established by religious orders
and denominations between the Civil War and World War I, many of these were founded
in order to resist a growing trend toward secularization in the nation.197 The creation of
new colleges, however, could not undo the epistemological shift which unseated divine
revelation as the source of knowledge and the unifying principle for teaching and
learning. Religion, in many cases, became one part of the curriculum and one dimension
of a school’s identity. Once the coherent driver of college curriculum, the Bible was
properly studied only among other great works of literature according to some faculty
members at Yale and Brown.198
I do not wish to paint colleges and universities as faithless secular deserts during
this time period. Certainly that is not the case and certainly not all institutions followed
these trends. In the main, however, the point I wish to make is that knowledge was no
longer defined by faith, and education for liberal culture by and large had replaced, in
Veysey’s terms, “piety and discipline.”199
The feeling was mutual. The church just as much as the academy was responsible
for the widening gulf between faith and knowledge. During what William McLoughlin
calls the “Third Great Awakening,” a “national prophet” with the most appropriate name,
Billy Sunday, arose on the heels of the urban revival ministry of D.L. Moody. Carrying
on the nascent fundamentalism, Sunday attacked new scientific theories which had
caused a good deal of confusion and fear for many Christian believers.200 “Evolution and
the naturalistic, pragmatic philosophy of the ‘new social science’…seemed to undermine
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the whole basis of the Christian faith as the romantic evangelicals understood it.”201
Sunday and other fundamentalists articulated a notion of salvation that was personal, and
academics seemed pleased to cede that sphere in exchange for their universal self-defined
relevance.
Against the backdrop of this widening gulf between personal faith and universal
knowledge developed attention to what became a contested middle ground, the social.
The academy and the church demonstrated a common concern for a better and more just
social order and to make sense of the newfound understanding of the place and role of the
human being in that order. An atheist, and the first professor of sociology at Brown
University, Lester Ward applied Darwin’s theory of evolution to human activity in the
world in a way that refuted the association of natural selection with laissez-faire approach
to social interaction. With an understanding of the human brain as both a product and an
influencer of evolution, Ward advocated what he called “‘fraternalism [as] the basis of
political order and progress, not competition. Finally, he declared that education is the
key to man’s mastery of his environment and therefore that the highly trained social
scientist must assume an active role…in setting the wisest policies for…progress.”202
Around the same time theologians were coming to terms with a new theological
coherence developed in light of emerging scientific understanding and prevailing
humanism. Progressive theologians’ acceptance of the Darwinian theory of evolution led
to an understanding of “the imminence of God, the organic or solidaristic view of society,
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and the presence of the kingdom of heaven on earth…[thus linking] moral and religious
improvement to the current optimistic belief in progress.203
These two philosophical positions did not develop in isolation from one another.
In fact, the liberal theologians were largely influenced by Ward and others in the
academy.204 Both academics and clerics desired social progress and each group had its
own way of achieving it. As liberal Protestants worked toward the social salvation of
realizing the kingdom of God on earth, social scientists engaged in social engineering to
foster liberal culture. These two schools of reformers were in frequent communication,
but a “post-Christian” humanist element developed it the academy just as the Christocentric Social Gospel was beginning to take its own shape in the church.205
The distinction between the academy and the church was not pure to be sure and,
as the common pursuit of a social good began to take shape, the way each articulated
their positions began to sound very much like the other. In fact, McLoughlin points out
the advantage of the difference between Ward’s voice as progressive academic
spokesperson and that of, perhaps his successor in that role, John Dewey who was willing
“to speak in accents of liberal Protestantism.”206 The relationship between progressive
academics and liberal Protestants was increasingly mimetic to the point of creating a kind
of unity embodied by Richard T. Ely who facilitated the formation of the United States
Economic Association which was as much grounded in liberal theology as it was in social
science.207
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Not only was the mimetic relationship in which both (groups of) actors desired to
articulate a place for human action in the advancement of society personified by Ely’s
integration of academic and religious approaches, it was institutionalized at the
University of Wisconsin under John Bascom and others at the turn of the century. David
Hoeveler describes Bascom, Ely, and John Commons as bringing “perspectives on the
educational functions of the university that were shaped by their own efforts to define a
Social Gospel program for America. But the “Wisconsin Idea” was not in any strict sense
a religious concept.”208
What had begun as two distinct approaches to social progress began to look more
and more alike as theologians adapted social science for their use in framing and
spreading the Gospel and as social scientists used the force of religion to invade personal
and corporate sentiment and retain a social cohesion for their ideas. Even atheistic Ward
valued religion as a “‘social instinct’ for the conservation of existing institutions.”209 Ely
called for “‘profound revival of religion’ and employed all the force and style of
evangelical rhetoric…[shifting] attention to the state…[as] the critical vehicle of social
improvement and moral power.”210 Thus, the social sciences became evangelical and the
Gospel became social.

From Rivalry to Sacrifice - Faith and Knowledge
As lecterns looked more and more like pulpits, the looming war put academics
and theologians alike to the test. President Wilson, the son of a Presbyterian minister and
208
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former academic, articulated a justification for the war that resonated with the object of
mimetic desire for progressive academics and liberal Protestants, namely social
transformation.211 By framing the war as one to end all war and by insisting on its ability
to make the world safe for democracy, Wilson offered the rivalrous partners the ultimate
progressive transformation. The mimetic rivalry had intensified between the two so much
that the means for transformation was essentially ignored. Never mind the fact that
progressive academics had originally placed their faith in the capacity of the human mind
in a social context to bring about liberal culture, and that liberal Protestants had counted
on the power of the Gospel of the Prince of Peace to realize the kingdom of heaven on
earth, academics and theologians alike had become preoccupied with their desired
outcome through intense imitation of the desire of the other. Their perspectives ultimately
merged into an almost wholesale support of the war effort.212
After the war, the Federal Council of Churches, an organizational manifestation
of the Social Gospel movement, would lament its support of the war, but Social Gospel
advocates and progressive academics were quite articulate, if not passionate, about their
support before and during the war.213 “Dewey justified the war as a means of social
control in both a more immediate and more wide-ranging sense…Dewey saw the
prospect of permanent socialization, permanent replacement of private and possessive
interest by public and social interest, both within and among nations.”214
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Ely, the personification of the unity of faith and knowledge, displayed a great deal
of regret at not being able to fight in the war himself. In addition he led a campaign
against his gubernatorial ally in the development of the “Wisconsin Idea,” Senator Robert
LaFollette who had expressed anti-war sentiment.215
US entry into World War I provided the opportunity for academics and
theologians alike to display their highly intensified, mutual, and competitive desire for
social change, apparently even at the cost of war. Their rational origins and evolutionary
hope had given way to a lust for immediate transformation. The two institutions had
grown mimetically so closely together that Ely’s argument did not have to draw explicitly
on theology or sociology to embody a relatively united position. The war had effectively
completed a sacrifice of the previous separation of faith and knowledge which had grown
important to the church and the academy prior to the rise of the Social Gospel movement.
Insofar as higher education was represented by progressive social scientists and insofar as
the church was represented by liberal Protestants, their common and competitive desire
for social transformation led to a radical unity of faith and knowledge, sacrificing their
previous relatively well-defined isolation from one another.

From Rivalry to Sacrifice – Mars and Minerva
In a parallel and simultaneous process, as the war continued, colleges also
looked more and more like military camps, and commanders more and more assumed the
role of instructor, tutor, or dorm monitor. Not only was the academy caught up in a
mimetic relationship with the church, its wartime service had created a similar dynamic
with the state. Both institutions were reshaped by the relationship. The latter two were
215

Ibid., 113-4, 208.

110
united in a common cause, suppressing (German) militarism. In joining together to
“defeat the Hun,” education and government essentially scapegoated militarism as
embodied by the German aggression.216 While it is not until the end of her book that
Gruber began to note any discord between academics and bureaucrats, the fact that these
two entities were not in conflict, but allied is only stronger evidence that the common
enemy or object of derision had brought them together and kept them together. The unity
of school and fort continued beyond World War I, even if expressed in new and less
drastic ways. The successful completion of the sacrifice of German militarism in wartime
victory forged a relationship between school and state that was explicitly stronger than
any relationship between German and U.S scholars, at least as far as Gruber is concerned.
Not only did US scholars participate in the sacrifice of German militarism in
partnership with the US government, they also participated in the sacrifice of objective
inquiry in conjunction with German intellectuals. Both of these sacrificial mechanisms
grew out of mimetic rivalries. While the sacrifice of militarism was, on the surface,
inimical to any prospect of unity in a relationship among United States and German
scholars, I suggest that a deeper analysis reveals the emergence of a renewed and
common commitment on the part of both German and US scholars to the objective
pursuit of truth. Intellectuals on both sides of World War I, by sacrificing intellectual
objectivity, actually participated in a process which led to its veneration. This
sanctification, if you will, occurred not in spite of, but because of the sacrifice.217
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Likewise, the joint defeat of militarism by US professors and generals resulted in
the “absence of a principled objection to the militarization of the campus”218 and the reestablishment of the Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC).219 These phenomena
signal the dawn of a new era of United States military might that depended on a
cooperative relationship between school and state, the consequences of which Gruber
foreshadows in her brief discussion of World War II.220

God-making and Integrity at the Dawn of a New Century
The operative sacrifices of the faith - knowledge duality, objective inquiry, and
militarism during World War I did not destroy any of the three. In fact it made them all
the more important. James Williams points to the Latin roots of the word sacrifice – to
make sacred – in order to demonstrate that the ultimate power of scapegoating is the
power to make gods.221 Communities celebrate the victim whose immolation brought
them unity in the face of severe rivalry. The mutual destruction of academic objectivity
by German and US professors and the defeat of the German military machine gave birth
to twentieth century versions of Minerva, the goddess of wisdom and Mars, the god of
war respectively. Similarly, the sacrifice of the separation of faith and knowledge
beatified the duality, again distancing the relationship between school and church.
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Gruber laments the professors’ abdication of the position of “critical
independence” for the sake of pursuing military victory.222 This abdication, and the
compromise position on academic freedom assumed by the American Association of
University Professors (AAUP), are cast as a lack of personal and organizational
integrity.223 While it is true that these changes are reversals from previous practice and
that they lack integrity from the standpoint of conventional academic practice of the day,
they have integrity when understood in light of the mimetic relationships at work. While
perhaps a departure from what their German tutors initially taught them, US professors’
forfeiture of objectivity on matters of war was wholly consistent with the concurrent
actions of those whom they regarded as mentors and guides. The mimetic relationship
across the ocean was intact and unified, even if the action and practices seem inconsistent
from one year to the next.
Similarly, the giving over of college campuses and aims to the War Department
on one hand compromised the relative independence and isolation college campuses
enjoyed prior to World War I, but on the other hand demonstrated the coherence of the
relationship between school and state in the project of building society. 224 In Gruber’s
terms, it was a natural extension of the ideal of service to society, especially when, as she
observes, the notion of society is conflated with the notion of state.225
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Gruber also observes that professors seemed to be oblivious to the compromises
they were making and seemed to be swept up in a hysterical movement in the same way
that the Federal Council of Churches confessed what it termed “‘the blind servility with
which the Christian Church gave itself to the government of the United States in 1917
and 1918.’”226 Misapprehension and denial of the scapegoating process are essential
elements of Girard’s theory. If the actors in a given mimetic rivalry are aware of the
scapegoating they are effecting, then the sacrifice becomes impotent relative to the goal
of diminishing the rivalry between the protagonists. One key mechanism for preserving
and intensifying this misapprehension is the dynamic of mob violence or what Gruber
might call hysteria which explains why “the legion of learned men…prostituted
themselves by offering ‘their intellectual gifts upon the altar of the nation.’”227
The gods of the ideal of service to society, pure scientific inquiry, and of personal
salvation fell from Olympus when US intellectuals reduced service to relevant practice,
and inquiry to application, and when clergy sent Jesus to war. In reaching out and
realizing (making real) otherwise transcendent ideals, colleges, universities, and churches
stripped moral purpose of its power to inspire intellectuals and believers to greater causes
that survive time and cross national boundaries. The power deployed toward the end of
obtaining the defined objectives of the war and of a good society ultimately
consummated those goals and gave birth to two new transcendent gods, Mars and
Minerva while dismissing Jesus, i.e. the previously dominant Christian faith, from any
clearly defined substantive public role in the academy. So while relationships with state
and federal governments and burgeoning research agendas settle into academic life after
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World War I, the academy engages in a search for its soul as the church struggles with its
exile from the academy it had helped create.228
Clearly at least three of the four major social institutions described by Bellah et
al., namely religion, education and government, are engaged in the social transformations
at the beginning of the twentieth century. A Griardian analysis shows how easily mimesis
can lead to the conflation of institutional frameworks in which there is very little
difference among church, academy, and state. Recall the role of religion as the institution
that encodes meaning-making processes for society. If religion - in the US, Christianity is writing and rewriting the violent myth described by Girard that each of these social
systems continues to deploy, then it infects education and government as the two draw
closer and closer together. This analysis demonstrated that education during World War I
at last gave up its role as objective inquirer the more it imitated the state. Education,
which, in Gruber’s estimation, should have served as the gateway for the ontological,
sought to impose norms on society. This search intensified in and through the mimetic
rivalries with German academics and the US Government.
While the subject of this example is not a particular leader, in Gruber’s account it
is clear that all the social actors were seeking to impose norms on reality. If Government
indeed does embody the norms of a society, at least in a democracy, then what happened
during the “war to end all wars” was a conflation of education - otherwise the gateway to
the ontological through learning and reasoning – and church – the would-be synthesizer
of moral meaning – into the normative dimension embodied institutionally by the state.
The collective meaning-making strategy of imposing the normative on the ontological led
228
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to the abdication of two social institutions, education, and religion and thereby kept the
system from opening up to objective inquiry and new information, and from synthesizing
the is and the ought respectively.
The is and the ought should have been kept in tension with one another rather
than being completely aligned. The normative dominance led to a developmental
regression on an institutional scale. This regression was encoded by the myth-making
religion – Christianity – as a rivalry which ultimately devolved into a system death in
need of a sacrifice to re-establish order. The Germans, along with the ideals outlined
above, filled the role of the scapegoat and victim necessary to re-establish order.
Neglected to this point is the role of the market economy in funding the
imposition of the normative on the ontological, driving education and religion into the
hegemonic purview of the state. As I have shown, however, a source of power such as
economic energy is vital to the continued endothermic imposition of the normative on the
ontological, particularly on the international scale. When such a conflation of Moral
Meaning Matrix dimensions, embodied by social institutions, occurs, the hunger for that
energy can redirect the moral purpose of those institutions toward the prospect of
maximizing resources. Once that final conflation, a conflation with the dynamic
dimension of the Moral Meaning Matrix, is complete, the consequences can be global
and deadly.

Colleges at War
In the United States, at least, on the level of social complexity identified in the
Moral Meaning Matrix as society, education institutionalizes the ontological dimension,
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prescribing the expected patterns of behavior relative to generalizing from the particular
and reasoning about information gleaned from learning. Education functions for the
ontological in the same way that religion institutionalizes signification. On the level of
complexity, described as institution in the Moral Meaning Matrix, education has, in its
own right, symbol, ritual, and a nomos within the realms over which society gives it
jurisdiction. In that way, education conveys and creates normative as well as ontological
elements. However, when education is contributing to the larger society, its rituals
prescribe and govern the way society makes sense of the ontological. So, my claim that
education institutionalizes the ontological is not to say that it is free of normative
elements nor is it to say that its norms and symbols are not translated into a societal
worldview. It is a claim, however, that education, functionally serves to establish and
legitimate the means and the terms by which society learns and forms a collective
worldview which is put into conversation with, and thereby influences, a society’s ethos.
Similarly, my analysis of Gruber’s account demonstrates how the government or
Government/Law/Politics in Bellah et al.’s terms institutionalizes the normative, setting
forth the means and the terms by which society establishes that ethos. This is evident in
the government’s elaborate policy making, interpretation, and execution functions. With
police and military power, it can, in very real ways, impose sanctions to enforce expected
patterns of institutionalized behavior. This leaves the dynamic dimension of reality and
one of The Good Society’s institutions remaining. In capitalistic US society, it may go
without saying that the economy is associated with power and therefore the dynamic
dimension of reality and the matrix. Yet the proposition bears testing. In order to test it
however, I will draw on examples outside the United States context. This will do two
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things. First it permits a functional understanding of the broader institutional pattern of
economy, and with that functional understanding, apart from a strict identity with US
capitalism, I can demonstrate the power necessary to make meaning. Second, it allows
me to explore the particular ways the economy institutionalizes violence by setting up the
power sources in the dynamic dimension of reality as objects of desire and, thereby
catalyzes rivalry and sacrifice.
In the following example drawn from two universities in the hotly contested
Middle East, I will use the term utilitarian to describe the phenomenon which equates
economic gains with citizenship demonstrating the conflating of the normative and
dynamic dimensions of the Moral Meaning Matrix. In other words, economic
achievement, development, and advancement show themselves to be, at least in the
mission statements and operational behavior of these educational organizations, preconditions for political identity. The economy in this example co-opts notions of
statehood and those notions of statehood co-opt the purposes of education.
A bomb exploded in the Frank Sinatra cafeteria on Hebrew University’s Mount
Scopus campus in Jerusalem. According to the “Embassy of Israel Briefing” of July 31,
2002, the Islamic Resistance Movement Hamas claimed responsibility for the bombing
that day which killed nine students, faculty members, and staff members, as an act of
revenge for the “recent counter-terrorist operation against Hamas Military Commander
Salah Shehada in Gaza.”229 Israeli troops had killed Shehada just days before.230
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In January 2003 Israeli authorities closed the doors of two Palestinian Universities
in Hebron (Hebron University and Palestine Polytechnic University) apparently in
response to previous suicide bomb attacks in Tel Aviv.231 The move was denounced by
the American Council on Education and the Canadian Association of University Teachers
and spawned a debate among United Kingdom educators about an “academic boycott of
Israel.”232 Israeli officials justified the closures on the grounds that the “chemistry and
computer labs at the universities were being used to research and train terrorists to build
bombs.”233
In recent years, institutions of higher education have moved to the front lines of
the Israel-Palestine conflict. Again Girard’s lens is useful. Understanding Hebrew
University, Hebron University, and Palestine Polytechnic University as instruments used
to gain advantage over rivals in the quest for land and economic empowerment exposes
the perils of a utilitarian or technical purpose for higher education, which are more
pronounced in the Middle East because it provides an acutely competitive and a
particularly violent context.234
The development of the organizational purposes of these three universities
contributes to their perceived legitimacy as military and terrorist targets. Participation of
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such organizations in mimetic rivalry sets up the universities as unwitting participants in
an increasingly violent social competition.
Rethinking of the purposes of the modern university in favor of one which
understands and exposes the mimetic mechanism could help universities escape
participation in such a destructive process and, moreover, act as an alternative to it. This
new conception of purpose will depend upon a more profound moral understanding of the
university than the prevailing technical or utilitarian model. Such a purpose will have to
cross national and political borders in order to sustain a notion of society-building that is
a broader and more profound endeavor than nation-building. 235
The language of retaliation and revenge in the rhetoric surrounding the closures
and the bombing discussed above is emblematic of the mimetic process involved in the
Israel-Palestine conflict.236 Each act is linked to a previous act. The violence feeds upon
itself to the point that no one is sure who acted first. The mimetic process makes that
question irrelevant. Each actor, the Israeli government and various Palestinian militants
in this case, perpetrate violent acts in response to violent acts. This type of war-like
context makes explicit what otherwise might be more subtle acts of mimetic violence.
But is the mimesis related to a common mimetic desire? If so, then is the violence more
than just mutual imitation? Has it become mimetic rivalry over that same object?
I suggest that the answer to all of these questions is yes. It is almost cliché to talk
about the Israel-Palestine conflict as a battle for land, but truly that is what it is. It is a
battle for land, but it is also a battle for independent statehood. In order to move beyond
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this assertion, I will examine how the desire to establish two states in the same land is
expressed by the three key subjects of this discussion: Hebrew University, Hebron
University, and Palestine Polytechnic University.

Universities as Mimetic Rivals
Hebrew University was established in 1925, the fulfillment of a dream articulated
as early as 1918 that “establishing a ‘University of the Jewish People’ in the Land of
Israel formed an integral part of the early Zionist vision.”237 The Zionist dream was
encouraged at that time by British influence, and later rule, over the region after World
War I and by Britain’s explicit support for a Jewish homeland in a land populated largely
by Arabs.238 The history of Hebrew University traces that school’s development through
the various wars of the last century, which repeatedly moved borders and boundaries,
sometimes leaving the original campus isolated from what has evolved into Israel
proper.239
The undulating demarcations also took their toll on the Palestinian side. To battle
the sense and effect of isolation, the mayor of Hebron in 1967 established a college, later
to become Hebron University, when he “realized that the Israeli occupation of the West
Bank and Gaza would eventually lead to isolating the cities and towns attempting to
create uneducated, easily ruled Palestinians.”240 Established in 1978, Palestine
Polytechnic University (PPU), also located in Hebron, states its mission in the
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affirmative, perhaps building on Hebron University’s earlier commitment to being a
countervailing force against Israeli occupation. PPU’s mission is “to produce and support
the leaders of tomorrow...for Palestine and the world.”241
Hebrew University grew up with and fostered the very idea of Jewish statehood.
The two Palestinian universities developed as a response to the state of Israel insofar as
they were attempting to hold onto or define what Palestinian identity would be in this
new context. Holding onto that identity was particularly challenging during this time
period because it was marked by a series of wars and accords which shifted boundaries
both between Israelis and Palestinians and between Israel and neighboring states.242
The purposes of all three of these institutions are closely linked with the
establishment of national identities, if not formal states, and the related issue of having a
place for those states to call home. While a case can be made for the theoretical
independence of the ideas of national identity and land, I think it is quite a different story
to dissociate the idea of an independent nation-state from the acquisition and control of
the land to serve as a nation’s home. Hebrew University, Hebron University, and
Palestine Polytechnic University, therefore define themselves by the quest for
independent nationhood and to elaborate national success through the preparation of
individuals for participatory and advanced citizenship.
Israel and Palestine each desire an independent nation on the same land.243 Israeli
and Palestinian higher education institutions express and strengthen those simultaneous
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desires to preserve, in the case of Israel, or establish, in the case of Palestine, competing
nation-states. The Israel-Palestine conflict, insofar as it involves establishing two nations
with the same borders, exemplifies mimetic desire for the land as well as for independent
nationhood. The three universities under discussion focus and symbolize this desire and
provide the means for more effective participation in the rivalrous relationship between
Israelis and Palestinians. Not only does academe exacerbate the mimetic desire, it
becomes an instrument of mimetic rivalry. As instruments of the rivalry, these
universities, therefore, participate in the process of violence.

Nation-building and Utilitarianism
Originating with the founding purposes, and within the context of war and quests
for independence, the Middle East academy’s role as an instrument of mimetic rivalry is
complicated by two related factors: the conflation of the idea of society-building with
nation-building and, consequently, the triumph of utilitarian aims over moral identity.244
In his message on Hebrew University’s website, President Menachem Magidor mourns
the loss of the nine members of his community, but in doing so he describes Hebrew
University as “an inseparable part of the society fabric of the State of Israel.” 245
Similarly, the Hebron University website reflects on the persistence of the University’s
mission in light of Israeli actions: “Despite such hardships, the University continues to
expand in new and creative ways in order to better meet the needs of the Palestinian
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society.”246 While PPU does not seem to make the link as generally and as explicitly as
the other two, the mission statement of the College of Engineering Technology describes
its programs and curricula as “carefully designed to address the current and future needs
of the Palestinian community.”247
On the surface, these statements do not seem dissimilar to what sociologist and
The Good Society co-author William Sullivan advocates as education’s role in building a
democratic society when he contrasts twentieth-century US higher education with “its
founding conception of itself as a participant in the life of civil society.”248 In America,
he illustrates a shift in purpose from that founding concept to what he calls “instrumental
individualism.”249
Each of the statements above orients education toward a particular telos or end of
establishing or preserving the society of a particular nation. While Sullivan’s loftiest
goals for US higher education only relate to cultivating United States democracy, I wish
to appropriate his utilitarian description of education as a critique of any model which
seeks to advance the goals of a particular nation rather than the goals of society generally.
In this respect, this discussion also serves as a critique, not of the rationale offered by
Sullivan, but of his limiting his discussion to the project of forwarding US democracy
only. His arguments and evidence are squarely situated in the US context, so it is
justifiable for him to make claims only about the potential for US civic life. However, the
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lessons from United States higher education, which Sullivan lifts up, might be instructive
in other contexts, especially those heavily influenced by US notions of the academy.
Sullivan describes post World War II higher education in US as
“advancing…major tasks then seen as essential to national interest.”250 This, he notes, is
evidence of a trend toward instrumentalism marked by projects that were “aimed at
particular strategic outcomes….focusing so relentlessly on contributing to external
goals… [thereby losing]…the inclination to address these ends from its own intrinsic
responsibilities.”251 Sullivan continues by discussing the indispensable role of science,
particularly in military applications and by pointing out the aims of education being
oriented toward economic empowerment.252
These same aspirations seem to be reflected in the development of the three
Middle East universities. They are as ambitious about their own national security and
enhancement as US institutions. The curricular offerings of the Middle East universities
exemplify commitments to the specialties that provide for technological advancement and
economic empowerment. Hebron and Hebrew Universities have faculties of arts and
humanities respectively, but the bulk of the academic programs reflect a bias toward
professional education and the application of, rather than the pursuit of knowledge.253
PPU is the most extreme example of this phenomenon with a “College of Applied
Science” and a “College of Applied Professions.”254 Not only do the universities
understand themselves as instruments at the service of nation-states, they perform their
duties as instruments in an almost thoroughly instrumental or utilitarian manner.
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As instrumental instruments of nation-states, Hebron University, Hebrew
University, and Palestine Polytechnic University not only participate in, but are also key
loci of mimetic rivalry between Palestine and Israel. Palestinians and Israelis are both
training themselves for economic advantage and for technological superiority in order to
lay claim to the same land as home for their respective, yet competitive, nation-states. In
this way, these institutions in this superheated context illustrate the link between Girard’s
notion of mimetic rivalry and a utilitarian understanding of higher education.
Further, as instruments of the rivalry with strategic goals aligned in support of two
nations, which are essentially at war with each other, the universities also become
strategic targets for military or terrorist violence.255 When examined in this way, the
involvement of higher education on the front lines of the Middle East conflict is not as
surprising as it might seem to be on the surface. These universities are rivals preparing
rivals for the sake of domination.
Nevertheless the targeting of the universities for closure and for terrorist attacks is
dissonant with our concept of the place that academe ought to occupy in society as
evidenced by numerous protests from educators.256 The attacks and closures of the
universities, judged by many in the international education community to be despicable,
are acts which are consistent with the utilitarian, state-serving role higher education has
carved out for itself in Israel and Palestine as well as in the US. So the dissonance
originates, not in the way universities are being treated in battle, but in the fact which the
battle illustrates, namely the diminished teleological role of the university in modern
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society. Sullivan, in “Institutional Identity and Social Responsibility in Higher
Education,” and in conjunction with his colleagues in The Good Society, calls for a
reversal of the trend which understands higher education as subordinate to government or
other institutions, and he calls for an assertion of education as an institution in its own
right, free from the hegemonic control of the institutions of politics and the economy.257
While associated with these other social institutions, education ought not be in service to
them.

The Moral Purpose of Education
One way to approach the liberation of education from the more dominant spheres
of influence of economy and government is to consider how academe can serve to thwart
the mechanism of mimetic rivalry. Higher education certainly cannot thwart such a
mechanism while participating in it. Yet, education is, arguably, the home of mimesis
which serves as a fundamental component of learning. Perhaps higher education can
leverage its familiarity with mimesis to help it avoid mimetic rivalry.
Girard suggests two ways to avoid mimetic rivalry. The first is through a rigid
observance of prohibitions such as religious codes. Laws which prohibit coveting,
stealing, and murder, for instance, act as a check on mimetic rivalry. These prohibitions,
however, flow into rituals which ultimately demand a sacrifice to effectively restore a
sense of order to a community. Girard shows how emphasis on such codes only leads to
controlled victimization and not to an eradication of violence altogether.258

257
258

Sullivan; Bellah et al.,153-6.
Girard, Berkshire Review, 13.

127
Because mimetic rivalry, scapegoating, and sacrifice for Girard all depend on a
misapprehension of the process, participants in the violence are unaware of the role they
are playing in the mimetic rivalry, much like the universities I discussed are unaware of
their contributions to their own troubles. What Girard suggests will end the rivalry,
violence, and victimization is the exposure of the rivalrous mechanism itself.
If these three universities wish to contribute to a peaceful settlement of the
conflict, or at the very least remove themselves from the frontlines, they should expose
the mimetic dynamic for what it is and open an international, trans-cultural debate over
the question of how two nations can occupy the same land at the same time.259 To
overlook the rivalry at the heart of the tension is to ignore the violence. To illuminate the
imitation and modeling going on in the struggle would disarm the mechanism of mutual
vilification by holding a mirror up to the imitator who is a model to his or her own
imitator and to the model who is an imitator of his or her own model. No aspersion of
wrongdoing could be cast without taking into consideration the reflexive and reciprocal
dynamic at work. This exposure of the mechanism first requires the educational
organizations themselves to be self-critical and, further, to pass along the self-critiquing
practices to those who would study there. Perhaps elevating critical thought and the
practice of mutual engagement is what prompts the authors of The Good Society to call
for diminishing the emphasis on specializations and applied technologies and “reintegrate
cognition with a more fully human understanding.”260
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“Genuine education” continue the authors of The Good Society, “knows no
boundaries….A concern for understanding our own society inevitably raises the question
of where we are in relation to all other human cultures, past as well as present.”261
Spanning national and cultural borders will not be possible without a fundamental
reorientation of the purposes of the university away from the utilitarian understanding
now prevalent.262 Only by reversing this trend toward utilitarian education can academe
take its first step away from participating in the process of violence in our society and
toward the integration of society in a way that does not artificially conflate the broader
more inclusive notion with the needs and interests of a particular nation-state, but is
authentically interested in the well-being of all of humanity.
Religion needs education to open society’s meaning-making process to the
ontological dimension of reality in order to re-write the religion-governed myths of mythmaking. But education’s signification processes are regressing into utilitarianism because
religion, the institution which prescribes modes of meaning-making, has been relegated
to the realm of the private and has very little, if any, standing in the academy. Even if it
did have standing in the academy, religion has been regressing itself, so any meaningmaking processes it would encode would be increasingly violent.
So, simultaneously, education needs to rehabilitate its self-understanding in order
to establish moral meaning in its own institutional terms. In so doing, it will have the
capacity to rehabilitate religion. Religion simultaneously needs to help education think
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through how to synthesize meaning in a way that is native to and authentic to education
and not pointed toward religious, governmental, or economic ends.

CHAPTER FIVE
LEADERSHIP AS MEANING-MAKING

To revive and advance public discourse about the relationship between religion
and education, I wish to explore the proposition that it is possible to change the
signification processes of persons, not apart from institutional contexts but as a part of
those contexts. The change must occur with full knowledge that the institution(s) is (are)
acting on the person just as the person is influencing institutional change. The persons
upon whom I wish to focus are those whose roles, skills, or access to resources give them
the capacity to facilitate meaning making for groups of people – leaders. By examining a
process of leadership development as an exercise in growing meaning-making capacity
beyond what the current institutional contexts prescribe and allow with the hope of
creating more pacific meaning-making processes and institutional patterns, I suggest a
theory of leadership development that cannot only rehabilitate education and religion in
their own terms in the United States to make way for more public discourse on what is
meaningful in United States society, why it is meaningful and what makes it meaningful,
but also to begin to establish new precedents for signification processes other than those
which are prevalent in the Untied States today. This would begin to reform institutions
and thereby reshape US society, its constituent cultures and those of the societies
influenced by US global hegemony. This exploration must begin with a more critical
examination of leaders and leadership.
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Leadership and Authority
It is difficult, if not impossible, to engage in any serious conversation about
leadership without appreciating the contributions to this field made by Max Weber.
Though his German to English translators infrequently use the terms leader or leadership
themselves, many of the prevailing concepts – or perhaps conflations of concepts – of
leadership emerge from and/or react to his rich school of social thought.263
More important for Weber than a notion of leadership is the idea of authority and
what makes authority legitimate. Legitimate authority makes possible what Weber terms
Imperative Co-ordination.264 For Weber, there are “three pure types of legitimate
authority” which, correspondingly, create the possibility of three types of imperative coordination: Legal authority, legitimated on rational grounds, Traditional authority,
legitimated on traditional grounds and Charismatic authority, legitimated on charismatic
grounds.265 The one who exercises legal authority in a rational bureaucracy is regarded by
Weber as the person “in authority who occupies an office.” The person and the office are
separable. The person’s authority is derived from the office and the office is derived from
the rationality of the bureaucratic structure. Any orders issued by the officeholder are,
thereby, impersonal edicts from the office more than they are orders from the person.266
In such a bureaucracy the offices are organized in a hierarchy and the officeholders are
often selected by virtue of possessing a certain set of technical skills required for the
efficient execution of the duties of that particular office.267
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Traditional authority, however, derives legitimacy from an understanding of how
power has been transmitted over time. As such it is dependent on a collectively held
understanding of the past. The authority rests with a person, perhaps in a monarchic line
of succession, and not with his or her office, even though the person might derive such
personal loyalty and power as a result of rules established beyond the memory of any one
particular individual, including, say, the queen, the leader, or “chief.”268
Charismatic authority also accrues to the person possessing it as opposed to
accruing to the impersonal entity of the office. However, unlike traditional authority,
charismatic authority is imparted to someone by the group because of personal qualities
or attributes. Those characteristics are described by Weber as being “supernatural,
superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities.”269 Despite the fact
that charismatic authority is highly personal, it can endure over time through a process of
“routinization.” Routinization perpetuates the social group which responds to the
charisma and which, in turn, seeks a successor to the charismatic leader. The successor
necessarily will be someone who is judged by the group to possess many of the same
qualities and characteristics as the original leader. While hereditary succession may play
a role in the selection of a new leader, this type of succession should not be confused with
the mantle which is passed down through generations in a structure retaining a traditional
type of authority.270
Weber describes each of these models as ideal types and suggests that often
groups of people respond to a mixture of these types of authority. He goes into great
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detail about sub-classifications of each of these and discusses ways in which types of
authority may complement one another in various circumstances.
While Weber describes the various types of authority, he does so without being
explicit about the purposes of such authority. He simply describes how it works, rather
than why such authority is warranted, desired, or useful. To get at his understanding of
the relevance of authority requires a review of some of the foundational points in his
work leading up to his own discussion of charismatic, traditional, and legal authority.
Authority, for Weber, “is the legitimate exercise of imperative control.” Imperative
control is the likelihood that a command will be obeyed by a group of persons. A
corporate group, a technical term for Weber that obeys such commands from a legitimate
authority is, in Weber’s terms, an “imperatively coordinated” group.271 Constitutive of all
corporate groups is the presence of a head, chief, or leader or, that is, a person in
authority.272 A corporate group is a specific type of social relationship, which, Weber
insists, exists only in the presence of the likelihood of a course of social action.273 In turn,
he clarifies that social action is meaningful human behavior which, “by virtue of the
subjective meaning attached to it by the individual (or individuals), it takes account of the
behavior of others and is thereby oriented in its course.”274 In his explicit treatment of
meaning, Weber paints a somewhat utilitarian understanding, linking an object or
organism to a purpose. It must serve as a means or an end to be intelligible or
meaningful.275 However, a more thorough reading of his basic definitions of sociology
and social action allows for the possibility that meaning is derived from “ultimate ends or
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values” or from other altruistic aspirations which may or may not be intelligible to
anyone other than the persons whose actions they orient.276
Sociologist S.N. Eisenstadt explores the linkage between Weber’s understanding
of authority and meaning by examining more closely the concept of charisma for Weber
and for sociological analysis beyond Weber. Weber’s distinctions between charismatic
authority and the other two pure types of authority begin to wear down once charisma is
routinized. In fact, Eisenstadt points out that Weber coins terms to express the
institutionalized charisma one finds in successive officeholders, “charisma of office,” and
in holders of familial, inherited, and transferred posts, “kinship, hereditary, and contact”
charisma respectively.277 Eisenstadt acknowledges that several studies in the research of
charisma follow Weber’s lead in assuming that charismatic authority, institutionalized or
originary, is most saliently effective in times of extreme crisis and with people who are
feeling a deep sense of personal alienation.278 However, drawing primarily on the work of
Edward Shils, Eisenstadt concludes that charisma, which he links even more closely with
the search for meaning than Weber, is elementary in any ordered set of social
relationships.
The search for meaning, consistency, and order is not always something
extraordinary, something which exists only in extreme disruptive
situations or among pathological personalities, but also in all stable social
situations even if it is necessarily focused within some specific parts of the
social structure and of an individual’s life space.279
Eisenstadt contends that this presence of charisma in ordinary life is borne out in
contemporary sociological research. Within that area of research, he identifies charisma’s
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prominent role at times of transitions or “rites of passage.”280 The necessity or the
effectiveness of charisma correlates to times when persons or groups actively participate
in life events which cause them to “experience some shattering of the existing social and
cultural order to which they are bound.”281 After such shattering, the persons or groups
look to the charismatic for re-establishing that order.
Hence in such situations they become more sensitive to those symbols or
messages which attempt to symbolize such order, and more ready to
respond to people who present to them new symbols which could give
meaning to their experiences in terms of some fundamental cosmic, social,
or political order, to prescribe the proper norms of behavior, to relate the
individual to collective identification, and to reassure him of his status and
of his place in a given collectivity.282
Again, it is important to emphasize that Eisenstadt does not view the advent or
appreciation of charisma as an extraordinary occurrence. The studies he reviews indicate
that it is “part of any orderly social life-of the life of individuals as they pass from one
stage in their lifespan to another, or from one sphere of activities to another, and of the
organization of groups and societies.”283 So charisma may be no less rare an occurrence
than is the regular need for making meaning or sense out of changing life circumstances.
Perhaps the seemingly regular need for charisma is the reason it surfaces as an attribute in
many leaders holding various types of positions and exhibiting any of Weber’s ideal
types of authority.
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Routine Charisma
In describing a particular leader in an academic setting, F. Stuart Gulley notices
the presence of a mixture of Weberian ideal types, including that marked by charisma.
While the position of university president is sufficient enough of an office to imbue the
officeholder with power, especially early in a president’s tenure, the personal traits of the
president become increasingly important as his or her tenure lengthens. Although
charisma is not something that all higher education leaders share, in Gulley’s estimation,
former Emory University President James T. Laney did exhibit this specific set of traits
in his academic presidency.
In remembering Laney, many of his senior staff describe him in
charismatic terms. They refer to his ability to listen, his oratorical skills,
his facility with language, his sharp penetrating mind, his energy, his
tenacity, his competitive and entrepreneurial instincts, his pastoral
sensitivities, a combination that made him a rare academic leader.284
While Gulley treats charisma as but one trait of many that made Laney a
successful and effective president, by his own analysis, Gulley makes the case that it is,
in fact, charisma, that made the other traits powerful, if not altogether possible. As Laney
lived out his own model of teamwork, his ability to listen and his pastoral sensitivities
surely made him more prone to know and understand “the importance of those on the
margin having their rightful voice in the decision making of the institution.”285 His
articulation of a vision in a way that would “gain the support of others” would have been
more anemic without oratorical skills, facility with language and a penetrating mind.286 In
the midst of “diverse constituent groups and varying agendas” Laney found ways to
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“make ambiguity work for him” because of, most likely, his energy, tenacity,
competitiveness, and entrepreneurial instincts.287 And finally, and Gulley makes this link
explicit, it was Laney’s charisma that allowed him to serve as a mentor and example for
his staff engaging the “moral dimensions of the office” by demonstrating “a model of
fairness and integrity that won him the respect of his followers.”288
Gulley’s account of Laney’s leadership gives a contextual grounding for Weber’s
connection between authority and meaning. Especially when read through Eisenstadt’s
interpretation of Weber in light of more recent studies, Laney’s approach to what Gulley
interchangeably terms “moral leadership” and “effective leadership” demonstrated
genuine concern for persons, especially in times of great transition.289 Some close staff
members credit him as “one of the most important and influential figures in their
lives.”290
He remembered people, expressed interest in their concerns, shared his
grief with them when they experienced disappointment or loss and
happiness and pride at a major accomplishment or marker event; such as
birthdays and anniversaries.291
On a broader level, Gulley commends Laney for successfully articulating a vision for
Emory. A vision, in Gulley’s terms, must answer the following questions: “Whom does
the institution serve? How might it better and more effectively offer its services? Why
does it exist?”292
Laney’s leadership was effective because it was meaningful in the lives of the
persons who made up the organization as well as meaningful in the organization’s life
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itself. Whether applying Weber’s utilitarian means-ends test for meaning, his test for a
referent of ultimate values or use Eisenstadt's test for consistency in times of transition,
Laney’s leadership, his gift, his charism, was the ability to create, evoke, articulate, and
sustain a sense of meaning.
In Laney’s presidency, Eisenstadt’s evaluation, and Weber’s definitions, a leader
makes meaning. But what about leaders in other settings, perhaps less accurately
described by Weber’s mechanistic notions of bureaucracy or who exhibit leadership
styles which deviate from or intentionally thwart traditional notions of authority and
leadership as defined by Weber?
Estella Bensimon and Anna Neumann contend that the shape of the university
presidency is changing as the organizations presidents serve also undergo transformation.
In Redesigning Collegiate Leadership, the pair observes that the role of any single
individual is diminishing in favor of group efforts, which Bensimon and Neumann refer
to as a “leadership team.”293 In examining the way fifteen different college and university
presidents used the teams at their disposal, Bensimon and Neumann observed varying
degrees of optimization of the collective group. The more presidents truly relied on the
team to share in the governance of the institution the more they were able to exert
strength in Bensimon and Neumann’s evaluation of their leadership capacity.
Interestingly Bensimon and Neumann identify teams with strong cognitive functioning,
that is a team that “thinks together,” as exhibiting “significant leadership.” The reason?
“They are actively involved in the interpretation of meaning.”294 For Bensimon and
Neumann, interpreting meaning consists of the team shaping and altering views of and
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responses to a particular situation, including the understanding and interpretation that the
president himself or herself brings to the circumstance.295 They argue that even those who
depart from the mechanistic organizational models of the past hold onto this fundamental
tenet. Whether found in a single individual or in a group of individuals, “leadership
requires skill in the creation of meaning that is authentic to oneself and to one’s
community.”296
Going beyond the walls of colleges and universities provides other examples of
leaders who also exhibit the principles observed and commended by Bensimon and
Neumann. Such is the case with Carol Bartz, for instance, chairman of the board,
president and CEO of Autodesk, a leading maker of design software and related
technology products. Michael J. Marquardt and Nancy O. Berger profile Bartz and other
leaders in Global Leaders for the 21st Century.297 Their portrait of Bartz describes her as
believing “in the importance of shared decision-making.”298 Much as Gulley describes
Laney, she attempts to lead by example acknowledging that “she must set the example by
not micromanaging her staff, and that they, in turn, must not micromanage their
employees.”299 This approach and her other attributes as leader suggest to Marquardt and
Berger the image of a symphony conductor who believes a leader’s role involves
facilitating goal-setting and promise-keeping while instilling purpose and urgency.300
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Management researcher and theorist Warren Bennis, along with his co-authors of
Beyond Leadership, Jagdish Parikh and Ronnie Lessem, credits a leader’s vision as
crucial to instilling that sense of purpose and goal-setting.
When the organization has a clear sense of its purpose, direction, and
desired future state, and when this image is widely shared, individuals are
able to find their own roles both in the organization and in the larger
society of which they are a part. This empowers individuals and confers
status upon them because they can see themselves as part of a worthwhile
enterprise. They gain a sense of importance, as they are transformed from
robots blindly following instructions to human beings engaged in a
creative and purposeful venture.301
So Bennis joins Gulley and others in establishing vision as a key element in leadership.
But notice the peculiar relationship among vision, charisma, and meaning. Charisma,
according to Eisenstadt, is necessary to enable leaders to provide stability in times of
transition. It is this stability, which bridges the unsettled middle that provides meaning
for persons within organizations and/or the entire organizations themselves. However, the
articulation of a vision seems to be precisely geared toward destabilizing the status quo
and articulating a future self-concept for the organization. Again charisma is necessary
for persuading others to share the mental image of the future. It seems to be irrelevant for
many analysts whether or not the status quo needs changing, although some will contend
that the absence of change at this time in history, particularly in the business world,
portends death to the organization.302 In many ways that taken-for-granted maxim is
moot. Whether the times demanded change or not, the leadership examples I have
examined, whether alone or as part of a team, evoked a desire for change by charismatic
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means and, by those same means, provided the support and guidance necessary to
navigate such change.
While Weber anticipated routinized charisma in organizations that outlived their
leaders, this seems to be something different.303 Rather than routinized charisma, it seems
to be routine charisma. It is almost as if charisma is the object or end of leadership and
not only the means of securing and conveying authority. It is no longer simply an
attribute of leaders, it is, as Gulley makes it out to be, synonymous with effective
leadership. So leaders, no matter their style and no matter which of Weber’s ideal types
best describe the authority they wield, can create meaning, but to a certain extent they can
also create the need for meaning-making itself. They do so by articulating a vision that
bridges the gap between the past and the future through an uncertain middle. As Gulley
puts it, “Only by understanding the past of the followers in the organization can the
leader move the followers into the future.”304 Bennis confirms, “With a vision, the
executive provides the all important bridge from the present to the future.”305 Not only do
leaders facilitate meaning-making, often during times of personal or organizational crises
during which time seems to stand still, but, they also do so in the very real context of a
group’s history. Charisma, then, becomes descriptive of a quality or a tool that any leader
of any type may or may not possess – a quality or tool that enables him or her to facilitate
meaning making for persons and groups of persons.
Clearly Weber could conceive of organizations that exist without experiencing
such disruptive crises or major organizational shifts through time, and he could conceive
of authority that did not derive from charisma. However, his suggestion that his ideal
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types could blend seems to be true to the observations in the accounts we have considered
thus far. But whether crises come without evocation or are created by the leaders, they
come, and the role of the leader is to bridge the gap of uncertainty with a meaningful
vision.

Meaningful Leadership
This role for meaning making in leadership informs my theory of leaders as
meaning makers. Frankl’s situation offers a laboratory of extreme conditions which
allows us to distill some principles of the meaning-making process more clearly than
from situations in less extreme conditions in which other circumstances occlude or
distract from the fundamental processes at work. Frankl’s journey from a relatively
speaking stable life before being taken prisoner through Naked Existence and then
through Cannibalism and then through Deceptive Dreaming offers a baseline anatomy of
the impact change has on social construction and meaning-making.
While Frankl’s change was forcibly thrust upon him, even voluntary change
requires a person or a group to question old norms in light of the facts of a new reality, to
move through a phase of generating provisional norms to cope with the temporary reality
of transition and adjusting those provisional norms to suit the facts of the new reality on
the other side of the change. While organizational change can happen with more rapidity
than the three years Frankl spent in the concentration camp, the search for meaning at
each stage is the same. The actors in society struggle with Berger’s anomy, alienation,
and bad faith until they again become co-builders of society.
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Eisenstadt’s demonstration that Weberian charisma, read through subsequent
social research, links the effectiveness and need for charisma with persons experiencing
deep senses of alienation. Further he discusses the important role charismatic authority
plays in helping persons put together pieces of shattered lives or worlds. His association
of charisma particularly with times of great transitions and rites of passage link this
fundamental attribute of leadership to the type of change and search for meaning so
poignantly described in Frankl’s account.
Further, each of the leadership case studies discussed above suggests that leaders,
in their meaning-making capacity, offer groups consistency through times of transition,
even if the leader or leadership team, himself, herself, or itself had dislodged the group
from the status quo to begin with. Both the stability through the transition as well as the
motivation of the group members to enter that transition emanate from the articulation
and sustaining of a vision of a future state. In other words, a leader deploys charisma to
articulate and sustain a synthesis between the is and the ought, even if the ought is a
future state relative to the group’s experience of the is. The charismatic motivators
contrast the future with the present in normative terms and create a sense that the future is
better than the present. Vision shields the group’s members from the anomy of Naked
Existence by supplanting the current ought with a newly articulated version of what
should be. It sustains the group through the harsh realities of the transition itself, by
preventing alienation with a sense of working toward a common purpose and vision.
Perhaps most importantly it has to ring true for the group as plausible, when the realitycheck of the future arrives, lest it be judged to have been a bad faith effort or a deceptive
dream.
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Note, however, particularly in Gulley’s description of Laney, that the charismatic
leader not only has the skill to motivate people to undertake the transitions which risk
plunging individuals and groups into successive and severe crises of meaninglessness,
charisma also entails being able to meet people in crisis, or times of transition, and help
them create a sense of meaning in those times. On the personal and organizational level,
persons experience anomy, alienation, and bad faith. They find themselves, for a variety
of reasons, dislodged from that which once made sense out of life. Leaders can deploy
charisma to aid persons in their quests to create, discover, or reclaim meaning during
times of loss or life transition.

The Ritual of Meaning Making
Whether the leader evokes a change or simply supports others through such times,
making meaning must attend to the dynamics of life transition. For a thorough discussion
of what happens during moments of substantive change, I turn to anthropologist’s Victor
Turner’s book, The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure.306 The subtitle offers
clues to his discussion as well as to the shape of this analysis.
Turner observes commonalities among some of the rituals of the Ndembu people
of central Africa and some movements and social processes of twentieth century United
States. Among the themes he abstracts, Turner describes the phenomenon of “liminality.”
He attributes his understanding of liminality to Arnold Van Gennep’s “liminal phase”
during rites of passage. The word liminal, Turner points out, is from the Latin, limen or
threshold. The liminal is one of three phases found in times of transition from one state to
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another. On either sequential side of the liminal phase are separation and aggregation
respectively.307
The first phase (of separation) comprises symbolic behavior signifying the
detachment of the individual or group either from an earlier fixed point in
the social structure, from a set of cultural conditions (a “state”), or from
both. During the intervening “liminal” period the characteristics of the
ritual subject (the “passenger”) are ambiguous; he passes through a
cultural realm that has few or none of the attributes of the past or coming
state. In the third phase, the passage is consummated. The ritual subject,
individual or corporate, is in a relatively stable state once more and, by
virtue of this, has rights and obligations vis-à-vis others of a clearly
defined and “structural” type; he is expected to behave in accordance with
certain customary norms and ethical standards binding on incumbents of
social position in a system of such positions.308
Turner’s work, drawing on his field experience and Van Gennep’s concepts, reduces
otherwise complex social behavior into three discernable points of analysis. The three
phases, in fact, describe well the experiences chronicled by Frankl on a grand scale, over
the three years of internment as well as on a miniature scale in any number of the microtransitions Frankl experienced.
On a macrocosmic scale, it is possible to see Frankl’s three years as a rite of
passage from separation from his wife, profession and Austrian society through the
liminal period of the prison camps and back into Austrian society again - this time
without his wife. It is also possible to view, in microcosm, his transition into camp as a
rite of passage, one that required a shift from the state of his position in Austrian society
to that of a prisoner in the camp through the liminal moment of physical and existential
nakedness in the shower. Similarly his re-entry into Austrian society likewise required a
separation from camp life, coming to grips in the margins with his Deceptive Dreaming,
and assimilating to a new life in his old home. Certainly there were many other such
307
308

Ibid., 94.
Ibid, 94 -95

146
microcosmic transitions during his time there. Nevertheless, the process seems to be
roughly the same. Whether from Naked Existence, through Cannibalism and beyond
Deceptive Dreaming, or through each of those stages respectively, it is possible to discern
Turner’s phases and, therefore, possible to probe more deeply into the dynamics of all of
them.
Turner draws our attention to the middle phase of the rites of passage. In so doing,
he exposes the profundity of what Berger terms anomy.
The attributes of liminality…are necessarily ambiguous, since this
condition and these persons elude or slip through the network of
classifications that normally locate states and positions in cultural space.
Liminal entities are neither here nor there; they are betwixt and between
the positions assigned and arrayed by law, custom, convention, and
ceremonial. As such, their ambiguous and indeterminate attributes are
expressed by a rich variety of symbols in many societies that ritualize
social and cultural transitions. Thus liminality is frequently likened to
death, to being in the womb, to invisibility, to darkness, to bisexuality, to
the wilderness, and to an eclipse of the sun or moon.309
Macrocosmically, and relative to his life before and after camp, Frankl’s imprisonment
was marked by many of these attributes. Microcosmically, each stage of Frankl’s journey
also had such characteristics relative to the before and after states of each transition
respectively.
So Frankl’s journey, Naked Existence-Cannibalism-Deceptive Dreaming, my
anatomy of social construction and meaning-making, is a rite of passage, which, in turn,
potentially consists of multiple rites of passage. In the middle of each passage is a
complete dissociation from social structure. Berger’s analysis shows, and Frankl’s
observations suggest, the importance of not only regaining a sense of that social structure
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but claiming one’s responsibility for co-shaping it with others to avoid the alienation and
bad faith which can follow anomy.
Leadership, as a meaning-making endeavor, therefore, requires a leader to
motivate others to join him or her on the threshold between the rooms of past and future
states, to experience this anomy and the liminality together. Charisma, as described in
Laney by Gulley, requires a leader to exhibit his or her ability to make meaning within
that threshold space, by showing concern at times of major life transitions during which
the passenger, to use Turner’s term, is experiencing liminality outside of the urging of the
leader, but simply in response to what he or she has encountered in life.

Communitas and Meaning
Whether inspiring others to join the trek into and through liminality or meeting
others in those marginal points of existence, the work of a leader or a leadership team
implies relationship with others. For this reason, liminality, if it has anything to do with
group processes, must be considered not only on the personal level but also in the plural.
Relying on the work of social psychologist Martin Buber, Turner develops the concept of
communitas to describe the collective experience of that which “breaks through the
interstices of structure, in liminality; at the edges of structure in marginality; and from
beneath the structure, in inferiority.”310 It is important for comprehending this concept to
distinguish it from the structures of society which normally provide the only artifacts for
social scientific inquiry and are therefore often mistaken for the totality of society itself.
Turner understands communitas as another “dimension” of society which is
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“spontaneous, immediate [and] concrete” in contrast “to the norm-governed,
institutionalized, abstract nature of social structure.”311
It is the human connectedness experienced in and through communitas which
provides the substance of society. The bonds which society’s structures order are formed,
discovered, celebrated, and experienced most fully in communitas. In fact, the experience
of the liminal is so energizing in this respect, Turner observes and analyzes several
instances of, ironically, structured attempts to preserve the experience of communitas for
what would otherwise be non-liminal moments. The process for doing this, of course, is a
perpetual seeking of liminality. Turner turns to St. Francis of Assisi and his rules for the
Franciscan order of monks as an example.
In all of this, Francis appears quite deliberately to be compelling the friars
to inhabit the fringes and interstices of the social structure of his time, and
to keep them in a permanently liminal state, where, so the argument in this
book would suggest, the optimal conditions inhere for the realization of
communitas.312
The pursuit of liminality for the sake of perpetuating communitas requires the monks to
disregard and disavow structures – at least structures other than, ironically, the rules
which govern the order. The anti-structural symbol of the Franciscan order relates to the
relationship Turner sees between property and structure. Disavowing property and
thereby all structure, except of course the Rule of St. Francis itself, is represented for
Francis by nakedness which symbolized “emancipation from structural and economic
bondage.”313
So was it communitas that Viktor Frankl discovered in the bath house? It was
certainly liminality. Losing his book was a symbol of losing structure or at least
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connections with social structure he had internalized. The anomy described by Berger,
then, is the unstructured environment necessary for the experience of communitas. Naked
Existence, insofar as it homogenized differences in that bath house, created an experience
of human connectedness and the fertile circumstance for collective meaning-making.
Communitas has also an aspect of potentiality; it is often in the
subjunctive mood. Relations between total beings are generative of
symbols and metaphors and comparisons; art and religion are their
products rather than legal and political structures.314
Far from being unstructured, camp life was highly organized and required
conformity with the discipline meted out by the guards. However, the dissociation from
the structures of Austrian society provided the opportunity to experience communitas
within the walls of the camp. Perhaps it was the structure of the prison that complicated
life as inmates moved from Frankl’s Naked Existence phase to Cannibalism. While one
understandable path is the dehumanizing one of alienation, the path of meaning-making
requires one to look around the edges of the camp structures. The restrictions of the camp
and the authoritarian environment crowded out with structure almost every opportunity to
experience anti-structure. It was not orderliness, curfews, or uniforms that provided the
opportunities to synthesize the is and the ought, it was on the fringes of the order that
Frankl found purpose and inspiration - in the cook who ladled soup fairly, and in
recounting stories with fellow prisoners after lights out and in daydreaming while digging
ditches.
Again, upon release and finding that his wife had died and that life would not be
ordered as it had been in his imagination, structure fled and left the void for communitas.
Those acting in bad faith without realizing the delusion of their Deceptive Dreaming
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were unable to re-engage life outside the camp in meaningful ways. It was the coming to
grips with the lack of structure again, that allowed the regeneration of meaning to
commence. Whether with prisoners from various countries, ethnicities, and stations in life
staring at the fixtures in the bath house ceiling, or with a dying inmate in the bunk above,
or with the Austrian neighbor who had never experienced a concentration camp but
whose life had been disrupted by the war, or even with his wife – living or dead – but
removed from his presence, Frankl experienced the human connectedness of communitas.
Frankl and those with whom he discovered he was profoundly and thoroughly,
connected, made meaning on the edges, the fringes, especially at moments during which
he was making transitions from one known structure, through a liminal state into another
structure. These transitions were brought into relief by the strictures of camp life, as
Turner observes: “Yet communitas is made evident or accessible, so to speak, only
through its juxtaposition to, or hybridization with, aspects of social structure.”315
To use the analytical terms from above, Frankl did not allow the abundant oughts of his
life to crowd out completely an experience of the is.
For communitas has an existential quality; it involves the whole man in his
relation to other whole men. Structure, on the other hand, has cognitive
quality; as Lévi-Strauss has perceived, it is essentially a set of
classifications, a model for thinking about culture and nature and ordering
one’s public life.316
Communitas, in its purest form, is an existential experience in the extreme. It is important
here, however, to restate Turner’s description of communitas as a dimension of society,
not an alternative to it. The existential qualities of society are always present alongside
the structural qualities. Even if communitas is the generative source of symbol and other
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artifacts of meaning, it becomes so, only in relation to social structure. Even in the case
of the Franciscans, the pursuit of communitas is an activity governed by norms. Meaning
is found in the synthesis of the is and the ought, the movement between communitas and
structure, or more precisely in Turner’s analysis, between anti-structure and structure. “In
other words, each individual’s life experience contains alternating exposure to structure
and communitas, and to states and transitions.”317 For Turner, this latter proposition is a
developmental one.
There is a dialectic here, for the immediacy of communitas gives way to
the mediacy of structure, while in rites de passage, men are released from
structure into communitas only to return to structure revitalized by their
experience of communitas. What is certain is that no society can function
adequately without this dialectic. Exaggeration of structure may well lead
to pathological manifestations of communitas outside or against the “law.”
Exaggeration of communitas, in certain religious or political movements
of the leveling type, may be speedily followed by despotism, over
bureaucratization, or other modes of structural rigidification. 318
Turner’s advocacy for balance has implications beyond individualistic existential
experience. It clearly suggests that adequate meaning-making processes are essential
components of ordering life together. In Turner’s terms, then, effective leadership is a
function of the health of the balance between anti-structure and structure.

Charisma and Communitas
With Turner’s descriptions as a backdrop, Weber’s ideal types of authority, now,
can be read back into the process of meaning making. Regarding traditional authority as
that which symbolizes continuity and derives imperative control over groups from
heredity shows leadership in the mode of preserver of social structure. Even the most
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structured societies, and perhaps especially the most structured societies, provide
opportunities to experience communitas. Such leadership transmits norms or oughts from
the past, into and through the present for a vision of the future which is by and large a
continuation, if not expansion, of the status quo. It is from such structures that
charismatic authority breaks and against which it defines itself. Charismatic leadership is
liminal leadership. It articulates a vision that is decidedly different from the status quo or
intercepts an already disrupted status quo. Whether the structures are fading away or the
vision itself calls for a rejection of those structures, the charismatic leader must be adept
at making meaning in the wilderness of change. It is here that the group, which has
entrusted a charismatic leader with the role of facilitating meaning-making, experiences
communitas and begins to construct shared modes of signification. The experience of
communitas without structure, is, however, inadequate and requires the preservation of
that meaning made in new forms of order and differentiation.
Here, bureaucratic authority is required to capture and perpetuate the meaning in a
structure that provides order and differentiation. The bureaucratic leader does so,
however, in increasingly less personal ways and in ways that create structures that
eventually, again, crowd out the experience of anti-structure, against which the antistructure will begin to appear in stark relief.
Other than the movement to routinize charisma, it is an oversimplification of
Weber to suggest that he was articulating a historical procession from traditional to
bureaucratic authority, and I do not mean to imply a cycle of authority that begins again,
necessarily, with a charismatic response to bureaucracy. What is clear, I think from
Weber’s ideal types, however, when read against the backdrop of the stories and
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processes I have examined, is that leaders make meaning. Both traditional authority and
bureaucratic authority impose norms on realities by creating hierarchies, systems, laws,
and power structures. While traditional forms of leadership derive normative power from
an ontological reality, such as heredity, and bureaucratic authority presumes the extant
normative power of the organization’s structure or, in the case of an individual, of his or
her specialization, both forms attempt to shape the is by the ought. The cases of
bureaucratic leaders I examined above showed effectiveness in breaking down
hierarchies and specializations, in effect breaking apart the bureaucracy. Now we can
examine those moves as making way for interstitial spaces within the structure for the
necessary experiences of liminality and, subsequently, communitas. In this way, the
bureaucratic leader, or, perhaps even an empowering monarch can incorporate
charismatic qualities in the imposition of power. Without such interventions, however,
the ability for the group to make meaning for itself is limited. Rather, it is imposed as the
is and the ought are fused by, literally, the powers that be. This leads to, in the case of
traditional authority, disaffected alienation as seen in the Cannibalism stage of Frankl’s
analysis. In the case of bureaucratic authority, it can lead to the bad faith of Deceptive
Dreaming because the normative is perpetuated without respect to changing existential or
ontological realities.
Only charismatic authority (or incorporation of some of its qualities) seems to
have the capacity for allowing the is to be in conversation with the ought. An antistructure virtuoso, the charismatic leader releases those who go with him or her from the
bonds of extant structures and norms. What the charismatic leader does with that
meaning-making opportunity is the subject of this inquiry. Charismatic leaders, by having
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access to the powerful resource of communitas, are engaged in collective meaningmaking, the powerful outcome of which will be shared.
How will the charismatic leader influence the shape of that meaning and what
influences the leader? It is possible to conceive of charismatic leaders facilitating
meaning making in more and less desirable ways. What are those ways and how can we
influence more desirable and fewer undesirable outcomes? And finally, what is at stake in
this project of influencing the meaning-making capacity of leaders?
Leaders are meaning makers. Frankl’s theory generalizes that every person
searches for meaning and is capable of synthesizing the is and the ought alone, but not
outside the context of relationships. Leaders facilitate meaning making for groups of
people at various levels of social complexity. In a relationship between two people, even,
one may exhibit more influence over the common praxis than the other. In groups, one or
more persons may be the repository and interpreter of custom, in organizations, leaders
are charged with articulating and enforcing tradition and, institutionally, it is the leaders
who act out the rituals that locate those traditions in the mythic framework of society. On
the societal level, it is leaders who interpret and author the myths that situate the society
in light of universal reality.
In this chapter, I identified charisma as the quality of a leader that enables him or
her to make meaning no matter what leadership style he or she employs and no matter
which of Weber’s ideal types of legitimate authority brought him or her into a position of
imperative coordination. Charisma is the leadership quality that imbues the leader with
the confidence of those within his or her sphere of influence to evoke a sense of
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communitas in times of liminality and, in many cases to also be the one who calls the
group or causes the group to muster the fortitude to endure liminality in the first place.
Change agents, perhaps, but whether or not the leader evokes the change, when familiar
structures fade into anti-structure, the charismatic leader, or more properly the leader who
possesses a sufficient degree of charisma will make sense of that change.

CHAPTER SIX
LEADERSHIP AND VIOLENCE

Leaders use charisma to make meaning. Earlier I discussed more and less violent
modes of signification. It follows then that some forms of leadership can make meaning
in explicitly violent way. In other words it is possible to conceive of more and less
violent types of charisma. Such is the case with some political dictators, for instance.
Hitler was known for his charisma, but the ways he made meaning for Nazi German
society set the context for the tragedy with which Frankl had to come to terms and
millions more just like him. Other forms of leadership appear orderly and peaceful and
therefore seem to defy this axiom. These instances of leadership are either in fact nonviolent or trade on a manner of imperceptible sublimated violence. Such may be the case
with the United States Presidency since World War II at least. While great conservators
of the status quo in many cases, the status quo preserved served to reinforce a power
structure which the US dominated or shared with the Soviet Union at times. Many in
smaller countries around the world would view the way the status quo was preserved as
violent and, in some cases terrifying. Pax Americana may only be Pax for Americans. In
this chapter, I will examine the meaning-making mechanisms employed or the way
charisma is used by various leadership styles – those overtly oppressive and those subtly
so. I will also look at the potential for leadership styles or ways of making meaning that
trade on a less violent form of charisma.
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There are a number of ways to classify leadership styles. I will choose one such
taxonomy offered by Brian Hall in a number of works, the latest of which is The Genesis
Effect: Personal and Organizational Transformations. I choose Hall not only because of
his close personal work with Paolo Freire,319 but also because his discussion of leadership
is based on a latter day developmental theory which takes into account many of the
classical developmental theorists and which has learned from many of the critiques of
those theories.320 Hall also has developed a corresponding evaluative system for
identifying leadership style on which he based his theory of human development. So
one’s leadership skills and capacity do not simply reflect, for Hall, a choice from a menu
of style options, they emerge from the complexity with which one understands and relates
to the world.321 I will examine his seven leadership styles in terms of René Girard’s
theory of mimetic rivalry and violence to detect the potential for sublimated violence in
various leadership styles.322

Hall’s Taxonomy
Brian Hall approaches leadership from the standpoint of his own work in values
theory. He developed his theory over decades as a result of Christian missionary work in
Central America with the Anglican Church of Canada. “It was there that I met and was
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influenced by Paolo Freire, Ivan Illich, and Erich Fromm. Their main impact was to
conscientize me to the dynamic relationship among languages, cultural, societal, and
institutional development.”323 Hall continued his work in the field of Christian pastoral
counseling and, with a number of collaborators, began to expand his understanding of
values which he describes as “a quality information system that when understood tells
about what drives human beings and organizations and causes them to be exceptional.”324
Unapologetically developmental in concept, Hall’s framework builds on the work of
Abraham Maslow and Milton Rokeach and specifically defines 125 values which he
maps onto four phases and eight stages of development. The transitions between stages
correspond to seven different leadership styles: Authoritarian, Paternalist, Manager,
Facilitator, Collaborator, Servant, and Visionary.325 Hall’s investigations revealed that the
seven leadership styles corresponded to what he, and his fellow researchers, came to
realize were “seven cycles of human and spiritual development, and the leadership stages
were simply one aspect of a far greater whole.”326 I will discuss each of these leadership
styles in terms of Hall’s corresponding developmental phases, stages and worldviews as I
explore the implications of Girard’s mimetic theory for each stage, and the theory in
general. I include a highly abridged version of Hall’s Development Map below for a brief
overview and introduction.327 Although my presentation of Hall’s developmental model
is linear in appearance, a person’s or organization's movement through stages may not be
as sequential and as linear as the process might appear on paper.
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Figure 9: Development Map
Phase
I. Surviving
II. Belonging
III. Self-Initiating

IV. Interdependent

Worldview
The world is a mystery
over which I have no
control.
The world is a problem
with which I must cope.
The world is a project in
which I want to
participate.
The world is a mystery for
which we care on a global
scale.

Stage
1: Safety
2: Security
3: Family
4: Institution
5: Vocation
6: New Order
7: Wisdom
8: World Order

Cycle: Leadership Style
One:
Authoritarian
Three:
Manager
Five:
Collaborator

Two:
Paternalist
Four:
Facilitator
Six:
Servant

Seven:
Visionary

In the following sections, I will depart temporarily from an active discussion of
education and religion. However, following the examination of leadership styles, I will
re-engage the notions of education and religion as institutions which sustain patterns of
behavior related to explicating reality (education) and synthesizing meaning (religion) at
various stages of development. I will also discuss the need for the institutions themselves
to be healthy in order to support healthy meaning-making patterns and processes.

Leadership and Mimetic Rivalry
The violent processes of mimetic rivalry and scapegoating as described by Girard
involve five main elements: Rival 1, Rival 2, the object of desire, the scapegoat, and the
hero (or sacrificed scapegoat which brings order). Each of Hall’s first five leadership
styles involves relational arrangements which reflect the rivalrous violence of mimetic
relationships. I will refer to the mimetic and scapegoating aspects of each leadership style
as a relational posture - that is as a position taken by the leader relative to others for
whom he or she serves as a leader, and, to some extent, relative to the social or relational
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entity in which the group finds or places itself.328 The postures relate to the way in which
the leader appropriates energy for himself or herself or facilitates the deployment of
energy within the social system in which he or she leads. It is the appropriation (or
deployment) of energy that fuels the meaning-making synthesis which, as we have seen,
is the project of leadership. Energy is simply the ability to do work. The work of leaders
is to synthesize meaning. Power is the rate at which energy is consumed to do that work.
What is powerful, i.e. what has the ability to deploy energy effectively, varies from social
context to social context and is prescribed by the dominant myths of the relevant society.
In one society, economic wealth may indicate power, another military might, in yet
another religious piety, and in yet another some combination of the aforementioned or a
different set of qualities altogether. Whatever power is in different contexts, how it is
used determines the level of violence inhering in the leader’s charisma.

Authoritarian as Dominant Rival
The first, and therefore developmentally least advanced, of Hall’s leadership
styles is that of the Authoritarian or Autocrat.329 The authoritarian leadership style
corresponds to Hall’s “Cycle One: The Primal Cycle.” In this cycle “the adult is
motivated by the need for security and material ownership, and the struggle for physical
survival. Ethical choices are based on self-interest which is viewed as the most practical
way for all to survive.”330 Rooted in the safety and security stages of Phase I: Surviving,
leadership in this cycle is “necessarily Autocratic on a day to day basis, and control of
328
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property, profit margin and financial flow, are of utmost importance. 331 Loyalty to the
organization through its leader [is an] overriding criterion for ethical choices.”332
While operation at this level is helpful in the midst of life and death crises when
barked directives to get out of a burning building, for instance, would be preferable to a
facilitated conversation about perceived danger in the same instance, it loses its efficacy
and can even be destructive when the context for leadership is not that dire.333 The leader
postures himself or herself as a dominant rival whether the leader is hurrying people out
of a burning building or placing “unrealistic expectations on others” at work for the sake
of controlling property, making a profit, or acting out of a deeply insecure fear about
one’s place in the world. In any case, the directive nature of this leadership relationship is
one of a dominant rival, the surviving fittest. In its worst form, it can take the character of
“domination…a form of manipulation where the individual bullies or threatens persons
into doing what he or she wants.”334 One rival has appropriated power relative to the
other or others in the case of the authoritarian leader. The leader, in this case, is able to
obtain and control the object of desire, whatever it is, as long as he or she maintains that
power differential. The autocrat concentrates the energy needed for the meaning-making
synthesis and is able to impose his or her own norms or values on the system. In that way
the leader gets to decide and define whether or not the way things are is the way things
ought to be. With this kind of control, the leader can direct resources to adapt the is to his
or her preferred ought, or simply assert a new ought by fiat.
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Paternalist/Maternalist as Object of Desire
Rivalries in relationships spring up out of a common and mimetically intensified
desire for an object. The centrality of the object of desire gives it a special place outside
of the relationship itself. The Paternalist leaders, situated in Hall’s Cycle Two: The
Familial Cycle which bridges the transition between Phase I: Surviving and Phase II:
Belonging, act according to the values related to stages two and three: security and family
respectively. Self worth, belonging, and being liked are among the possible values for
individuals who find themselves at this particular stage and with this particular leadership
style. A benevolent autocrat, this leader reserves decisions for himself or herself while
listening and caring for those who are subordinate within the hierarchy. Potentially
concerned with social prestige, this parental leader is as interested in looking good to his
or her superior as being loved and supported by his or her peers and underlings.335 The
followers in this case, says Hall, still feel “oppressed relative to the expression of ideas
and personal authority, but feel cared for much like a child feels about a parent.”336 While
Hall discusses the perspective of the follower in the singular, in a group setting this
metaphor would suggest that fellow followers are like siblings who must curry favor with
the parent. If the parent’s favor is limited in any sense then seeking it, i.e., the object of
desire, is a source of rivalry and competition.
Being concerned with external desirability, the leader in this cycle avoids the
conflict of the rivalry himself or herself but remains in control by taking the position as
the object of desire fostering the rivalry. The Paternalist/Maternalist thereby retains the
power that others in the social system want. This leader uses that energy to synthesize the
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is and the ought, again in the way he or she wishes, but the others in the system assent to
and affirm the synthesis in the spirit of one-upsmanship in the competition with fellow
rivals for the affection of the synthesizer-leader.

Manager as Scapegoater
Hall characterizes the Cycle Three leader as one dedicated to “Efficient
Management.” This person, who is moving from a family-oriented life perspective to one
that is more centered in institutional life, is deepening values such as self worth,
control/duty, and tradition and discovering emergent values such as worship, work/
confidence, and law/duty.337 This leader’s worldview has shifted from “The world is a
mystery over which I have no control” to “The world is a problem with which I must
cope,” according to Hall.338
This transition begets a leadership style that understands business as “ordered,
efficient, and productive. It is therefore managed bureaucratically through the principles
of scientific management… [such as] management by objectives… [and has a high regard
for]…respect for superiors and the rules of the…organization.”339 The manager is able to
muster the organizational team around objectives or a set of principles and practices
which are less dependent upon the subjectivity of his or her own dicta than in the two
leadership styles previously examined. Within the mimetic and rivalrous relationship at
work, then, the effective manager points away from himself or herself and away from the
group to a set of goals or rules which organize activity.
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In the earlier stages, the rivalry among individuals in the system is controlled by
the autocrat’s appropriation of power which gives him or her the ability to dominate the
relationship entirely and the more benevolent dictator’s (Cycle Two) success in situating
himself or herself as the object of desire. Still the locus of power and authority, the
manager has subordinates who compete with each other for access to that power.
As discussed above, rivals ultimately wish to prevent the other in the relationship
from acquiring that which they so intensely desire. Insidiously this acquisition prevention
is intensified by the mimetic effects of the relationship. As the violence intensifies in the
relationship, effective leaders must channel and redirect that energy. In the relationships
described by Girard, communities will identify a scapegoat upon which to direct that
violent energy and, in some cases, hatred. In the rawest, most "primitive" societies this
might involve the actual ritual sacrifice or immolation of a human or animal victim.340
For Girard, religious sacrifices are related to religious codes, “Religious prohibitions
[are] efforts to prevent mimetic rivalry from spreading throughout human
communities.”341 Both ritual sacrifice and religious rules manage escalating interpersonal
rivalry. I suggest that attention to law and duty is attention to the same sort of control. A
leader with these values recognizes, perhaps on an unconscious level, the disorder which
is just beneath the surface. Organizational rules also help sustain differentiation within
the system. As people increasingly imitate one another, the distinctions between and
among people begin to break down. Rules, guidelines, roles, and specializations help
people distinguish themselves from each other when their desires are drawing them
increasingly closer to non-differentiation. Picture the classic US bureaucratic workplace
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festooned with identical cubicles. The more the differentiation breaks down, the more the
group moves toward a chaotic violent free-for-all.342 Girard asserts that rituals shore up
the group’s ability to deal with its “loss of differentiation whose ultimate expression is
the creation of a ‘mob.’”343
The effective manager attempts to control this mob dynamic with rules and
practices that support and sustain the differentiation and shores up that effort with rituals
that actually re-enact scapegoating. Policy-making on the one hand, which prescribes
rules and procedures and defines roles relative to those rules and procedures represents
the orderly way that managers try to create and preserve distinctions. On the other hand,
engaging in strategic planning process that evoke “out of the box” thinking when the
rules ostensibly do not apply provide (albeit a muted bureaucratic version of) a ritual that
places planning goals and objectives outside the group – often on the altar of a flip chart
or PowerPoint slide. By directing and focusing the attention and energy of the would-be
mob outside the system of relationships on objectives, the manager gains unanimity in the
group, not unlike that experienced after actual religious sacrifices which “assuage the
desire for violence.”344
With less blood and fanfare, a manager might lead a group in a planning process
which outlines future goals. If the goals are thought of as the inverse of negative elements
which the group desires to reverse, expel, modify or otherwise cast out or destroy, then it
is easy to see, in Girard’s terms how “management by objective” can “relieve” a group of
their “tensions” helping them “coalesce into a more harmonious group.”345
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As Hall points out, one of the tendencies of those operating in Cycle Three is to
be overly competitive and alienating of persons who are not loyal to the system.346 In
either case the identification and expulsion now gives the group what Girard would
identify as “a single purpose, which is to prevent the scapegoat from harming them, by
expelling and destroying him.”347 Managers execute plans. Managers are executives.
They “carry out” problems from within the community and on behalf of the community.
Sometimes the problems they carry out of the system are the employees whose salaries
must be cut from the budget in order to protect, for example, the third quarter earnings
statement since it is, after all, the celebrated (i.e. holier than personnel) objective of the
flip chart ritual.
The executive or manager acts, in religious analogue as a priest, organizing
communities around a set of rules and rituals which translate the violence of mimetically
rivalrous relationship into orderly differentiation and/or rallying around common efforts.
The effective manager exploits this dynamic to maintain order and create meaning. The
energy necessary to synthesize the is and the ought comes from the energy of the rivalries
themselves. That energy is re-channeled by the manager for the maintenance of the
community. In so doing, he or she creates legitimacy and plausibility for the actions
necessary to manage the community. The manager does not have to inject his or her own
power into the system, but must effectively appropriate the energy brought to the system
by the group members. The least dictatorial of what Hall describes as three levels of
autocracy, the manager leads by managing the scapegoating tendencies of the group.
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Facilitator as Victim
For Hall the next transition is an important one. The move from Phase II to Phase
III signals a move from an “Autocratic” to a “Participative” lifestyle. The person making
this transition is now beginning to see the world as “a project in which [he/she] must
participate.”348 Emerging values for the person in Cycle Four, which Hall labels the
“Intrapersonal Cycle,”349 include equality, service, actualization/wholeness, and
empathy/generosity. “The strong institutional values of Phase IIb and Phase IIIA [cause]
the feeling of uncertainty in the areas of decision making….Ethical issues no longer seem
black and white [for instance].350
In “The Omega Factor,” Hall refers to Cycle Three’s leadership style as
“Facilitator.”351 In Genesis Effect he uses the term “Enabler...an interim style due to its
conflictual nature. The leader is caught between adherence to institutional demands, and a
new view of human dignity and sense of self. The leader/follower distinction is not clear
for this person.”352 For these reasons, it is important to consider this cycle and this
leadership style in relation to the one preceding it and the one following it. It is the
transition between manager and collaborator. The group-defined self must give way to
the interpersonally and intrapersonally defined self. Unlike the autocrat whose identity
derives from the rivalry which he or she dominates, unlike the Paternalist/Maternalist
whose identity is derived from sustaining desirability, and unlike the manager who looks
for identity outside of himself or herself and the group, the locus of authority and identity
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begins to shift internally at this point.353 The facilitator or enabler is beginning to put the
group process above his or her own needs or direction.
At the center of the group process, the facilitator or enabler begins to diminish
himself or herself for the sake of the community. In a metaphorical sense, the self as
center of power dies as the leader begins an inward search for personal authority and
direction. In this way, the leader is offering himself or herself as a scapegoat to the group,
allowing them to unify around his or her own self-sacrifice.354 The scapegoated leader
facilitates the process of meaning-making by enabling the members of the group to begin
synthesizing the is and the ought with their counterparts who are brought together by the
harmonizing effects of the relative diminution of the leader. It is possible that some of the
leadership teams examined by Bensimon and Neumann involved university presidents
who were operating out of this – or a later – cycle of leadership development. The
concept of leadership team would only begin to make sense at this level of personal
development.

Collaborator as Hero
In Hall’s terms, this diminution results in a leader who now transcends the group
dynamics, whose presence is not integral to the function of the group, but whose
influence has the effect of unifying the group, empowering its members to the point
where the leader should be able to delegate to a competent colleague anything for which
the leader has responsibility. “This person sees the whole first and the parts second” and
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is susceptible to the “corrupting influences of power, particularly manifest in the person’s
inability to accept personal limitations.”355 Based in Cycle Five which is a transition
between values which emphasize “Vocation” and those which emphasize “New Order,”
this self-initiating Phase II leader “move[s] beyond personal human issues to integrating a
human systems perspective. 356 The Collaborator-Hero has died to himself or herself and
to the group, and has moved into a (developmentally) unprecedented place from which to
empower the group to realize its potential for partnerships and for meaning making in a
context that transcends the interpersonal and intra-group dynamics.
While the sacrifice of the leader in the previous cycle is not a bloody one and does
not involve the type of violence directed at a victim that we might observe in other social
situations, the leader’s diminution of himself or herself is for the sake of the order and
harmony of the group. Antithetically, then, the leader’s prominence, if reasserted, could
threaten the order and may be treated as such. When the sacrificial transition is complete
and the leader is no longer a central figure, the leader may experience what Girard calls
“double transference.”357 Prior to the sacrifice, those perpetrating the violence blame the
victim as a scapegoat responsible for the disorder of the group. Once the sacrifice is
complete and the desire for violence is satisfied, those who previously converged upon
the scapegoat now celebrate the victim whose sacrifice restored order and assuaged
violent impulses that otherwise would have run rampant throughout the group. So, not
only is the scapegoat seen as a threat to the order of the group prior to sacrifice, but also
he or she is venerated as a god or hero once the group’s order is also attributed to his or
her sacrifice. So the leader gets the blame for the disorder and the credit for restoration or
355
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preservation of order. The collaborator is the transcendent leader to whom such credit
accrues.

Servant as Transformer
“Servant leadership,” according to Hall, “is different than all other forms, in that it
not only moves beyond any form of autocratic tendency, but it also transforms the value
of independence into interdependence.”358 This style thwarts rivalry, scapegoating, and
acquisitive desire by causing “creative synergy in the group that cannot be obtained by
any one individual alone. In other words, leadership beyond this cycle is always plural in
form.”359 Meaning is made by the group which shares energy as it synthesizes the is and
the ought. Leaders in this category are beginning to understand the world as “a mystery
for which we must care.”360 As the leader moves away from embodying a mythic
understanding of leadership and relational dynamics, he or she exposes a new way to
sustain order and meaning at the expense of no one, thus demythologizing the
organization’s behavior and values. In so doing, he or she aids in the transformation of
the organization into a non-rivalrous and, therefore, non-violent community.
Up to this point, the discussion has centered on leadership styles that are based in
Girard's assessment of rivalry in human relationships. Moreover, that rivalry is mimetic
and, by that mechanism, self-intensifying. Each leadership style thus far has described
different ways for leaders to locate themselves relative to that human dynamic for the
purpose of channeling, coping with, or exploiting the power of the underlying violence
for the purpose of meaning-making. For Girard, this is a “basic principle behind the
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mechanism which, in a single decisive moment, curtails reciprocal violence and imposes
structure on the community.”361 Further, Girard suggests that “in order to retain its
structuring influence the generative violence must remain hidden.”362 Understanding
human relationships in this way is unattractive and confounded by the fact that the
mechanism’s effectiveness depends on its own misunderstanding. Modernity hides the
mythic mechanism with claims that modernity and myth are antonyms. “We are not
dealing with the sort of repressed desires that everyone is really eager to put on public
display, but with the most tenacious myths of modernization; with everything, in short,
that claims to be free of all mythical influence.”363 The understanding that modernity is
free of myths is in itself a myth that helps conceal the influence of the mythic
mechanisms that Girard suggests are insidiously most effective when hidden or
concealed. The servant leader exposes this myth and thereby the underlying violence of
the mimetic rivalry in all the previous stages, fundamentally disrupting the mechanism
and thereby interrupting the cycle of acquisitive desire and violence that humans
perpetuate for the sake of maintaining order which we, ironically, confuse with peace.
Girard argues that the most effective exposition of the mimetic mechanism is one
which reveals the innocence of the scapegoat or sacrificial victim. The dynamics leading
up to the identification and expulsion or immolation of the scapegoat ascribe to that
person or problem the guilt for causing disorder and lack of differentiation. In religious
terms, the scapegoat embodies the sins of the community. The community must be rid of
361
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the sin and therefore rid of the scapegoat. Revealing the social utility of the mechanism,
which depends on absolute conviction that the scapegoat is, in fact, guilty of the above,
requires demonstrating that the scapegoat is innocent of that which the community has
ascribed to him or her. For Girard, the Christian Gospel demonstrates that
“Jesus…provides the scapegoat par excellence – he is the most arbitrary of victims
because he is also the least violent. At the same time he is the least arbitrary and the most
meaningful because he is the least violent.”364
Girard argues that the insight of the Gospel is itself misunderstood for the sake of
perpetuating the violent structures which underlie all institutional forms, including
religious ones.365 The mythic misunderstanding of the Gospel Scapegoat is that Christ
was modeling a self-sacrifice or that God the Father required the sacrifice of Christ for
the expiation of sin. Girard points out that “Jesus dies, not as a sacrifice, but in order that
there may be no more sacrifices.”366 Exposing this insight distinguishes the servant phase
of leadership from the scapegoat-hero coupling of cycles four and five, which depend
upon a (self-)sacrificial system of meaning-making. So whether the scapegoat was the
manager’s set of planning objectives, the facilitator, or the collaborator, the servanttransformer exposes the scapegoat as a social artifact and not an inherently necessary
component of group order. By so doing, the servant-transformer offers a new paradigm
for group meaning-making that is collective and cooperative in nature.
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Visionary as Strange Attractor
Hall’s developmental model is linear in appearance, but recall that a person’s or
organization's movement through stages may not be as sequential and as linear as the
process might appear on paper. Hall relies on metaphors and principles from physics and
mathematics’ chaos theory to describe his system.367 A values-based vision draws one
into the future as if it were a “strange attractor” giving order to what might otherwise
seem to be a set of disconnected events, relationships, and behavior.368
The most developed vision-level values which draw one into the future are
represented in Cycle Seven, among them are wisdom and transcendence/ecority.369 For
Girard, the quest for peace and wisdom are intertwined and mutually confounding; “You
cannot become aware of the truth unless you act in opposition to the laws of violence,
and you cannot act in opposition to the laws of violence unless you already grasp the
truth.”370 This is rare and difficult to achieve. In chapter ten, I will flesh out a specific
example of a Palestinian Melkite priest whose actions and influence seem consistent with
visionary leadership in that they embody Girard’s admonition that “the Gospels tell us
that to escape violence it is necessary to love one’s brother completely – to abandon the
violent mimesis.”371 Notice Girard modifies the word mimeses. Mimesis itself is
fundamental to human relationships and “is not to be done away with, but is to be
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fulfilled, transformed, and ‘converted.’”372 Imitating love at the level described above
uses the mimetic effect, not for rivalry and violence but for peace.373
Hall describes the leader in this cycle as “Visionary” in “The Omega Factor” and
as “Prophetic” in The Genesis Effect. In either case, leadership at this level involves
“interdependent governance by a peer team, [which manages] a system on the basis of
pre-chosen value clusters.”374 In addition Cycle Seven – and the people and organizations
operating within that cycle reconnect with values and people in Phase I.” The whole
person at this cycle therefore integrates the values of survival, security and selfpreservation as they are experienced by others at a global level…. Issues of world peace
and poverty are going to be major action concerns.”375
If leaders in Cycle Seven are embodying Girard’s love in community and are, as
Hall suggests, able to relate to any person at any level of values development, then not
only do the vision values act as strange attractors, but also the visionaries themselves do,
if by no other means than through the mimetic mechanism so well-rehearsed at any of the
stages of previous development. Visionaries as strange attractors draw people into their
own futures through mimesis but replace acquisitive desire and rivalry with
interdependence, wisdom, transcendence/ecority, and love. The future into which others,
then, are being drawn is one not founded on violence and sustained by the myths which
mask the inherency of violence, but one formed in community that understands
leadership as a community proposition. Because leadership is a meaning-making activity
and, in Cycle Seven is a community act, synthesizing the is and the ought in this Cycle
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generates its own self-sustaining energy as meaning is internalized, expressed, and
synthesized simultaneously by a synergetic interdependent community whose mimetic
love intensifies and compounds as rapidly as mimetic rivalry.
Hall places Gandhi and Saint Francis of Assisi at Cycle Seven. My appropriation
of Girard’s work for Cycle Seven comes from a chapter entitled the “Divinity of Christ,”
underscoring the rarity of Cycle Seven leaders.376 However, Hall suggests that
technology, global communication, and advances in education are combining to produce
an increasing number of Cycle Six leaders who may later be capable of advancing into
Cycle Seven.
Hall’s analysis is very much informed by his experience with the Christian faith.
Girard grounds his anthropological insights in his understanding of Christianity as well.
Both would claim that the theories they have put forward can be generalized beyond
Christianity. However, for the sake of this dissertation, it is sufficient to understand
simply the correlation between an example of a religious myth system and a particular
taxonomy which I have shown it influences. My analysis to this point is clearly through
the lenses of Christianity, particularly as it is practiced in the United States. The
conclusions I have drawn thus far do not need to be extrapolated to other contexts in a
strict manner. The particular influence of Christian theology on a particular taxonomy of
leadership styles merely demonstrates the functional relationship between the deployment
of power by leaders to make meaning on the one hand and a religious symbol system on
the other. It also provides landmarks by which to judge various ways of making meaning
in violent and non-violent ways. In other words, it documents the existence of various
types of charisma.
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In subsequent analysis, I will examine how this functional relationship that is
capable of encoding violence in social systems, such as the organizations led by those
who operate with Hall’s first five leadership types, can translate through to broader and
narrower levels of social complexity and influence culture formation on various levels.
Recall also, that even though the examples I use above locate these conclusions in a
particular context, the context, namely the United States, holds an unusually influential
place in global affairs and therefore the meaning-making systems prescribed and
reinforced by dominant myths in this context have the potential of exporting themselves
into other contexts. This is not unlike the ways Freire observed colonizing norms
oppressing indigenous cultures by forcing the colonized to communicate using the
language of the colonial power. So for good or for ill, given the present international
conditions, the degree to which meaning-making in the United States is violent influences
the level of violence in meaning-making systems around the world.

CHAPTER SEVEN
CULTURES AS COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS

Leadership involves the more or less violent ways of making meaning. Examining
the meaning-making process on organizational, institutional, societal, and global levels
demonstrates more and less violent ways of relating on all levels of social complexity.
Using the language of the Moral Meaning Matrix, leadership on the organizational level
appropriates authority to synthesize language and category in tradition. On the
institutional level, a leader balances jurisdictions for the sake of synthesizing symbol and
nomos in significant rituals. On the societal level, a leader deploys power to synthesize
ethos and worldview in coherent myths. Global leaders, then, are challenged with
detecting and helping to create a new common global culture which can see the is and the
ought simultaneously and with sustainable energy.
This chapter will explicate the mechanism by which the various levels of social
complexity in the Moral Meaning Matrix are linked. Once those links are established, I
will expose in greater detail how the meaning-making processes, evoked by leaders at
various stages of leadership development, actually use energy to synthesize the is and the
ought in what might be thought of as a theory of cultural thermodynamics. Detailing
minor distinctions among the various cycles of leadership will reveal a major distinction
between what, in Victor Turner’s terms, I will call uninitiated and initiated leaders.
Finally, I will show that even though some leaders are initiated into meaning-making
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mechanisms that release rather than consume energy, most leaders operate as if the
social systems they lead are closed to external influence. This presupposition of leaders
contributes to an over-reliance on violent types of charisma.

The Social Fractal
To gain perspective on the interlocking relationships among the various levels of
social complexity, I turn again to chaos physics and mathematics to order and integrate
otherwise disparate levels of analysis within the Moral Meaning Matrix.377 I wish to use
the idea of fractal to explore the possibility that each of the levels outlined in the schema
are comprised of infinitely repeating patterns expressed successively by increasingly
contextual levels. The universe level is comprised of the patterns of societies; societies,
institutions; institutions, organizations; organizations, groups; groups, persons and
interpersonal relationships. Fractal geometry suggests that patterns repeat on infinitely
refined scales. Therefore adjustments in interpersonal patterns of relating require or cause
adjustments in societal patterns and vice versa.
Developmental theories focus primarily on the personal, interpersonal and,
increasingly, on the organizational level. But, to my knowledge few have answered the
call of The Good Society to examine institutional development in a way that effects
changes at the societal level. To that end, I propose to use this framework to develop
further a theory of leadership development that can effect growth on all levels including
the institutional. In order to do that, I will relate the institutional level of the matrix to its
neighboring levels of society and organizations. I will examine the phenomenon of
cultures, including the prospect of global culture, using, primarily, Samuel Huntington’s
377
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The Clash of Civilizations.378 I will look at the simultaneous interconnectedness of
multiple levels of social complexity using the emerging ideas of network and complexity
theories.

Network and Complexity Theories
The structural nature of the Moral Meaning Matrix combined with the
progressivism of Hall’s developmental theory opens the discussion up to a post-structural
critique that would expose the inadequacy of any theoretical construct used to describe
the dynamic reality of social relationships. Furthermore, such a systematic approach
purporting to be systemic in scope runs the risk of moving from the realm of the
descriptive to the normative. Even if such models could succeed at adequately describing
reality at any given moment in time, the very articulation of such models holds the
potential of shaping reality, or at least future interpretations of it, by the model’s
influential introduction into the language used to understand social dynamics themselves.
Conversely, and perhaps more insidiously, is the prospect that the normative has bled
over into the descriptive in the first instance. Pure description is thereby rendered
impossible by certain normative assumptions that remain unarticulated but which are
given expression in a so-called descriptive framework.
Rather than try to unpack what those hidden assumptions might be or to try to
sterilize the models so as to be purely descriptive, it is wholly consistent with the Moral
Meaning Matrix that such an ambiguous interplay of the normative and descriptive
(ontological) would occur in any attempt to make sense out of reality. The enterprise of
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this investigation and analysis is a meaning-making exercise itself. It is a project of trying
to reconcile reality with theory in a way that can influence reality in the future.
The contribution of deconstructionists is to expose the normative nature of models
which purport to be purely descriptive. The purported descriptions take on normative
attributes either by embedding normative assumptions or by creating them. Theoreticians,
then, are left with two possibilities: abandon any attempts to be descriptive or
acknowledge the interplay between the descriptive and the normative. I have chosen the
latter path because this choice allows me to proceed with a pursuit of a comprehensive
understanding of the relationship between social change and leadership development but
not one that can represent itself as a closed system devoid of influences external to the
system being described. Philosopher Mark C. Taylor makes a helpful distinction in this
regard between the terms “totalizing” and “whole” when responding to deconstructionist
critiques that might otherwise render theoretical discussion futile. He reacts specifically
to the deconstructionist perspective articulated by Jacques Derrida.
What Derrida cannot imagine is a nontotalizing system or structure that
nonetheless acts as a whole. Important work now being done in
complexity studies suggests that such systems and structures are not
merely theoretically conceivable but are actually at work in natural, social
and cultural networks.379
Derrida and others point out that totalizing structures or systems are closed. For instance,
theories, as mine seems to be up to this point, that neatly sum up all possible occurrences
can represent and behave as totalizing structures. Taylor points out that “the violence of
structuralism results from persistent efforts to reduce difference and repress otherness.”380
This provides a stark warning as I proceed. It is possible for me in developing a theory
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about violence – violence caused by imposing norms on reality – that I develop a
normative system with the capacity to be as violent as the systems which I examine and
hope to transform. But there must be a way to proceed without creating the illusion of a
closed and complete system or structure because, as Taylor points out:
Deconstruction changes nothing. While exposing systems and structures
as incomplete and perhaps repressive, deconstruction inevitably leaves
them in place. This is not merely because deconstruction involves
theoretical analyses instead of practical action but also because of the
specific conclusions reached by theoretical critique. Instead of showing
how totalizing structures can actually be changed, deconstruction
demonstrates that the tendency to totalize can never be overcome and,
thus, that repressive structures are inescapable.381
As an example of a system that is non-totalizing but acts as a whole, Taylor turns
to the emergence of technology in the twentieth century. Its implications on
manufacturing and on communication are profound, even to the point that production has
been crowded out by information as the currency of the modern economy. The influence
of media and technology “cannot help but reach the very limits of the system, as soon as
entire sectors of society topple from productive forces to the pure and simple status of
reproductive forces.”382 A deconstructionist critique would argue that even an
information-based society is closed and that any presumptions about social arrangements,
for example, based on this paradigm are in fact structural in nature and ignore
fundamental presuppositions. But Taylor observes something more profound here, a
system and a paradigm that does not construct walls to resist difference. He observes:
The technologies of production and reproduction in network culture are
creating strange loops that are transforming rather than destroying
differences and oppositions that long seemed secure. In a world where
screens displace walls, neither map nor territory, code nor substance,
information nor matter, image nor reality, virtuality nor actuality,
381
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simulacra nor the real is what it had seemed to be when it was the opposite
of its presumed other. Something else, something different, something
new is emerging.383
In this chapter and in the chapters that follow, I intend to re-read the Moral Meaning
Matrix as a system that acts as a whole but does not attempt to totalize. In the analysis of
signification processes that follow, I hope to offer yet another example of a model that
avoids structural pitfalls of crowding out difference without simply stopping at a
deconstructionist self-critique.
In order to proceed down that path, it is important to rehearse here some of the
important elements of complexity studies or complexity theory. It is first of all important
to have a grasp of the overwhelming influence of many powerful factors at work in
shaping social life in the twentieth and, now, in the twenty-first century. One of the most
salient metaphors which social and natural scientists are using to describe these
influences is the image of the network. Not only does this metaphor connote the influence
of rapidly developing technology in our lives during what has become known as the
Information Age, it also provides the possibility for understanding the rapid and
seemingly unpredictable connections that people make with people by various means. In
sum, it describes the means and results of human connectedness. Social and natural
scientists alike describe this nexus of relationships as network culture.
In order to assess these changes, it is important to understand information
as inclusively as possible. Information is not limited to data transmitted on
wireless and fiber optic networks or broadcast on media networks. Many
physical, chemical, and biological processes are also information
processes. This expanded notion of information makes it necessary to
reconfigure the relations between nature and culture in such a way that
neither is reduced to the other but that both emerge and coevolve in
intricate interrelations.…What is emerging in this moment is a new
383
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network culture whose structure and dynamics we are only beginning to
fathom.384
Understanding nature and culture in this way allows us to take into account the diversity
observed in most systems by social and natural scientists, to respect chance and to begin
to describe randomness. Rather than another attempt to create a paradigm that applies
itself uniformly to all circumstances, network theory allows for structure and chance to
live together in what is known as a self-organizing system. Rather than leaving us adrift
in a sea of lack of understanding of deconstructed social and natural phenomena, network
theory provides an opportunity to describe the complexity of relationships by
demonstrating the existence and arrangements of relationships in the first place.

Network Theory
Physicist Albert-László Barabasi distinguishes what he terms “real networks”
from classical theory about the randomness of networks developed thoroughly over the
last half-century by mathematicians Paul Erdös and Alfréd Rényi. Random network
theory “equated complexity with randomness. If a network was too complex to be
captured in simple terms, it urged us to describe it as random. Sure enough, society, the
cell, communication networks, and the economy are all complex enough to fit the bill.”385
With a nod of respect to the role that randomness and chance play in the construction of
real networks, Barabasi describes such systems as “spiderless webs.”
In the absence of a spider, there is no meticulous design behind these
networks either. Real networks are self-organized. They offer a vivid
example of how the independent actions of millions of nodes and links
lead to spectacular emergent behavior. Their spiderless scale-free topology
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is an unavoidable consequence of their evolution. Each time nature is
ready to spin a new web, unable to escape its own laws, it creates a
network whose fundamental structural features are those of dozens of
other webs spun before. The robustness of the laws governing the
emergence of complex networks is the explanation for the ubiquity of the
scale-free topology, describing such diverse systems as the network
behind language, the links between proteins in the cell, sexual
relationships between people, the wiring diagram of a computer chip, the
metabolism of the cell, the Internet, Hollywood, the World Wide Web, the
web of scientists linked by coauthorships and the intricate collaborative
web behind the economy, to name only a few.386
So what are the implications of understanding society as a network, or perhaps
more accurately, as a network of networks? In order to answer that question, I will
analyze the model which provides the metaphor I am appropriating. Part of that analysis
must be, however, determining whether the model is a metaphor that aids in describing
complex social systems or an actual description of the system itself or both. Barabasi
seems to take the approach that networks are not only a metaphor but also an actual
description of social phenomena. In fact, he labels it a new science that provides the
benefits of a metaphor, namely creating a “new language…allowing us to casually
converse about ideas and issues that we were struggling to describe before.”387 However,
he studies social systems as well as physical, biological, and technological systems using
mathematical tools. To the extent that all mathematics is metaphorical, the new science
remains in that realm. To the extent that mathematics describes in common terms the
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properties of diverse phenomena, then he has developed mathematical formulations that
aid in the understanding of social as well as physical complexities.
What then are the properties of complex, or in his terms, real networks? While
Erdös and Rényi easily described the properties of random networks, these networks did
not exhibit any particular order. The arrangement of each new connection with extant
nodes was, in fact, random. What Barabasi observed in most complex, real, or naturally
occurring networks, however, was that connections formed between nodes in a nonrandom fashion thus yielding the bell curve useless in describing and predicting the
activity of growing networks as they became scale-free and developed hubs – or highly
connected nodes – while many, if not most, nodes remained only minimally connected by
comparison. It appeared as if these networks were moving from randomness to
orderliness. Reinforcing this notion was the fact that in natural systems, power laws - the
formulae describing the emergence of hubs – emerge only rarely. In fact they are closely
associated with physical phase transitions such as that state between water and ice and the
point at which a ferromagnetic metal becomes magnetized. Power laws signal a time of
flux, but one that is moving from the disarray of water molecules to the crystalline form
of ice or from the randomly arranged magnetic spins of millions of atoms to a
unanimously aligned array of spins. Both of these phase transitions, and others, occur at
what scientists call critical points. For water turning to ice, for example, the critical point
is the freezing temperature of 0° Celsius.388
The mathematics of most naturally occurring networks seem to indicate that such
networks are in a state of change and that time or some other factor can evoke orderliness
out of randomness at any moment. Instead, Barabasi concludes that the scale-free
388
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networks are not moving from disorder to order in the traditional conception of order.
They are, in fact, stable and ordered in a highly complex manner, a manner which by and
large defies our ability to understand all of their properties.389
The emergence of the power laws, then, is attributable to at least two factors,
according to Barabasi. The first is growth. Erdös and Rényi had categorized networks as
random. In order for this assumption to obtain for as long as it did required those
interested to treat networks as static entities. Barabasi’s work introduces the dynamics of
growth to network theory. Growth alone does not propel a network from random
distribution to power law hub-creation. The second element, which Barabasi terms
“preferential attachment,” when combined with the dynamics of growth, leads to the
creation of hubs. Random growth of a network makes it likely that the original node will
end up with the most number of connections. If the network grows large enough, the
random nature of establishing links eventually distributes out in a bell curve average
number of links per node. However, in real networks, some nodes are clearly favored
over others and the key seems to be that nodes prefer to link to the nodes with the most
number of other links. This dynamic still favors the earliest nodes in the network, but it
favors them to the extent that a bell curve quickly becomes inadequate to describe or
predict the number of linkages any one node will have. The prediction and description of
hub creation in these cases requires a power law. 390
Still, observation confounds theory. Some nodes in a network seem to be favored,
but not because of their temporal seniority but because they have qualities that attract a
number of linkages. Barabasi describes this inherent quality as “fitness.” The more fit a
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node is, that is the more serviceable the node is to others in the network, the more links it
will form within the network. Barabasi uses the rapid and late rise of Google on the
search engine stage as an example of a fit node that generates more hits than competitors
because it is more attractive to internet users. Google was not at all the first search
engine.391 When taken together, these three factors: growth, preferential attachment, and
fitness create hubs of hierarchical significance, in terms of number of linkages, within
networks.392
Networks, then, provide a tool for understanding complex social dynamics and we
are growing in our understanding of how those networks behave. Interestingly, these
descriptions defy the well-known and well-trodden fields of randomness and structure.
While ordered, scale-free networks do not behave in static or structured ways as we have
traditionally understood social theory, neither do the observations legitimate a
deconstructionist critique that there are no generalizable laws other than the law that there
are no generalizable laws. Network theory has the potential to hold both diversity and
holism together.
Network theory alone – a largely mathematical construct – is not comprehensive
enough, however, to describe the dynamics of relationships within social networks. It
does, though, open the door to understanding social networks in terms of another
emerging theory. How do people interact with each other in an orderly but evolving
network? The key to understanding evolving order is in understanding the concept of

391

Barabasi, 93-5.
In order to account for the popularity or fitness of certain nodes and the coalescence of new linkages
around those nodes, Barabasi and his students draw on quantum physics to show a correlation between a
factor measuring node fitness and the extent to which that node would emerge as a hub. Barabasi, 96-102.
392

188
self-organization. How do social networks, or any other networks, for that matter,
organize themselves? To use Barabasi’s image, how does a web develop absent a spider?

Complexity Theory
To answer this question, it is important to recall that even though scale-free
networks are not, in Barabasi’s estimation, moving through a phase change from disorder
to order, they are perpetually evolving through the dynamics generally described by
phase change physics and mathematics. In that sense scale–free networks exist in this inbetween state which requires theoretical exposition that is different than the exposition
required by chaotic or random systems and different than that required by systems that
are in a, relatively speaking, static state of orderliness. Scale-free networks behave
neither like water nor ice. They are also not in transition from one to the other. They are,
however, constantly evolving.
Nobel Prize winning chemist and physicist Ilya Prigogine, along with his
colleague Isabelle Stengers in Order out of Chaos approach this problem from the
standpoint of measuring the way the system handles energy. Crystals, like ice, are
“equilibrium structures” in the language of classical thermodynamics. To describe the
state that resembles phase transition, but is stable, Prigogine and Stengers introduced the
term “dissipative structures.”
[This] notion …emphasize[s] the close association, at first paradoxical in
such situations between structure and order on the one side, and
dissipation and waste on the other…heat transfer was considered a source
of waste in classical thermodynamics. In [dissipative structures] it
becomes a source of order.393
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Dissipative structures are found in conditions that Prigogine and Stengers describe as “far
from equilibrium” and exhibit organization on the supramolecular or macroscopic scale.
Whereas crystalline properties are reducible to the properties of the molecules that make
up the crystal, dissipative structures essentially exhibit global properties that are a
function of the “global situation of nonequlibrium producing them.”394
Dissipative structures and their properties offer insight beyond a scientific novelty
to a very puzzling contradiction in modern sciences. The Second Law of
Thermodynamics establishes that the universe is increasing in entropy or randomness.
Yet, Darwinian evolutionary theory lays out a sustained process of increased organization
in which increasingly complex beings have emerged from less complex beings by a
process of natural selection. How could Darwin’s processes survive the entropic forces of
the universe? Prigogine and Stengers dispute neither Darwinian assumptions nor
thermodynamic laws. Rather, dissipative structures demonstrate how increasing entropy
or randomness does not preclude organization or order. “According to Prigogine, disorder
does not merely destroy order, structure, and organization, but is also a condition of their
formation and transformation. New dynamic states, which emerge in conditions far from
equilibrium, can temporarily check entropic forces.”395
These dynamic states are the subject of Taylor’s inquiries and the inspiration for
his work to develop new theoretical parameters for understanding systems that seem to
behave in ways that we once would have written off as random. These complex systems
which resist simple explanations seem to exist somewhere between what we
conventionally conceive as order and chaos.
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Complexity theory attempts to identify common characteristics of diverse
complex systems and to determine the principles and laws by which they
operate. Moreover students of complexity share the conviction that the
systems they investigate are not limited to natural phenomena but can also
be discerned in social, economic, political, and cultural life.396
Complex systems exhibit the following characteristics.
1. Complex systems are comprised of many different parts, which are
connected in multiple ways.
2. Diverse components can interact both serially and in parallel to
generate sequential as well as simultaneous effects and events.
3. Complex systems display spontaneous self-organization, which
complicates interiority and exteriority in such a way that the line that is
supposed to separate them becomes undecidable.
4. The structures resulting from spontaneous self-organization emerge
from but are not necessarily reducible to the interactivity of the
components or elements in the system.
5. Though generated by local interactions, emergent properties tend to be
global.
6. Inasmuch as self-organizing structures emerge spontaneously,
complex systems are neither fixed nor static but develop or evolve.
Such evolution presupposes that complex systems are both open and
adaptive.
7. Emergence occurs in a narrow possibility space lying between
conditions that are too ordered and too disordered. This boundary or
margin is the “edge of chaos,” which is always far from equilibrium.397
Any examination of complex systems is as concerned with the properties of the
whole as it is with the functions of the parts. What is fascinating is how the parts
and the whole seem to form a partnership in the creation of a self-organizing
system. Taylor draws on Mark Millonas’s study of a swarm of bees to illustrate
this point. “The swarm as a whole operates according to a logic that cannot be
discerned in any of the activities of the individual bees.”398
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Belgian chemist Jean Louis Deneubourg formulated the principle
governing these interactions and named it “allelomimesis.” In an effort to
understand the behavior of wasps recorded by E.O. Wilson, Deneubourg
extended Prigogine’s theory of nonlinear self-organization to the activities
of insects. In allelomimetic behavior, the conduct of each individual is
influenced by the activities of its neighbors.399
The introduction of the study of swarms as a point of departure for discussion brings us
back to examination of networks. Likening swarms to neural networks, Taylor and
Millonas suggest that networks learn; they are stable despite fluctuations, but when
conditions change the stability and the learning provide the robustness for the networks to
adapt.400 The dynamism of these processes lead Taylor to identify them as complex
adaptive systems.
Emerging self-organizing systems are complex adaptive systems. For
complex systems to maintain themselves, they must remain open to their
environment and change when conditions require it. Complex adaptive
systems, therefore, inevitably evolve, or, more accurately, coevolve. As
the dynamics of evolving complexity are clarified, it not only becomes
apparent that complex adaptive systems evolve, but it also appears that the
process of evolution is actually a complex adaptive system.401
In inescapably anthropomorphic terms, Taylor details what we are learning about
the way complex adaptive systems learn. Even systems not characterized by a high
degree of human involvement exhibit properties akin to what we would know as memory
of the past, experience of the present, and anticipation of the future.402 In evolution of
species, for instance, a genetic mutation which might occur by chance could endow a
particular organism (or more likely over time several organisms) with a superior means
of appropriating nourishment, a more efficient way to reproduce, or the ability to outlive
other organisms of the same species. Any of these advantages increase the likelihood that
399

Ibid., 153.
Ibid., 156.
401
Ibid., 156.
402
Ibid., 168.
400

192
the mutation will be passed along in the genetic code of offspring. In this case chance has
appropriated the experience of the present – increased ability to survive and/or reproduce
– and encoded it in memory of the past. The mutation may come to be prevalent in the
genetic code of subsequent generations of that species because it offered a successful
adaptation. In the way that the system favored the successful adaptation at that theoretical
initial point of the genetic mutation occurring, it anticipated future needs of the organism
and the species as a whole.
These processes, in non-human networks at least, are “telenomic” rather than
“teleological,” that is “end-directed but not purposeful…neither linear nor circular.”403
Drawing on the work of physicist Murray Gell-Mann, Taylor describes this end-directed
process which can appropriate past experiences for future behavior. These systems
recognize patterns in the data they encounter. They do more than just store that data,
however, they apparently generalize or abstract that information into “schemata” which
they appropriate when encountering new data. The systems evolve new behavior in
response to the combined effect of the new data and the schemata.404 Previous data,
including previous behavior of the system, are summarized and compressed into a
schema that can formulate competing variants of possible future behavior. Encounters
with present data lead to new behavior based on the selection of one of these competing
variants. The consequences of the action are fed back into the system modifying the
schema, eliminating the schema altogether as inadequate or elevating one schema as
more viable and effective than other schemata.405
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Halachic Learning
Theologian Richard Voyles provides a method for understanding this learning
capacity in terms of the ontological dimension of the Moral Meaning Matrix. His
application of the notion of halacha or Jewish law also illustrates how the ontological can
operate separately from the normative and, in some way, establish its own rules that
govern behavior independent of attitudes and values. This distinction is particularly
important when considering non-human complex adaptive systems, but, as I will show, it
is also important when considering human systems.
Figure 10: Moral Meaning Matrix
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Like Freire, Voyles emphasizes the importance of context. Different and
seemingly contradictory behaviors (or activities) can be legitimated in different contexts
and the decision to behave in a certain way can operate independent of a norm held
constant, but changes, almost as a dependent variable, with changing context. One of the
examples Voyles gives is showing the incongruity between normative claims about
Christians not killing other people and the circumstances under which Christians do in
fact kill people. In such situations, killing is ruled as legitimate, e.g., war, capital
punishment, and importantly for Voyles, the holocaust.406 Different contexts evoke
different precedents for activity, and those precedents are ordered or prioritized by the
category selected for comprehending the context.
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Beyond the illustrations given in the Emory University case study, the simplest
example I can give for the relationship between precedent and category is one in which
two people approach a hole in the ground. One sees it as a latrine and the other as a well.
Latrine and well are categories. While there may be an infinite number of things to do
when encountering a hole in the ground, selecting the category latrine will give priority to
a precedent that is much different from the precedent evoked by selecting the category of
well. Of course a third person might know holes in the ground as both latrines and wells
and would look for clues like buckets and ropes nearby or walls erected to give privacy.
The context of his or her encounter with the hole will cause him or her to select one
category or another. It seems that any universalized norm or attitude he or she was taught
about holes in the ground may or may not apply as flexibly to various contexts. The
context and category selection can legitimate two different and even contradictory
behaviors without even engaging normative absolutes.
Simply employing category, precedent, and activity gives the decision-maker all
the tools he or she needs to respond to the new data of the hole in the ground. However,
the schema of the person with only the category of well available for identifying
precedents may be altered, subordinated, or eliminated if indeed he or she encounters a
latrine.
This decision-making scenario lives in the ontological dimension, and, to the
extent that we have explored it here, leaves the normative alone. No doubt there is an
aspect of ruling and legitimating involved, but it is different from drawing on a fund of
values and attitudes to decide how to act. It greets life as it is and draws on life
experience as it has been in order to determine how to act in the new context. The priority
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of context, for Voyles, injects the freedom to access a number of different possible
solutions for problems related to behaving in the world.
The activity-precedent-category interplay opens up the opportunity to explore
social relationships in decision-making contexts as networks. Translating the various
levels of network complexity might lead to an arrangement that understands each person
in a network as a node or a “knot in a web of relations [which] function like switches and
routers that send, receive and transmit information through the network.”407 Following
this logic leads to the possibility of re-framing the Moral Meaning Matrix as descriptive
of a network by considering groups as clusters of nodes; organizations as hubs;
institutions as entire networks and societies as systems of networks. Of course, the choice
to designate these structures as such is completely arbitrary. Network theory permits
application of the same nomenclature to almost any level of social complexity. Indeed,
each person in the network is more than an elemental node that cannot be subdivided any
further. Each person is, in fact, a very complex system of biological networks. So a
society is a set of network systems within network systems within network systems.
Similarly nodes can become hubs, and clusters can appear as nodes in a large network.
Certainly hubs and clusters are networks all their own as well. However the necessity of
the arbitrary deployment of this nomenclature for the purposes of making distinctions
among various levels of social complexity does not undermine its usefulness for
interpretation. In fact it makes the point that networks have multiple levels of imbedded
complexity, and the various components of a network can only be discerned and
described by taking snapshots of the network at various levels of scope. The repeating
patterns on large and small scales alike “form a fractal set, [which is] a self-similar
407
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mathematical object discovered in 1970 by Benoit Mandlebrot” and which I described
earlier.408
The process which follows the sequence of activity-precedent-category moves
right to left through the organization level of the Moral Meaning Matrix. But Taylor’s
schemata exhibit self-organizing properties that subordinate and include the schemata
themselves. Barabasi describes this organizing property as the network’s topology. Real
networks exhibit a scale-free topology governed by power laws. Understanding the
balanced dynamism and stability of scale-free topologies illuminates the character of the
word nomos as used at this level of social complexity in the Moral Meaning Matrix.
Worldview in the Moral Meaning Matrix can be thought of, in Taylor’s terms, as the
telenomy, that is the telenomic orientation of the topology governing the schemata used
to engage and encounter experience.

Network Consciousness
Conceiving of the levels of complexity in the Moral Meaning Matrix as
components of a network and conceiving of the ontological dimension of the matrix as a
complex adaptive system enables examination of the properties of social behavior in this
dimension in the terms of network and complexity theories. Integrating these insights
with the insights gained by examining the dynamics of halacha also permits the
understanding of the ontological dimension of the matrix as its own complex adaptive
system which can operate to generalize patterns without calling upon the normative,
meaning, or dynamic dimensions of reality in the matrix. The decision about how to act
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with respect to the hole in the ground, for instance, could be conceived of exclusively as
an ontological decision and not a normative or meaningful one necessarily.
These ontologically-based processes could pertain to any complex adaptive
system, animate or inanimate. In discussing human social systems, however, it is
important to understand the semi-autonomy of the ontological level, which has an order
all its own - as in the well/latrine example. It is also important to understand how the
ontological dimension relates to the other dimensions of the matrix. Human systems
make the process of network learning more complex by adding in the effects of the other
dimensions of reality as exhibited in the Moral Meaning Matrix. Taylor refers to this
difference between human systems and non-human systems as consciousness. Taylor
clarifies the otherwise anthropomorphic language he uses to describe the processes of
inanimate complex adaptive systems:
Here as elsewhere, the use of the terms like “experience,” “memory,”
“anticipation,” and “learning,” does not, of course imply either
consciousness or self-consciousness. Consciousness is no more necessary
for these operations than it is for the processing of information.”409
Consideration of human involvement with such systems requires, however, that we do
take into account the effects of consciousness, reasoning and, meaning.
Information, of course, is not knowledge, and knowledge is not
necessarily meaningful. We know many things about the world and
ourselves without grasping the meaning. The articulation of meaning
extends the information processing, which begins in sensation and
perception, and continues in consciousness and self-consciousness, by
screening knowledge to form coherent and relatively comprehensive
patterns. This process takes place through reasoning. Reason seeks to
determine not only what happens but why it happens.410
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While non-human systems can learn, that is integrate the general with the particular on
the ontological dimension of the Moral Meaning Matrix, human systems seek vertical
integration as well, that between the ontological (what) and the normative (why).
The discussion this leads into is about as convoluted as a complex adaptive
system itself. As a way to offer clarification in advance, I distinguish the following terms
because in other circumstances they might be used as synonyms. There are at least three
major processes at work in human complex adaptive systems, and I intend for these
clarifications to relate those processes to the Moral Meaning Matrix. The first process,
discussed above is learning. Learning is simply the screening of new data in terms of
information already gathered. Learning, in this strict sense, engages only the ontological
dimension of reality. The second process is reasoning. Reasoning, which I will discuss in
greater detail below is the screening or evaluation of the ontological information patterns
(the products of learning) in light of normative patterns that have been stored in the
system. These normative patterns, I will show, result from the assimilation of meanings
that were made in the past by the third process at work. The third process, which has been
a major focus of this dissertation, is signification. Signification is the synthesizing of the
normative with the ontological into new patterns, which emerge as a result of making
sense of the discrepancies detected by the reasoning process’s screening of the
information patterns, which, in turn, resulted from learning.
Insofar as signification (moral meaning making) depends on the effective
cognitive processes of learning and reasoning, moral development is dependent on
cognitive development. However, the normative dimension derives its patterns from pastmeanings made, so reasoning is dependent on the signification process. Therefore
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cognitive development is reciprocally dependent on moral development. These
conclusions foretell the interdependence of the social institutions of education and
religion and prescribe the two types of development necessary for complex adaptive
systems on all scales and especially for the cognitive and moral processes of leaders.
Before I consider cognitive and moral development further, I will consider more fully the
three processes such development is meant to improve. For this discussion, I return to
Taylor.

Learning and Reasoning
Whereas the process of screening information – on the ontological dimension – is
learning, the process of screening the patterns of information into knowledge out of the
ontological dimension by the normative dimension is reasoning.411 The normative
dimension serves the social system as the memory or storehouse for past meanings-made,
which are encoded in a moral language and symbol system. This allows the normative
dimension to act as the screen or the pattern against which the new patterns of
information are encountered, understood judged, incorporated, or rejected. The new
patterns that emerge from the screening (of the ontological by the normative) of new
information patterns against old meaning patterns constitute meaning in the present. The
latrine/well act would become meaningful, for example, if the person who had known
holes in the ground only as wells had actually encountered a latrine and acted according
to a normative prescription of, say, drink from wells whenever possible because they are
few and far between. He/she would add another precedent – albeit an unpleasant one – to
his/her set of experiences and one that questioned his/her set of norms which prescribed
411

Ibid., 228, 210.

200
drinking from wells when encountered. His/her tradition of well-drinking might modify a
bit to ascertain the contents of the hole. This mediates the difference between the
potentially unhealthy (or at least unsavory) normative prescription and the inadequate set
of categories. As the ontological adjusts to add the unpleasant precedent, the category set
expands to include the category latrine. Holes of different types are named with separate
words and the story of how to distinguish latrines from wells enters the narrative which
he/she hopefully will share with others as their overarching moral language adjusts to
incorporate the now meaningful tradition of sniffing before drinking. The new patterns of
meaning, then, assume their place in the normative vocabulary as past meanings made in
order to understand the next data set to emerge from the ontological dimension.
Both axes of the Moral Meaning Matrix are engaged in learning and reasoning.
Taylor identifies these two vectors in his work as well: “from the concrete to the abstract”
and from the “particular to the general” which map onto the Moral Meaning Matrix as the
movement from ontological to normative and the movement from interpersonal
(contextual) to universe respectively.412 Both axes are important and should not be, even
if they often are, conflated. While generalizations can imbed norms, it is possible to
generalize in a way that is not normative. In observational research, for instance, it is
possible to identify patterns as generally occurring without saying those patterns ought to
occur. Likewise it is possible to abstract norms from reality that are highly contextual in
nature. In American English, a slap on the wrist is different than a pat on the back.
However if either activity were observed by a person unfamiliar with indigenous acts of
discipline and appreciation, much less with colloquial expressions for the behaviors
(which can be invoked even if the actions themselves do not take place), the outsider
412
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might not be able to discern much difference between the two forms of physical contact.
Not only might the American English context be an important factor, but even knowing
the circumstances surrounding the contact would be important. In a very particular way,
the activity and the language which speaks about the activity, so thereby the praxis, of
physical contact between people can be understood as normatively different depending
on the context. There is no way to generalize from these data that physical strikes of this
sort to another’s body exhibit any sort of predictable - always good or always bad pattern.
When the normative and the general are confused, social systems create what
Elizabeth Kamarck Minnich identifies as “faulty generalizations” which result from
abstracting generalizations from too small of a data set. This causes two subsequent
mistakes. The first is assuming that the generalizations from that data set are applicable to
those not represented in the data set. The second is the creation of what Minnich terms a
“hierarchically invidious monism,” or a “system in which one category is taken to be not
literally all there is, but the highest, most significant, most valuable, and, critically, most
real category-which sets up all others to be defined and judged solely with reference to
that hegemonic category.”413
Just as it is important to distinguish the general from the normative, it is also
important to keep distinct the meaning and normative dimensions of reality. This
distinction is particularly helpful for parsing Taylor’s discussion of meaning making.
Doing so keeps in the forefront the difference between extant meanings and past
meanings made. The latter, which constitute the screens against which ontological
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information is evaluated, provide stability over time to the entire social system. The
former have the potential to be much more vibrant and responsive to the environment.
Taylor would agree with this dynamism in the process of meaning making. “Meaning is
always relational and thus inevitably contextual. As relations change and context shifts,
meaning transforms.”414 Where Taylor and I differ in this discussion is in his equating, on
a functional level, theory and myth. Theory, in terms of the Moral Meaning Matrix,
belongs more to the realm of the normative whereas myth belongs to the realm of
meaning.
Theory, or in the case of religion, theology, constitutes the schemata against
which reality (ontological patterns) are screened. As schemata, they pre-exist experience
and can predict or anticipate experience. The domain of myth belongs more in the
meaning-making dimension in that it is the outgrowth of theory trying to make sense out
of realities for which it is, at least momentarily, inadequate. Myth may not endure in a
predictive way in the same way that theory might, but it aids in bringing meaning to life
when theory and information seem to be irreconcilable. Eventually theory might be able
to evolve into a pattern that can anticipate the variations in reality, which precipitated the
myth making. The myth, or parts of it, then, might be absorbed into the theory. The
theory also may be rejected in whole or in part by the realities presented through new
data. In either case, the need for the content of that particular meaning-making myth is
then obviated, but the need for a new myth to make life meaningful is only as far away as
the next discrepancy between theory and reality. Both can be understood as complex
adaptive systems within complex adaptive systems, but as Taylor himself points out, in
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contrast to theory, “myths tend to preserve the temporality of experience in ways that
theories do not.”415
Consider the classic tension in the United States between creationism and
Darwin’s theory of evolution. Darwin underwent a process of learning that no doubt
resulted in information that differed from the normative patterns he brought to his
research. He reconciled the tension between the discovered is and whatever oughts he
possessed as he continued his studies. This tension gave rise to meaningful hypotheses
(meaningful syntheses) similar to a myth about natural selection and so forth. As he
tested his hypotheses in broader and broader contexts and analyzed more and more data,
he solidified a theory, enshrining the accumulation of past meanings-made into a symbol
system that others could use to formulate normative predictions about what one ought to
find, say, in the paleontological record. The theory is refined by further research by
others in the ways discussed above and adapts or reinforces itself as new data are
assimilated.
Christians with a certain set of normative assumptions about God creating the
earth and all life encountered (and still encounter) Darwinian theories in the ontological
dimension as discordant with their normative symbol system. One response, when
reading the new data against this normative screen, is to reject it outright and make
meaning explicitly in contrast to Darwinian theories. Recently, some Christians have
posited a way of making sense out of the difference between Darwinian theory and their
norms by creating the synthesis known as Intelligent Design. This synthesis is
unacceptable to Darwinians who reciprocally encounter it in the ontological dimension,
screen it against their normative pattern of the theory of evolution and reject it.
415
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Nevertheless, Intelligent Design represents an attempt to make sense of new data in light
of the patterns of past meanings made. For those to whom the Intelligent Design myth is
meaningful, it will become a normative theory, which is likely to be a slightly different
normative framework than one that would reject any Darwinian influence.
What makes theory and myth so similar is that theory, or other normative
systems, are symbol systems. But Geertz’s proposition and my argument demonstrate
that myth, ritual, and the other elements of the meaning dimension are constituted not by
the normative alone but by the interaction between those symbol systems and reality as
patterned in the ontological dimension. This difference between the normative and the
meaning dimensions is important to keep in mind as a backdrop when considering
Taylor’s discussion of myth and meaning produced in this third process of human
complex adaptive systems. This third process, joining learning and reasoning, is
signification, which grows out of reasoning’s screening of learning.

Signification
Keeping reasoning and signification separate is more than a heuristic device,
although it is that as well. Confusing reasoning with signification results in the normative
being confused with meaning. When this occurs, social systems set up two more
occasions for error: “circular reasoning” and “mystified concepts” in Minnich’s terms.416
When the normative assumes the role of the meaningful, then the premise seeks a
conclusion which reinforces or supports the premise. The normative screens reality in a
way that filters out discrepancies and rejects difference. This could be the case indeed for
Christians who refuse to entertain Darwinian theories and, arguably, for evolutionary
416
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biologists who reject, without any consideration, notions of divine creation. The
normative simply replicates itself as the “new” pattern, rather than allowing a truly new
pattern, which incorporates difference, to emerge. An “assertion is not open to
contradiction because it is not a descriptive statement, after all. It is prescriptive” or
normative.417
The meaning dimension holds, temporarily, the new patterns that emerge when
the ontological information patterns are screened by the normative schema in the
reasoning process. When the normative pattern projects itself into the locus of the
meaningful, it displaces any new patterns in favor of a recurrence of past meanings made.
Conversely, if the new patterns of the meaning dimension occupy the normative, the
neophyte concepts have no supportive language to place them in the context of past
meanings made. This renders new patterns with normative weight but little explicability.
Minnich, in her examples, does a thorough job of showing that some concepts, when
scrutinized, have no grounding in patterns of screened information or learning processes.
They do no not conform to any rigorous reasoning process that reconciles them with past
meanings made, but simply live in the realm of custom, tradition, and myth - that is in the
realm of the meaningful. Yet in the hands of powerful and dominant classes, these
traditions can be appropriated as norms, but norms without, as she demonstrates, a
coherent moral language.
The words, the concepts, we…consider tend to be mind-numbing either
because they are worn smoothly into platitudes (as in pious invocations of
“excellence”) or because they are fraught with emotion and/or taboo and
confusion (sex/war). I want us to think about them for precisely those
reasons; platitudes and taboos are two sides of the same coin.418
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Meaning is a temporary emergent pattern which must be stabilized and incorporated
recursively into the normative patterns of past meanings made. Using the dissociated
emergent patterns in place of the normative leads to the appropriation of vacuous
concepts and inexplicable values. Conversely, allowing the normative to project its old
patterns in place of the emergent meaning re-circulates old patterns. In religious terms,
the former dysfunctional meaning-making process results in what might be described by
the phenomenon of people identifying themselves as being spiritual but not religious
whereas the latter results in self-identification with religious fundamentalism.
Minnich’s observations interject into the system, more explicitly at least, the role
that human agency plays in interfering with the development of complex adaptive
systems. Of course, the complexity of such systems can account for such agency, once
we assume that persons are part of the system, even if we have to account for it as
chance. Taylor sufficiently accounts for – indeed depends on – chance in developing out
the dynamics of the complex adaptive system. But it is worth recognizing at this point
that social systems and their cognitive and moral processes, even if they are evolving and
changing over time, can be arrested or appropriated by human activity in various ways
that interrupt – or at least further complicate – the patterning and the functioning of those
patterns over time.

Thermodynamics of Closed and Open Systems
Taylor examines the role of chance in some detail in his discussion of the role
communication plays in the thermodynamics of complex adaptive social systems. The
communicative thermodynamics which propel complex adaptive systems provide a

207
useful category in examining how humans interact within social systems as if we were
outside of them and how such ambiguity can lead to the confusion and misappropriation
of dimensions outlined above such as confusing the general with the normative or the
normative with the meaningful.
There are three keys to understanding the thermodynamics of complex adaptive
systems. These keys distinguish complex adaptive systems, which are dissipative
structures in Prigogine’s terms, from more familiar systems. The keys are irreversibility,
difference, and openness.
Classical thermodynamics examines systems that are reversible. That is, these
systems can work forward and backward. They can be done and undone. In a chemical
reaction, for instance, two substances react and produce a product or products. Under the
right conditions, the products can decompose or recompose into the original
substances.419 When reversibility is optimized the reaction occurs in both directions at
equal speeds, and change is not detectable. This type of system stability is known as
equilibrium.
Even in classical thermodynamic systems though, equilibrium, which is a state of
forces and energy being distributed rather evenly throughout a system, is also a state that
keeps the system from doing any perceptible work. In order to effect work, the system
has to be put in contact with another system whose conditions are different. The
difference produces a gradient across which energy can transfer to create a force that can
translate into work. It is easier to conceive of potential difference in physical rather than
chemical terms. A steam engine puts water, otherwise in equilibrium with its
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environment, in contact with a heat source. The heat increases the kinetic energy of the
water molecules which causes them to expand in the form of steam. When the molecules
expand far enough to create more pressure inside the system than outside the system, the
steam will work across yet another gradient in an attempt to equilibrate the pressure
inside with the pressure outside. Placing a turbine in the middle of that second gradient
harnesses the steam for work. Recall here the understanding of energy as the ability to do
work.
The potential difference across these gradients is essential for the production of
forces sufficient to cause work to happen. Unfortunately, real systems such as steam
engines are not perfectly efficient. They cannot translate that energy potential into pure
work. Some of the energy that moves across those gradients is lost to the environment. In
the case of the steam engine, that energy is detectable in the expression of heat from the
system. While the heat might be useful, if harnessed, for another work process, some of
the energy of the system is lost in the form of entropy. Entropy is evident in the more
fluid arrangement of molecules in steam relative to their more ordered arrangement in
water. The heat released from the system also increases the entropy, or randomness, of
the environment surrounding the system. The second law of thermodynamics predicts
this. Entropy, unlike energy, in the universe is increasing. By contrast, energy, according
to the first law of thermodynamics, is conserved.
In order to calculate the energy transfers, scientists draw boundaries around these
processes. These boundaries, which might be beakers, pistons, measuring instruments, or
machines, are systems. In order to measure these energy exchanges, scientists regard
these systems as closed to their respective environments. By allowing only measurable
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heat to pass across the boundaries, scientists can determine what net change of energy
occurs in the processes. It is these closed systems that can come to equilibrium after they
have absorbed or expended sufficient heat from or to the environment.
Complex adaptive systems are open systems. They exchange energy and matter
freely with the environment. As systems, they are discrete entities within their
environment, but the boundaries of those systems are porous compared to the artificially
restrictive, but often well insulated, boundaries, of closed systems. By being open to the
environment, they are constantly susceptible to the creation of potential differences
within the system that allow the system to do work. That work is the work of selforganization of the patterns discussed above. Because these systems do not reach
equilibrium with their environment or internally as long as their environment is changing,
they consistently have a potential gradient across which to work.
The second law of thermodynamics suggests that the environment of complex
adaptive systems is always changing, if for no other reason than because the entropy of
the universe is increasing. This environmental change alone could keep such systems
from achieving internal equilibrium or equilibrium with their environments. Now it is
useful to recall Prigogine’s observation that dissipative structures, and therefore complex
adaptive systems, occur only in circumstances far from equilibrium. In these conditions,
complex adaptive systems thrive because there is always a potential gradient across
which to work. Entropy, then, which is commonly thought of as useless energy, becomes
useful in destabilizing complex adaptive systems enough to propel their growth.
Interestingly, while the entropy creates the conditions for the work of the complex
adaptive system, the system’s work, as we have seen, is the development of increasing
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complexity or self-organization. So increasing randomness is creating the conditions for
increased order in these systems. These systems, as Prigogine and Barabasi have shown,
are stable systems, but not because they achieve any sort of equilibrated state intrinsically
or extrinsically. They are stable but not reversible. The increased organization cannot be
undone because, in a very real sense, it is the outgrowth of increased entropy, which is
always, and only, increasing.
To manage the difficulty of this concept of entropy having an organizing, and not
randomizing, effect on complex adaptive systems, Taylor uses the term “negentropy,” or
negative entropy.420 Negentropy appears only in open systems. Closed systems, such as
the universe is presumed to be, or such as in a bounded chemical reaction, follow the
second law of thermodynamics and tend to maximize entropy. Negentropy forces the
conceptualization of open systems within closed systems. While the entire closed system,
say the universe, still acts according to thermodynamic laws and net entropy increases,
within the relatively limited scope of the open complex adaptive system, randomness
decreases and order increases. The second law obtains for the larger scope of the closed
system but not within the subordinate open system.
So the processes of emergence and evolution of complex adaptive systems are
irreversible. They are sustained by a potential gradient generated by increasing entropy in
their environments. Finally they are sensitive to that shifting potential gradient because
they remain open to that environment. The complexity compounds. Changing systems
within changing systems must be “coadaptive,” increasing the likelihood of what we
might describe as chance to influence the evolution of those systems. “On the one hand,
system and environment are joined in recursive circuits that create both unexpected and
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disproportionate changes, and, on the other hand, the openness of complex adaptive
systems leads to aleatory changes in schemata that distinguish the point of departure from
the point of arrival.”421 Social systems are open systems, yet generally our myths
prescribe meaning-making processes for leaders and cultures which presume (and
recursively reinforce the presumption) that social systems are closed.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
THE VIOLENCE OF CLOSED SYSTEMS

Taylor uses his understanding of the thermodynamics of complex adaptive
systems as a backdrop against which to read communication theory when thinking about
social systems. Having established the relationship between information and knowledge
as shown above, Taylor’s work pushes the concept of communication one step farther.
He relates noise or static to entropy, and information to the conversion of that noise into a
communicative potential gradient across which work can be done. “If information is
understood as a difference that makes a difference, noise can be understood as either the
lack of differentiation or the profusion of indifferent differences.”422 The evolution of
social processes follows the track of noise to information to knowledge. This flow is
counter-entropic. Much like the evolution of increasingly complex species despite the
tendency of the universe to maximize entropy, the complexity of open social systems
increases despite the deterioration of knowledge into information into noise in the
surrounding closed system of the universe.
The key to harnessing the creative influence of entropy is maintaining the
openness of the social system. Closing the social system, perhaps in attempt to stave off
entropic randomness, walls the system off from its font of difference and thereby creates
conditions in which the processes become reversible and achieve equilibrium in which all
422
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forces and energy are distributed equally throughout the system. Equilibrium precludes
the creation of dissipative structures, which only occur far from equilibrium. Equilibrium
also eliminates potential gradients across which work can be done. The system is
analogous to the water tank in a steam engine without the fire.
When a social system achieves this sort of homogeneity, it cannot grow or change
without some sort of destabilizing influence. René Girard discusses the social threat such
an absence of difference creates and the two main ways societies respond to that threat.
Interestingly it is a threat that arises only from closing a social system off from what
otherwise is a constant flow of difference.
Violence in Girard’s thought is an outgrowth of rivalry. Rivalry grows to the point
of needing a scapegoat or sacrificial victim after intensifying through the feedback loop
of the mutual imitation of the mimetic desire each of the rivals has for a given object.
However, mimesis in a closed system creates another problem. It creates homogeneity or
lack of difference. As mimesis intensifies and broadens there are fewer and fewer
distinctions between imitator and model. “The similarity of behavior creates confusion
and a universal lack of difference.”423 This poses a threat, in Girard’s analysis, and such a
threat has created the conditions for, if not triggered, many of the great persecutions in
history.
Men feel powerless when confronted with the eclipse of culture; they are
disconcerted by the immensity of the disaster but never look into the
natural causes; the concept that they might affect those causes by learning
more about them remains embryonic. Since cultural eclipse is above all a
social crisis, there is a strong tendency to explain it by social, and,
especially, moral causes. After all, human relations disintegrate in the
process and the subjects of those relations cannot be utterly innocent of the
phenomenon. But, rather than blame themselves, people inevitably blame
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either society as a whole, which costs them nothing, or other people who
seem particularly harmful for easily identifiable reasons.424
This blame escalates to the identification of a scapegoat or a whole group of
victims against which society can express the violence that stems from the disorder.
However, the function of the violence is not to exacerbate the disorder but to restore
order. The selection of victims also entails ascribing to them crimes against society which
inevitably can be traced to crimes against difference. The victims of the persecution are
accused of transgressing the orderly hierarchies and other lines of distinction that society
had created. Whether violent crimes against the strongest or weakest in society, sexual
crimes, or religious infractions, they “seem to be fundamental. They attack the very
foundations of cultural order, the family and the hierarchical differences without which
there would be no social order.”425
It is important to remember that the function of the violence is to re-establish
difference when considering Girard’s counter-intuitive point that victims are not selected
because of their difference alone, but because they are not different enough.
The various kinds of victims seem predisposed to crimes that eliminate
differences. Religious, ethnic, or national minorities are never actually
reproached for their difference, but for not being as different as expected,
and in the end for not differing at all. Foreigners are incapable of
respecting “real” differences; they are lacking in culture or in taste, as the
case may be. They have difficulty in perceiving exactly what is
different….The barbaros is not the person who speaks a different
language but the person who mixes the only truly significant distinctions,
those of the Greek language….Aliens imitate all the differences because
they have none.426
Interestingly, Girard suggests that societies respond to the prospect of this crisis in
two seemingly contradictory ways. First, societies try to avoid the disintegration of
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difference by establishing religious prohibitions and taboos that reinforce hierarchies and
other lines of difference. Like Berger’s sacred canopy, the potential of the anomic
circumstance created by deteriorating differentiation precipitates a religious response.
Since mimesis ultimately renders the prohibitions and taboos ineffectual in preserving
distinctions, religion develops a complement to prohibitions and taboos. That
complement is ritual. Rites, as Turner and others have demonstrated, however, often
require participants to violate taboos and enact behavior otherwise proscribed by the
religious prohibitions. Girard reconciles this apparent contradiction by seeing the roots of
the rites in the mythic stories which recount disorder and lack of differentiation as the
conditions of creation, or at least the foundation of society or civilization.
Mimesis is mimetically attractive, and we can assume that at certain
stages, at least in the evolution of human communities, mimetic rivalry
can spread to an entire group. This is what is suggested by the acute
disorder phase with which many rituals begin. The community turns into a
mob under the effect of mimetic rivalry. The phenomena that take place
when a human group turns into a mob are identical to those produced by
mimetic rivalry, and they can be defined as that loss of differentiation
which is described in mythology and reenacted in ritual.427
In other words, the rites that Girard examines formalize and sacralize the same processes
inherent to persecutions and mob violence. Along with prohibitions and taboos they
create a cultural process for maintaining and routinely re-establishing the differences
within the society. The prohibitions and taboos create a feedback loop within a society
which attempts to regulate the diminution of difference. When that regulatory effect fails,
persecutions and rituals which mimic the dynamics of mob violence provide a feed
forward loop. “Instead of trying to roll back mimetic violence it tries to get rid of it by
encouraging it and by bringing it to a climax that triggers the happy solution of ritual
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sacrifice with the help of a substitute victim.”428 These loops demonstrate the dynamics
of an autopoietic system as described by Taylor. “Such recursivity does not, however,
transform causality in a way that makes the operation of the system irreversible.”429
Autopoietic systems chart “a course from creation through transformation to
destruction.”430 Despite this progressive track, which ultimately leads to greater
complexity within the system, such systems remain closed.431 As closed systems they
“seek to overcome disequilibrium” and seem to leave “no possibility of chance, accident
or contingency.” Recall “however, equilibrium appears to be death-dealing rather than
life giving.”432 So, insofar as prohibitions, taboos, and ritualized or real violence disrupt
equilibrium, they preserve and advance the life of the closed, albeit, autopoietic social
system.
Closed social systems, then, tend toward equilibrium. In order to keep them
viable, however, the actors within those systems must stave off equilibrium and
periodically disrupt its onset. Taboos as well as ritualized and actual violence sustain the
viability of closed social systems.
There are two ways to think about a system as being closed in terms of the Moral
Meaning Matrix. They are related. The first way is to conceive of structural barriers of
isolation that actually prevent any new stimuli from entering through the ontological
dimension. The social system, in this case, experiences very few, if any new realities over
time. This type of sequestered existence cuts off the process of learning described above.
The second type of closure, for which the first is a sufficient but not necessary condition,
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is the closing of the reasoning or the signification processes by conflation one way or the
other of the normative and meaning dimensions. In those cases norms are re-circulated as
meanings, or meanings masquerade as norms. The former leads to retrenchment of
fundamental values, while the latter leads to an ungrounded mysticism. If the ontological
dimension is not closed off, then, in the former system, new information will be judged
by the fundamental screen as either meaningful or not. Rather than meaning resulting
from a synthesis of the is and the ought, realities that do not make sense in terms of the
normative screen are simply rejected as meaningless. While in the fundamentalist system
there is a stark contrast between the ontological and the normative, in the mystical
system, there is no substantive normative to act as a point of tension with the ontological.
Absent a process of reasoning, the new experiences simply feed an increasingly vacuous
set of meanings holding the place of norms. Every new thing is meaningful and, in a
relativistic way, normative because nothing old is preserved.
Whether the system is closed on the ontological level providing no new
experiences for any dynamism within the Moral Meaning Matrix, or whether the
normative and the meaningful are somehow conflated, the processes eventually tend
toward the identity of all three dimensions involved in signification. The fundamentalist
system refuses any incompatible patterns, the mystical accepts and incorporates all
patterns, and the completely sequestered system has no information with which to create
new patterns. In all cases the potential difference between the ontological and the
normative tends toward zero. The dynamics of any of these closed systems, in yet another
way – a way related to the meaning-making process itself – settles toward equilibrium or
system death.
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This necrosis can occur at any level of complexity within the social fractal:
interpersonal, group, organization, institution, society, or universe/global. Because it is a
fractal, the decay spreads throughout the web, if by no other means, then, mimetically.

Closed Systems Leadership
Mimesis also can be the salvation of these otherwise doomed closed social
systems. It is now possible to read the Girardian analysis of Hall’s leadership taxonomy
into the context of closed social systems. Understanding what has typically been called
leadership style as different methods with which to disrupt equilibrium demonstrates how
leaders affect the meaning-making process by keeping the closed social system
destabilized and, thereby, viable. It is necessary at this point to recall the discussion
above about the endothermic and exothermic syntheses of the is and the ought. Imposing
the normative on the ontological in a closed system requires that energy be absorbed from
the environment into the system. Giving primacy to the ontological over the normative,
as Freire argues, releases energy from the system. Combining this understanding of the
more traditional thermodynamics of a closed system (as contrasted with the
thermodynamics of an open complex adaptive system) with the need to maintain
distinctions or re-establish order in closed systems leads to an analysis of the cycles of
leadership in terms of the manner with which energy is deployed for the sake of meaning
making and the way in which differences or hierarchies are maintained and/or restored.
Leaders facilitate the work of signification for groups. That work requires energy.
Leaders in closed systems use that energy in one of a finite number of ways relative to
release or absorption of energy on the one hand and relative to the degree of order and
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differentiation maintained on the other. Leaders adapt postures relative to entropy and
energy and do so in various ways depending on the cycle of leadership from which they
are operating.
It might be simplest to think of these two points of analysis as two axes of a grid:
energy and order. Each of the first six of Hall’s cycles of leadership, within a closed
system, is exothermic or endothermic with respect to energy consumption and each style
promotes, diminishes, or maintains differentiated order. This is outlined in Figure 11.
Figure 11: Leadership Posture Grid
Leadership Posture
ENERGY

Promotes

DIFFERENTIATED ORDER
Maintains
Diminishes

Endothermic

Authoritarian

Paternalist/Maternalist

Manager

Exothermic

Facilitator

Collaborator

Servant

Perhaps the Authoritarian level of leadership occupies the most intuitive position
on the leadership posture grid. By adopting a dominant rival approach to imposing norms
on reality, the authoritarian maintains a strict hierarchy which sustains stark
differentiation. As long as the authoritarian is the dominant rival in the closed system, the
order is under no threat of disintegration. In order to stave off the natural tendency toward
equilibrium, however, the authoritarian leader rapidly depletes the energy (or power) of
others within the system and must appropriate energy from outside of the system and
bring it across the boundaries. This model can lead to a high level of sustained
productivity, but it is very costly. The leader must continually replenish the energy or risk
losing his or her position and therefore the life-sustaining differentiation of the system.
The Paternalist/Maternalist leader, by maintaining a position as the object of
desire in the Girardian scheme, maintains order. Rivalries are managed as rivals are kept
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at bay and in competition with one another. The leader remains out of the fray, and others
do not challenge his or her imposition of personal norms on reality as it would jeopardize
their ability to curry favor with the parental figure. Still, the parent-leader, in the context
of the closed system, uses the energy of the competing rivals in order to impose those
norms on reality. To a lesser extent than the authoritarian, the paternalist/maternalist must
still bring energy or resources from outside the system into the system if for no other
reason than to maintain his or her desirability. The differentiation among rivals and
between rivals and object of desire (or leader) keeps the system away from equilibrium.
When the paternalist/maternalist system breaks down, when the object of desire is
no longer the leader, then the rivalries begin to usurp the power of an otherwise strong
leader. Enter the manager, a type which occupies perhaps a counter-intuitive place on the
leadership posture grid. However, the dynamic that the manager is managing happens to
be, essentially, in Girardian terms, that of a mob. Order has broken down to the point that
the manager, or executive, continually creates policies to preserve it, and when these fail,
the manager must serve as the priest of continual sacrifices to channel the mob violence.
The manager, then, rather than maintaining order, constantly disorders and re-orders the
system around successive rituals of scapegoating and sacrifice. While efficiency, order,
and bureaucracy are the hallmarks of the manager, such order stands out because it is
achieved under the most difficult of circumstances. Order, as a goal, is made explicit
against the backdrop of what otherwise would be chaos. The mob freely gives up its
energy to the leader for the imposition of norms on reality, but the manager too, must use
that energy to maintain the successive rituals necessary to affix those norms. To a lesser
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extent than the antecedent types, the manager must also bring in resources from outside
the system in order to fuel sacrificial dynamics of this closed system.
Once the mob’s energy can no longer be converted for the maintenance of a
normative-oriented culture, the energy posture of the system and therefore of the leader
changes. The facilitator diminishes himself or herself relative to the group in order to
assuage the violent needs of the group. And, like the manager, the facilitator must do this
over and over again. While the manager is managing the mob chaos on a disordered
brink, the facilitator allows the mob’s sacrifice to complete itself and so rests more
comfortably in the re-ordered aftermath of the sacrifice. The facilitator promotes order by
empowering the others in the organization. As the facilitator elevates the experiences of
others in the system, those realities begin to give shape to the system’s norms in the first
of the exothermic meaning-making postures. Rather than requiring energy from outside
the system, the facilitator releases the power from within the system. It gives energy back
to the universe. The facilitator does not bring any energy or resources into the system. So,
if the system remains closed, then its exothermic nature will eventually run it into
equilibrium even if differentiation and order are not a problem as multiple perspectives
are honored and incorporated into an overall framework of meaning and organizational
structure.
On the other side of the facilitator’s sacrifice arises the hero. The hero's role in
myth and as a collaborative leader symbolizes and maintains the order that has been
created by the sacrifice. A social fabrication, the hero, or collaborator in this case, derives
all power from the mob turned society that created him or her. As primus inter pares, the
collaborator delegates authority and preserves the order the system has created for itself.
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The system has taken a step away from the still more hierarchically ordered facilitator-led
array by the creation of equals. Homogeneity becomes an increasing threat. The flipside
of the paternalist/maternalist, the collaborator preserves order while releasing energy
from the system by empowering others to take the lead. Relative to the facilitator, the
collaborator as hero is one step closer to terminating the closed system because the model
both gives up its energy to the universe and diminishes the distinctions upon which order
is founded.
The death blow to closed social systems, however, is dealt by the final closed
system leadership style, servant-leadership. The servant intentionally disrupts the order
by actually inverting hierarchical relationships. Coupling this disruption of order and
difference with the exothermic effect best described as revolutionary by Freire makes the
servant model of leadership the end of the line for closed systems. The pace toward
equilibrium is hastened by the double threat of loss of differentiation and loss of energy
in what may be the social equivalent of combustion.
In a closed system, the most orderly leadership level but the most costly in terms
of its insatiable appetite for resources from within and from outside the system is the
authoritarian style. The least ordered is the servant. As long as the system remains closed,
the autocrat will hunt for power and the servant will be running his or her social system
headlong into equilibrium. The endothermic styles only maintain their meaning-making
ability as long as they continue to use energy from the surrounding environment. The
exothermic styles only are able to continue making meaning as long as they have energy
to release to the environment. The exothermic styles, then, remain the luxury of the
already empowered. It is only possible to lead as a facilitator, collaborator, or servant as
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long as one has sufficient resources to maintain that level of leadership over time or as
the systems themselves continue to grow. So with the addition of resources, an
endothermic leadership posture can turn exothermic, and vice versa. If posture toward
order is held constant, then a system accustomed to authoritarian rule, once it discovers
abundance within the system can afford to support more of a facilitative type of
leadership. Likewise, a Paternalist/Maternalist can move to Collaborator and Manager to
Servant. Conversely, when resources are scarce, Servant-Leadership can collapse into
executive mob management, the hero can turn parental and the facilitator can replace the
flip chart on the easel with his or her portrait. This potential oscillation exhibits the
reversibility of the closed system based on the relative flow of energy.
If resources are not in play, but differentiation is either threatened or strengthened,
then systems might be able to sustain adjacent leadership styles on the developmental
continuum within the same energy posture. A servant-leader could retreat into
collaborator mode in search of greater differentiation; likewise a collaborator to
facilitator. Styles with endothermic postures could proceed accordingly: manager to
parental and parental to authoritarian. However, if the system experiences a great deal of
increased differentiation, either through expansion or personnel turnover, for example,
then the system might be able to sustain the next (or higher) level of leadership. In this
way the closed system of leadership also exhibits reversibility along a continuum of more
and less developed leadership styles.
Just because the system can sustain a leadership level or style that is more highly
developed does not mean that it will move the leaders in that direction. The leader must
have the cognitive (learning and reasoning) and moral (signification) capacity to adapt to
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the changing dynamics of the system or risk losing leadership status. A leader can easily
assume a less developed leadership style for a social system operating using, say,
authoritarian modes of signification, just as an adult who can ride a ten-speed bicycle
probably can somewhat awkwardly manage to ride a child’s tricycle. But if the social
system evolves to the point of calling for the leadership equivalent of a unicycle rider,
then a Tour de France champion may not even be able to succeed without further
cognitive and moral development. Like the excommunication of a judgmental evangelist
caught with sin-stained hands, the most likely means of removing a leader from a system
which he or she helped create and which is outgrowing him or her will be by the violent
meaning-making mechanism the leader himself or herself helped encode or reinforce for
the sake of the system’s stability. Dominant rivals get dominated; scapegoating managers
are sent packing; collaborators get elevated to honorary yet non-functional posts.
However, when the system is threatened with extinction due to a diminishing
number of resources and/or lessened differentiation, then the leader’s reversion to a less
developed approach may be necessary to maintain the viability of the closed system. The
mere perception of such scarcity of resources and loss of differentiation within the system
might be sufficient to cause such a retreat. Such a perception may, in fact, be cultivated
by the leader in order to maintain power at the less developed style of leadership.
Remember that the systems under consideration are closed or are being treated as closed
by the leaders and the constituents; so the ability for the systems to adapt and change in a
way that makes sense to persons with a closed-systems mindset is not as fluid as that of
complex adaptive systems.
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Regardless of the capacity of closed systems to support various leadership styles,
all such systems tend toward equilibrium and the leader’s role is to stave off that
equilibrium. Each of the styles or cycles of leadership moves the system away from
equilibrium either by imposing hierarchical orders of differentiation or by creating
differentiation by disrupting homogeneity. Each style brings its own gift or charism for
creating differentiation within the system. The charism of the Authoritarian is rivalry, of
the Paternalist/Maternalist, desire, of the manager, scapegoating, of the facilitator,
sacrifice, of the collaborator, heroism, of the servant, transformation. It is possible for
leaders at different stages to exhibit charisma and for that charisma to have the effect of
creating differentiation within the system. Now it is possible to understand why
contemporary leadership analysts seem to suggest that charisma must be routine and why
saying a leader is charismatic does not necessarily say much about the style of leadership
or the developmental cycle of the leader. At any level, without routine charisma of one
type or another, the system would settle into equilibrium and would die.

Charismatic Energy
Charisma is the gift of being capable of destabilizing the system. Charismatic
leadership is the ability to destabilize the system in a way that also facilitates the
construction of meaning for the group. Understanding charisma in functional, rather than
evaluative, terms reveals that it is available at all cycles of development. Charismatic
leadership, then is a means of posturing relative to equilibrium and entropy in a system
insofar as those systems are closed or regarded as closed by the leaders. A closed social
system requires that a charismatic leader articulate a vision for re-ordering or establishing
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new distinctions when the old distinctions fail or begin to slide inevitably toward
equilibrium. The charismatic leader gains credibility in this task by having demonstrated
a comfort level with entropy and equilibrium, perhaps by being effectively present and
supportive at times of major life disruptions - that is at times of entropy on a personal
level. Note, however, that the way a leader expresses such effective presence may be
directly related to his or her level of moral and cognitive development as a leader.
As differentiation and order break down in a system, the need for charisma
increases. In Girard’s analysis, the breakdown looks like and/or precipitates mob
violence. In the face of that eventuality, the charismatic leader uses his or her gift to reestablish order. The gift or charism differs based on the leadership style being employed.
An authoritarian uses dominance; a paternalist/maternalist, desire; a manager,
scapegoating; a facilitator, self-sacrifice; a collaborator, heroism; a servant,
transformation. Note in this analysis the particularly important role charisma plays for a
servant-leader. The combination of expending energy and disrupting order requires a
continuous need for re-establishing what is, ironically, a disordering order. The servant
almost constantly has to call his or her community into a re-ordering transformation for
the sake of creating the level of energy necessary to sustain the system.
With respect to the leadership posture grid, leaders encounter the threat of
thermodynamic equilibrium relative to energy flows in the oscillation between
exothermic leadership styles and endothermic leadership styles. If the system balances
energy, it ceases to be exothermic or endothermic. The social system and the
corresponding leadership style are reversible across this point. Likewise leaders
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encounter maximum entropy when moving between the manager and facilitator styles at
the point prior to re-establishing order.
Leadership postures relative to equilibrium, then, resist a balancing of the energy
flow. Recall now the earlier analysis of Freire’s insights relative to the Moral Meaning
Matrix. Endothermic meaning-making corresponds to the imposition of the normative on
the ontological. Conversely, exothermic meaning-making corresponds to the privileging
of the ontological over the normative. A balance between the normative and the
ontological would equate with equilibrium. Thus in a closed system, the leader
necessarily privileges either the normative or the ontological in order to stave off
equilibrium. Understanding normative patterns as past meanings-made and ontological
patterns as potential future meanings unfolds the dimension of time into these
conceptions of leadership. Endothermic leadership styles are regressive in nature in that
they rely on past-meanings made for the processes of signification they engender.
Exothermic styles, however, are progressive in that they give primacy to potential and
future. Remember that the systems are closed and are therefore reversible. A progressive
leader, when energy runs out, reverts to the corresponding regressive style to bring
energy back into the system.
The danger this reversibility causes is that once a leader adopts a regressive mode,
the past is recursively privileged pulling the leader toward, developmentally speaking,
earlier and earlier, modes of meaning-making. A servant turned manager in the face of
depleting resources can regress through paternalist/maternalist to authoritarian. Whereas
reclaiming a servant style requires that the system replenish its resources, devolving into
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authoritarian requires only the repetition of the cycle of privileging the past over the
future.
Conversely, in a system with plentiful resources, the leader’s meaning-making
style has the opportunity to shift into exothermic or progressive mode. In this mode,
future meanings, in the form of the ontological, are privileged thereby facilitating
personal growth and development.
While the abundance of resources may be a necessary condition for enabling a
progressive leadership style, it is not a sufficient condition. The leaders must have the
cognitive and moral capacity to operate at higher cycles of development. Such growth
again has to do with the leader’s posture relative to the onset of equilibrium and entropy
in a social system.
In the middle of the developmental continuum for leaders and the systems for
which they facilitate meaning-making is the point at which the enterprise of signification
shifts from an endothermic process to an exothermic process. This is the point where the
meaning-making process of the system is immanently reversible. In the theoretical center
between manager and facilitator systems there is no energy exchanged and the
ontological and the normative contribute equally to the meaning-making synthesis. The
only problem is there is no tension between the two points. The system is incapable of
producing meaning because it is in equilibrium – heat death.
Closed systems leaders at all levels of development must deal with this threat of
equilibrium or system death. Endothermic leadership styles regress away from the
equilibrium and experience the increased entropy that comes naturally from the
ontological dimension as pulling the system closer to heat death. No closed system
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leaders can escape increasing entropy, because entropy is always increasing. At one
extreme, authoritarian leaders react to entropy by increasing hierarchical ordering and,
given the charism of the authoritarian, interpret entropy as a foe - yet another rival to be
dominated. Charismatic authoritarian leadership, therefore, involves the dominant rival
leader articulating a vision for followers that demonstrates his or her ability to fend off
the entropic forces of experience with power appropriated from outside the system to
establish the articulated future vision. Given the regressive nature of endothermic
leadership, this norm-dominated future vision will involve a retrenchment of past
meanings. Thus the struggle between entropy and order for the authoritarian regresses the
leader and the system as a whole. It is meaningful, but meaningful in increasingly
historic, or fundamentalist, terms. Again here we encounter the conflation of the
normative with the meaning dimensions in its extreme which reveals the closure of the
system through increasing fundamentalism. Differences in the system are recursively
screened out as ontological data are judged against the more and more rigid normative
screen. Taken to the extreme, this closure of the system, in response to entropy, results in
a homogenization as distinctions regressively disappear thus requiring the leaders to
appropriate more and more power from within and from outside the system to maintain
any kind of hierarchical ordering at all. This very power hungry system, in reaction to the
entropy of the future, powers itself into the homogeneity of the past which intensifies and
eventually overcomes the system. As Taylor observes, the “processes of globalization
have unleashed resurgent nationalisms and fundamentalisms throughout the world.
Though these reactions often issue in devastating violence, they are ultimately fated to
fail.”433
433
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Whereas the authoritarian is hungry for power for the sake of constantly reestablishing order, the servant, on the other end of the spectrum, is hungry for difference,
needing to add it to the system to sustain the exothermic meaning-making process. Since
the servant system depletes energy rather than absorbing it like the authoritarian, it must
move away from equilibrium by increasing difference. It does so by privileging the
ontological over the normative to the extreme, enveloping the variety of new experiences
in order to resist the equilibration of energy exchange. Unlike the authoritarian, entropy
in the servant system increases difference and propels the progressive system away from
equilibrium. Whenever the system nears equilibrium, the charism of the servant
transforms the power structures and demythologizes the status quo. This leaves the
system radically subject to the ontological without regard to any governing norms. It is
intensively progressive to the point of making past meanings made irrelevant. The
ontological realities feed the process of signification without any substantive screening
by the normative. The meaning dimension serves as a substitute for the normative and
simply must accept the ontological as meaningful and therefore normative. The way it is
becomes understood as the way it ought to be. The relativistic ungrounded mysticism
tightens the seal on the closed system by shutting it off from the past. The Moral
Meaning Matrix dimensions collapse into homogeneity.
So authoritarians react against increasing entropy and in so doing regress into
homogenization. Servants allow entropy to increase to avoid equilibrium and in so doing
progress toward homogenization. Both equilibrium and homogenization in closed social
systems establish the mythic conditions for creation or re-creation. A Girardian analysis
suggests that societies will differentiate and re-order by re-enacting the myth with a firm
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grip on the meaning-making process. Times of homogeneity and equilibrium require
sacrifice, or the mimetic violence will destroy the social unit altogether.
Thinking about the leadership styles as a continuum of openness to the
ontological dimension, with authoritarian being the most closed to it of the six, and
thinking of the ontological dimension as the dimension that introduces entropy in the
form of new experiences which increase difference in the system, makes it easy to
understand how authoritarians fighting entropy move farther and farther away from
difference and into increasing homogeneity. It is equally easy to imagine how servant
leaders stand on the precipice of total entropic consumption, yet servants retain a closed
system by ultimately disallowing any dialectical conversation with the past. The degrees
of openness between authoritarian and servant are also degrees of balance between the
ontological and the normative positions in the matrix. Authoritarians privilege the
normative to the exclusion of the ontological and servants privilege the ontological to the
exclusion of the normative. This scale of shifting balance corresponds to a continuum of
energy deployment moving from highly endothermic to highly exothermic. In the
theoretical middle of this continuum is the immanently reversible system in which the
ontological and normative are balanced. Between the manager and facilitator leadership
styles is that middle ground. This equilibrium state in the evolution of leaders and their
closed systems serves as an attractor as the systems will move naturally toward
equilibrium. As a result, the charisms of the manager and facilitator are probably among
the most often engaged to stave off the entropic pull toward equilibrium by ordering and
re-ordering the system, in the case of the manager, or allowing in just enough entropy to
thwart the slide into equilibrium in the case of the facilitator. The charisms involve
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making meaning by using power using the mythical processes of execution and selfsacrifice. The equilibrium-attractor of closed social systems invokes the apex of the
violent myth. So the ritualized activities described above of scapegoating and sacrifice
are actively and intentionally replayed over and over again in order to revive closed
social systems that would otherwise plunge irresistibly into the equilibrium of mob
violence.

Scapegoating a Manager
Consider, for example, a case study of a budget-cutting process at the University
of Missouri. The normatively-driven decision-making processes attempted to close the
system. The openness of the system persisted however and at least one leader who had
participated in prescribing managerial meaning-making modes experienced his own
scapegoating once others in the system re-ordered it as his expense. The other two
scapegoating manager-leaders temporarily re-established order in the system, which was
headed toward undifferentiated equilibrium, by scapegoating the third manager. They
simultaneously regressed the system and kept it from opening up even more.
In the early 1980s, Provost Ron Bunn at the University of Missouri faced several
questions as he attempted to chart a long-range path for responding to the financial
pressures the university had been experiencing. His thought processes and actions are the
subject of a case study developed for the Harvard Institute for Education Management by
Jacqueline Stefkovich, Chris Harris, and Lee Bolman.434
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The case study leads me to characterize Bunn’s decision-making process as one
which attempts to discern which budget cuts make sense in light of the fiscal crises he
faced. In his case, I generally detect a desire to inscribe the normative onto the
ontological. In other words, Bunn’s rational approach (along with that of Chancellor
Barbara Uehling and President James Olson) to the difficult situation he was facing was
to impose his normative sense of orderliness on the complex realties of the situation. He
was attempting to keep an open system closed by emphasizing and acting from the
normative and general at the expense of the ontological and contextual. While he was not
at all naïve to the complexities involved, his rational approach did not find a happy
reception within the organizational framework.
Organizational theorists Michael Cohen and James March, from the framework
they articulated in Leadership and Ambiguity, would argue the rational approach is not at
home in an academic setting because the environment does not conform to common
assumptions about what is reasonable. In their words, such an environment is an anarchy,
and Bunn was not sensitive enough to the chaotic environment to employ tactics that
would enable him to make decisions or execute successful strategies.435
Beyond the order-disorder dyad outlined by Cohen and March is a third option.
That is the possibility that what Cohen and March might construe as anarchy has an order
in and of itself that is discernible but not necessarily resonant with a western rational
sense of order. Cohen and March point to this possibility somewhat, but I read their
suggestions and tactics more as helping the normatively-driven provost succeed in
applying norms to a chaotic environment. Rather than calling for a complete surrender to
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the ontological order in which a leader finds himself or herself, the authors give a
normative handbook for navigating the wild jungle of the university.436 They still
presume that normativity precedes ontology but admit that acting normatively in such an
environment requires special skills derived from attention to the fact that the environment
is norm-resistant. 437
I would like to push Cohen and March to go a step farther and abandon the orderdisorder duality and look into the chaos of the university to find the sense that is, in fact,
made there. What is it that rules the chaos? That is, how does the chaos itself make
sense? Rather than trying to force norms upon a system that is resistant to them or slip
them by while the system blinks, it may be the mark of a more powerful leader to attend
to, understand and act in accordance with the laws of an order that may be judged as
chaos on the surface.
In the case of the latter, I argue that the ontological gives rise to the normative and
that the ontology itself has an order all its own. I will attempt to show evidence of this
ruled chaos with what data are available from the University of Missouri (UMO) study as
we examine how that community makes sense of the cuts.
My analysis proceeds as follows: Cuts That Make Sense, Cutting Sensitively, and
Making Sense of the Cuts. In each of these sections, I discuss the thought processes,
actions, and justifications around two dimensions of the study: The tension between
uniform cuts across the board and making strategic cuts, and the development of criteria
to guide Bunn’s and others’ decisions.
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Cuts that Make Sense
The president, chancellor, provost, Board of Curators, and faculty council all
agreed “in principle” that executing uniform budget reductions across the board was an
undesirable solution to the financial problems facing the university system. A poll
conducted by the campus newspaper confirmed, to the extent it could, that the campus
generally favored strategic cuts over reductions that were spread evenly across campus.
The “principle” to which so many assented seems to have been summed up nicely by the
following:
Both Bunn and Barbara Uehling believed that it was essential for the
Columbia campus to concentrate its resources on its strongest and most
significant programs. Uehling had frequently and publicly expressed
concern over the University’s tendency to skim all programs across the
board at the expense of the institution’s mission.438
The mission of the university provides a normative standard against which programs can
be judged. In fact, the way the case study is written implies that some programs already
had been assessed against that standard at least in the minds of Bunn and Uehling. What
is unclear from the case study is whether even Uehling and Bunn shared a common
understanding of what made a program “strong” and “significant.” The mission held
symbolic value for both Uehling and Bunn as it likely did for the entire campus. Further,
the principle of measuring programs against that mission seems to have obtained near
universal agreement.
Rationally, it would seem that the decision-making process was off to a great
start. The community could commonly affirm the mission and agree in principle that it
ought to guide the university’s actions as the community navigated this difficult budget
crisis. This consensus, however, begs the question that, theoretically, nothing ought to
438
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exist in the university if it is inconsistent with or detrimental to the mission of the
university.
The consensus is not illusory. It is real, but it is consensus around a symbol which
by nature throws together disparate meanings and holds them as unified. The power of a
symbol is that it can express a multitude of values, some of which may be in conflict with
one another. In this case, the engineering dean and the education dean, for example, could
affirm the mission with equal conviction while holding contradictory interpretations of
what that affirmation means.
So the consensus is off to a rocky start at the beginning, and the difficulty is
amplified by the principle of judging programs against that symbol. Knowing that there
may be as many interpretations of the mission as there are people interpreting it makes it
even more difficult to conceive of how many myriad ways programs can be judged
relative to that standard – a standard which turns out to be a multitude of standards after
all.
The mission as symbol is useful in that it helps to unify an otherwise disparate
operation, but its strength is its weakness if it is deployed in a deductive manner and
applied to a situation such as the one confronting UMO. The principle of judging
programs by the mission is problematic from inception because of the symbolic nature of
the mission.
When confronted with a difficult reality, Bunn and Uehling attempted to organize
the complex by reaching for available norms, gaining or confirming consensus around
those norms, and applying them to the situation. Bunn and Uehling attempted to apply the
normative mission to resolve the ontological budget crisis.
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Bunn, Uehling, and Olson were aware of the difficulty in applying this principle
to the situation and its susceptibility to many different interpretations. Therefore they all
proposed and followed criteria in their decision-making processes. President Olson
articulated criteria for the consideration of the Board of Curators. His criteria included:
quality, need, redundancy, and financial considerations. The Curators agreed to these
criteria. In a more extensive process of consensus-building, Uehling had led her staff to
the formulation of campus-specific criteria which Bunn later used in his evaluation of
programs. These criteria were quality, centrality to the mission, cost-effectiveness, and
demand. Both Olson’s and Bunn’s criteria are discussed in more detail in the case study.
At issue here is not the validity of the criteria but the fact that criteria were developed in
the first place.
Again, Uehling’s norm-development process was year-long and involved many
constituencies. Olson’s criteria were well-developed and published in a speech before the
Board of Curators. Contrast, however, the process of developing criteria publicly with the
chaplains’ process at Emory of trying to determine what to do. UMO focused on
consensus around the why before getting to the what, whereas Emory ultimately focused
on the what and built the why around it. Nevertheless UMO was able to gain consensus
around the normative as well as around the principle that one can use the normative to
evaluate and shape the ontological. By using the normative to guide his actions, Bunn
proposed cuts that made sense.
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Cutting Sensitively
The analysis of Cohen and March begins to expose the problems of the way the
leaders were approaching this problem. While nodding to the importance of the
ontological and qualifying the role of the normative, even Cohen and March’s approach
does not quite go as far as embracing the full openness of this system. Nevertheless, their
conclusions move this analysis in that direction.
Cohen and March suggest that statements of purpose are “meaningless or
dubious.”439 In order to be broadly accepted, the goals statements must remain ambiguous
and, therefore, in Cohen and March’s estimation, meaningless. This ambiguity makes
“ordinary theories of decision making and intelligence…problematic.”440 Cohen and
March offer strategies for “how a leader with purpose can operate within an organization
that is without one.”441
It is perfectly understandable how Bunn, Uehling, and Olson could come to
understand the normative dimension of the crisis as key to resolving it. Yet by
concentrating on the normative, Bunn et al. construct an artificial clarity of purpose that
is, in actuality, unrelated to the organizational circumstances surrounding the crisis.
Cohen and March illuminate the dissonance between the presumptions of
leadership and the realities of the context in which they lead. It is possible that Cohen and
March would argue that Bunn did not pay attention to this dissonance and headed off in a
process that mistakenly presumed an environment hospitable to a normative approach.
The same might be said of the establishment of criteria to guide the budget cuts.
Cohen and March critique what they call an “ethic of rationality” which presumes
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purpose and which requires consistency between action and belief and relates
consequences to objectives.442 Certainly the way in which Bunn deployed the criteria in
the midst of this crisis was to achieve some, if not all, of these elements of a rational
approach to the crisis. What Cohen and March might suggest to Bunn, among other
things, is to reconsider the whole notion of evaluation.
As nearly as we can determine, there is nothing in a formal theory of
evaluation that requires that criteria be specified in advance. In particular,
the evaluation of social experiments need not be in terms of the degree to
which they have fulfilled our prior expectations. Rather they can examine
what they did in terms of what we now believe to be important.443
In sum, by referencing the mission at the beginning, employing the principle of
evaluating programs in terms of the mission, and by elaborating that principle in the
establishment of measurement criteria, Bunn and the other UMO leaders imposed an
artificial order on an environment which might have yielded new terms of self-evaluation
if attended to in what Cohen and March call a “playful” manner.444 By relaxing, rather
than clarifying rules and standards, Bunn may have been able to discover new norms
more native to the organization than the ones prescribed by the mission and measured
with the evaluation criteria. Cohen and March might suggest that cutting the budget
sensitively relative to the organizational context would have been a key to effective
leadership in this time of crisis.

Making Sense of the Cuts
Despite the fact that a number within the UMO community seemed to assent to
the idea of strategic or mission-guided cutting as opposed to across-the-board cuts, the
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reactions to the budget cuts show that the common affirmation did not lead to an outcome
that was as universally accepted. Across-the-board cuts were a more common precedent
than strategic cuts, so the call for a more mission-based approach was a call for departure
from historical practice.
While Bunn and the leadership seem to have achieved consensus on the departure
from precedent, some of the reactions to Bunn’s proposals indicate that the departure was
still being judged against the precedent which was, essentially, equal budget cuts for all.
George Nicklaus, dean of the College of Public Health and Community Service, viewed
his school as having been “attacked” for the gain of faculty salaries in other areas, and he
criticized what he perceived to be a lack of clarity as to where the redirected resources
would go.445 His arguments do not subscribe to norms based on mission or strategy but
rather appeal to the order of fairness inherent in the across-the-board cuts of previous
years. Mission-based cuts could justify the elimination or reduction of programs without
accounting for the savings. In fact, the mission does not seem to enter into Nicklaus’s
protests at all. His arguments were based more in what appears to have been the tradition
of how budget cuts were done in the past.
As far as the use of the criteria is concerned, there is little or no evidence in the
protests recorded in the case study that anyone indicted the decision-making criteria per
se. What happened, rather, is that protestors imputed criteria upon the decision-making
process. “Engineers said that [Bunn] was ‘anti-engineering.’” Other faculty “rejected the
assumption that there was a fiscal crisis, and argued that the university was in excellent
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condition….‘This was an administration-induced crisis that was mismanaged.’” Many
ridiculed the process claiming that it was not universally representative.446
Still no one seemed to reject the articulated criteria on their face. In fact the
reactions seem to ignore the a priori normative criteria altogether. They did not see the
cuts as stemming from an application of criteria. Instead they saw a need to postulate
criteria based on the ontological reality of the cuts.
Both instances described above indicate that the ontological has more sway over
the normative in this case than does the normative over the ontological. In making
meaning of a given set of actions and decisions, the community members most affected
by Bunn’s proposals drew on precedent (the way things have been done in the past) to
judge the actions of the present. In other words present actions were judged against past
action, both elements of the ontological realm. The standard applied to the present actions
was whether or not it was consistent with the precedent that budget cuts are conducted
out of necessity in a zero-sum world having an equal impact on all programs or,
alternatively, unfairly benefiting one at the expense of the other. The precedents
themselves actually provided a sense of order that guided or could have guided decisionmaking. When the order of the precedents was violated, it was more noticeable and more
hotly protested than a normative violation would have been.
In Cohen and March’s framework, this shows up as chaos or anarchy, but closer
examination reveals that there is an order; it is just not an order which derives from
normative assumptions. The ontological conditions here give rise to new meaning around
the notions of fairness. However, an ethic of fairness was not one that was ever
articulated in the debate about across-the-board cuts versus mission-based cuts. It is a
446
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tacit order which proceeds from the history of actions of those within the organization an
organizational category of precedents in terms of the Moral Meaning Matrix. This
category lives within a broader nomos or order at the institutional level of education.
In the same way, the force of the post-facto imputation of criteria upon the
decision-making process not only overshadows the a priori work conducted by the
leaders of the organization, it essentially negates it and disregards it altogether. Even after
lodging protests, the same dissenters might be able to agree to the criteria Bunn, Uehling,
and Olson had articulated, yet their protests give evidence that such consensus and
conversation is, in fact, irrelevant to the actions of reducing budgets and eliminating
programs at UMO.
Again those who would be affected by Bunn’s proposals make meaning out of the
action. Note, however, that again the what preceded the why. There is no evidence in the
case study that those who disagreed with Bunn showed any contempt for his application
of principles. Rather they looked at the actions themselves and began to think about
reasons and motives. They made sense of the actions, the ontological, by assigning norms
to them. It was the ex post facto assigned norms which were criticized for being part of a
personal agenda, not the norms that Bunn originally applied. The a priori norms became
irrelevant. Again, the ontological preceded the normative.
In Cohen and March’s evaluation, this might seem chaotic and offer evidence of a
context that resists or denies norms. Looking at it from the perspective of whether or not
the organization accepted the prescribed norms would lead to that evaluation. But the
university was not norm resistant. In fact it was searching for norms, but the norm
development came after the action, not before it.
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Cohen and March hint at both the value of precedent and the ontological
preceding the normative. In their discussion of experience as theory, they suggest a need
to develop a “normative theory about acting before thinking.”447 However, their
framework still regards the ontological as un-ordered chaos. Their discussion, for
instance, of “foolishness” entertains the idea of norm-breaking as rule-breaking to see if
new criteria for what is important might surface.448 They acknowledge that preconceived
notions may not be able to impose order on a situation. They call for leaders to depart
occasionally from preconceived notions and “play” in the disorderly world to see what
new directions emerge.449 Still they hold order and chaos or ruled behavior and play in
opposition with one another in their recommendation that leaders sustain a “creative
interaction between foolishness and rationality.”450 This indicates that their framework
still is mythically inscribed – seeing openness to the ontological as a disordering threat
that needs to be engaged but ultimately only for the sake of managing it.
What I have tried to show, however, given the limitations of the case study, is that
there is evidence of an order in what Cohen and March call chaos. It is not an order in the
rational sense of the word, but in the sense that organizations can be ruled by it. Rather
than advocating a dance between poles, I suggest that leaders work to understand the
order inherent in the system and act in accord with that order. Just as the order could
permit and understand uniform budget cuts as well as cuts that benefit one program at the
expense of the other, the order is not necessarily rigid and limiting. It might have its own
limitless possibilities. So rather than fighting the ontological order with a normative one,
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a leader might be better advised to attend to the ontological halachically and learn how
people make normative sense out of what is actually occurring.
Cohen and March plant their feet squarely in the camp of the normative shaping
the ontological when they characterize the world as “absurd [so that] the president’s
primary responsibility is to virtue.”451 The point of their recommendations seems to be to
find ways to introduce virtue into the absurd when the world embraces and lives by the
absurdity. Perhaps a better course of action might be to learn to find the virtue in the
world, absurd as it may seem.
Others in the UMO community sought to make meaning on the edges in their own
experience of communitas while administrators tried to impose normative explanations
on a highly disruptive reality. The managerial style of leadership involved in executing
these budget cuts left many feeling rightfully victimized and excluded from (read
scapegoated by) the community. Given the breadth of the impact of these cuts, the
meaning-making style was adopted mimetically by the larger community, which sought
out its own scapegoat, Ron Bunn.
At a hearing before a standing committee of the state Senate, Uehling and
Olson testified first, seated side-by-side. When Bunn’s turn came, the
committee chairman asked, “Are you alone?” Bunn replied, “Yes, but I am
getting accustomed to the idea.”452
Scapegoating processes whether they hurt persons or isolate or elevate ideas and
ideals mimetically translate throughout the fractal web to all levels of social complexity.
By looking at a specific organizational example we are able to see how the system was
indeed open and made meaning as an open system. However, the leaders’ treatment of
the system as closed called for a scapegoat-based budget-cutting process. The meaning451
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making myth inscribed by that approach obtained even at the expense of one of the
leaders, as others in the system tried to stave off equilibrium.
Reviving such systems however, requires a leader with developed enough
charisma to lead the meaning-making project through these rituals. Hall’s taxonomy is a
developmental one. Leaders whose meaning-making skills have only developed as far as
authoritarian or parental will be unable to execute the ritual sacrifices necessary to keep
the system out of equilibrium. Their only hope is to continue to privilege the normative
over the ontological which eventually leads to homogenization and subsequent system
death – a death from which authoritarians and parents will be unable to recover.
Managers know how to keep the system from succumbing to the entropic pull toward
equilibrium, but as norm-privilegers themselves, they also regress the system.
Authoritarian, Parental and Managerial leaders regress systems by privileging
norms. Norm-focused efforts to evoke change can be met mimetically with norm-focused
resistance, especially when the leader is invoking a non-native moral language.
Conversely, facilitators, collaborators, and servants employ a charism that focuses on the
ontological and has the effect of progressing the system, at least to a point, allowing the
ontological to bring new data into the system. Contrast the endothermic and the
exothermic charisms in the following case study involving Harvard Law School.

Dominating a Rival and Elevating a Hero
In Confronting Authority: Reflections of an Ardent Protester, Derrick Bell cites
his mother, Ada Childress Bell, as one of a number of his models for challenging
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authority.453 In one vignette, Bell describes the occasion upon which his mother refused
to pay her rent until the landlord repaired the doorsteps of her family’s house. Through
her own protest, she was successful in obtaining the response she sought from her
landlord. In one of the stories he tells about his own personal protests, Bell was not
successful in convincing the Harvard Law School faculty to retain among its ranks
Professor Regina Austin, an African American woman with a visiting appointment.454 In
fact, Bell seemed to evoke a normative retrenchment on the part of his colleagues.
Contrasting these two instances illustrates Ada Bell’s ability to change the reality of her
family’s living conditions and Derrick Bell’s inability to reshape norms related to
Harvard Law School’s hiring practices. The difference in the two approaches is one of
awareness of the openness of the respective systems.
“Eventually,” says Bell, “the Harvard Law School will hire and tenure its first
woman of color…even that event will not herald the adoption of polices to ensure either
diversity or merit in the hiring process.”455 While Harvard may eventually behave in the
way Bell hopes, the behavior will not be, according to Bell, a result of a normative shift
for the faculty. Bell’s failed Harvard protest, as I will show, was a normative one, which
did not understand or exploit the power of the contextual and the ontological. By trying to
appropriate norms from one institution to another without passing through the gateway of
ontological context, Bell exhibits the same moral con-fusion demonstrated by the
president and the bishop in the Emory case. His mother, by contrast, effectively changed
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her circumstances by leveraging the contextual and ontological within the appropriate
institutional framework.

Ontological Change
By withholding the family’s rent money from her landlord, Bell’s mother was
able to pressure him to bring the residence out of its state of dangerous disrepair. She
waved the rent money in front of the landlord’s teller and refused to hand it over until the
landlord repaired the back steps of the Bell residence.456
Analyzing his mother’s actions, to the extent we have the data to do so, in terms
of the Moral Meaning Matrix shows that her protest was really focused more on the
ontological dimension (or on changing reality) and less on the normative. Her actions
actually did not necessarily call into question any norms that the landlord may have held.
Her refusal to pay rent was legitimate and salient within the same normative framework
that also would have caused the landlord to expect payment. As an aid, I reproduce the
Moral Meaning Matrix in Figure 12 below. In this version, however, I identify the levels
of social complexity as components of a network as discussed in chapter seven.
Figure 12: Moral Meaning Matrix as Network
Dimension

Universe
Ought

Society
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Group
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Energy

Power

Jurisdiction

Authority

Resource

Relationship

As shown in Figure13, the institutional framework for the transaction between
landlord and tenant is (and was at the time) the market economy. Paying rent and
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withholding rent both make sense in the framework of the market. Bell describes the
teller cage in symbolic terms. Paying rent was the ritual interaction between the
normative and the ontological that established the authoritative relationship between
landlord and tenant which was formalized in a lease which served as an instrument of
power with the force of jurisdiction in the relationship. 457
The operative tradition, in this situation, within the market economy is one of
exchange. The Bells paid rent; they had a place to live. Other exchanges are legitimate as
well. Bell’s mother probably most often categorized the rent-for-housing exchange as
money due to the landlord. The only power in the relationship within that categorization
is that of the landlord who would have had authority over the use of the property. The
precedent this category evoked for Ada Bell up until the point of her protest was,
presumably, one of dutiful response to that obligation.
At the moment of protest Mrs. Bell effectively re-categorized the transaction as a
trade. Not only was the landlord getting money for the use of his property, the tenant,
turned customer, was expecting some consideration for the payment. Under this
categorization, the landlord had to operate more as a merchant in the relationship than a
collector - a merchant who had an interest (limited as it may have been) in his or her
customer’s satisfaction. Figure 13 displays the analysis above in tabular form.
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Figure 13: Ada Bell’s Protest vs. Business as Usual
Dimension
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Paying Rent

Is

Worldview

Tenancy

Energy
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Mrs. Bell did not confront authority as much as claim the authority she already
had in the relationship. She did not alter the institutional framework but worked within it
taking full advantage of the multiple options available to her at the group and
interpersonal levels of social complexity. She had authority over the money used to pay
the rent and used that authority to re-categorize the transaction. This put her in a position
of bargaining as she, perhaps, had done in other contexts in which she withheld her
money until she saw a product she was willing to purchase at a price she was willing to
pay. Not only might the precedent have been familiar to her, it could have been familiar
to the landlord as well. It fell squarely within a narrative the two likely shared even when
they may have shared little else. Her praxis in this case, then, was to act as a consumer
instead of acting as a debtor. She behaved meaningfully and in a way that was intelligible
to both tenant and landlord, but she behaved differently than expected nonetheless.
Mrs. Bell’s behavioral change did not require a normative shift for her or for the
landlord. Derrick Bell never reports his mother trying to convince the landlord to
reconceive of the repairs as something he or she ought to feel obliged to do. She never
tries to persuade him in terms of fairness or safety, for example. Ada Bell withheld
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something she knew the landlord wanted and would likely prefer over the prospect of
locating a new tenant. In a way that was meaningful for him, the landlord responded by
repairing the steps. The response, initially at least, was as limited as the circumscribed
protest.

Normative Failure
While his mother effected change on the ontological level, Bell’s own protests
seemed to have been oriented toward trying to alter the ethics and norms held by the law
school faculty. In fact, a similar analysis of his protest regarding the retention of Regina
Austin illustrates that Bell was fighting for his cause on a normative front while
simultaneously acting in a way that was inconsistent with the faculty’s operative
normative framework.
As Bell relates the facts of the Austin case, he notes that she was a visiting
professor for the 1989-90 school year.458 His request to the faculty, by way of the
appointments committee, was that Harvard find some way to “retain” her.459 Bell does
not indicate that there was a search underway or hint at any open position on the faculty.
Bell uses the faculty’s refusal to consider the possibility of creating a position for
Austin as the focus for his protest regarding the addition of a black woman to the faculty.
He then articulates the case for such an addition, be it Austin or not, in the context of an
appeal to diversity within the faculty ranks. He points out many of the educational and
symbolic advantages to having a diverse faculty. He persuasively argues that, despite the
appearance of diversity, the faculty needed to be even more diverse and was indeed
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lacking the important component of a black woman.460 His argument departs from the
specific question of whether or not to retain Austin and focuses more on his assertion that
the faculty ought to include a black woman for the sake of diversity.461
Within the meritocratic order of the faculty, the potential for a visiting professor
to seek a permanent position was governed, generally speaking, by prohibiting such
consideration until after he or she had completed his or her visiting term.462 The practice
of a one-year delay coheres with past practices and the extant meritocracy without
explicit appeal to the normative. When pushed, however, other faculty members began
making meaning of that policy by discussing the merits of a visiting professor being able
to teach freely without being inhibited by oversight and evaluation. This rationalization is
consistent with a general devotion to academic freedom.463 That devotion, in turn, resided
comfortably within a broader and more symbolic educational commitment to tenure for
members of the permanent faculty.464
Bell’s protest, however, does not draw on precedents described by the faculty’s
normative framework of tenure and academic freedom. His action is based on the
precedent of boycotts within the civil rights movement. By ceasing to teach, he is hoping
to interrupt operations and leverage his power to effect change. Unfortunately, for Bell’s
cause, he is withholding very little from the law school unlike his civil rights role models
who had both buying-power and the cumulative effect of collective action to leverage
changes in corporate hiring practices. 465
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Contrast Figure 13 with Figure 14. While Bell’s mother’s protest began with an
activity at the intersection of the ontological dimension on the interpersonal level of the
Moral Meaning Matrix, Bell’s own protest begins with the organization’s norms,
challenging straight away the moral language which was deeply imbedded in the
institution of education.
Figure 14: Harvard Hiring Practices vs. Bell’s Protest
Dimension
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The moral language Bell invoked was from a foreign institutional context. His mother’s
protest was an inductive one which started with activity and only precipitated change as
general (left on the matrix) as challenging whether within the tradition the landlord was
going to behave as a merchant or collector. Her protest never appealed for change on the
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normative level. Rather it used the extant and shared norms to synthesize new meaning
on the organization, group and interpersonal levels.
Bell’s protest, conversely, was a deductive one which worked from moral
language through to his activity decision to stop teaching versus waiting a year. Because
he appealed to the moral language of a different institution altogether, even the dynamic
dimension of the matrix gets altered to reflect the tensions between two different power
structures legitimated by two different institutions. Jurisdiction, authority, resources, and
relationship are defined and assigned differently in education than they are in the
economy. Figure 14 details this analysis in tabular form.
Significantly, the precedents upon which he draws pertain to situations and
contexts related to white-owned businesses which, like Mrs. Bell’s rent protest, primarily
relate to the institution of the market economy and not to higher education. Importantly
the operative relationship in the civil rights protests he cited as models were between a
customer and a proprietor which is a much different set of relationships than those
between one professor and the balance of his colleagues on the faculty. While the praxis
of a leave of absence registers as a protest in the latter context and while it seeks
normative change and just business practices in the same way as the civil rights protests
did, ontologically there is a difference between refraining from teaching and refraining
from buying. 471 By adopting the category of boycott to interrupt business, Bell presumes
he has leveraging power that would be akin to buying-power in the marketplace. But he is
not in the marketplace; he is in higher education. The law school seemed to cope with
Bell’s absence in ways that boycotted companies could not and, therefore the faculty
changed neither reality nor norms as a result of Bell’s activities.
471
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Bell’s protest differed from his mother’s in two important ways. First, she desired
an ontological change and not a normative one. The landlord could do what Mrs. Bell
wanted him to do without changing the principles which framed the landlord’s actions
and relationships with tenants. Derrick Bell, conversely, seems to have been less
concerned with the ontological question of retaining Austin and more focused on
replacing or supplementing Harvard’s normative and symbolic commitments with a
dedication to diversity. In order for Bell to have succeeded, the faculty as a whole would
have had to undergo a significant shift in the way they conceived of what they ought to
be about. Second, Bell subscribed to a practice that was not native to higher education. A
boycott was an effective practice within an entirely different institutional framework. In
many ways, it did not make sense in the university setting, especially when undertaken by
a lone faculty member.
Had Bell exploited the exceptions previously made to the one-year deferral
policy, including the one which he described as being granted to another colleague,
Robert Clark, he might have found a precedent that he could have deployed in the service
of retaining Austin.472 Like his mother, he would have had the opportunity to recategorize the situation by describing it in the same way Clark’s circumstances had been
described – in whatever terms they were described at the time of the exception having
been made for him. If he had been successful in convincing the faculty that the Austin
situation in 1990 was just like the Clark situation in 1978, he may have been able to effect
change without having to challenge the operative normative framework.
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Ontological Change and Normative Shifts
If diversity, writ large, and not Austin’s retention was truly Bell’s goal, then my
suggestion above would still be only a partial victory. Considering his mother’s results
more fully, however, offers hope for the possibility of a normative shift as well. Mrs.
Bell’s landlord apparently went on to repair all of the steps in the complex without being
asked or provoked to do so. He embarked upon a new practice, one which may have
stimulated a new process of meaning-making. The unexpected universal repairs could
have indicated a category shift in which the landlord began to view all tenants as
customers who might otherwise withhold rent, or it could offer a glimpse of a nascent
ethic for the landlord - one that had to do with equal treatment and fairness of his or her
tenants. Without knowing the landlord, it is impossible for me to say.
Mrs. Bell may have affected a normative shift for the landlord, but her actions and
aims resided decidedly in the realm of the ontological. What is clear is that on the level of
organization in the Moral Meaning Matrix, or hub in network theory terminology, the
landlord was able to make meaning of his relationships with tenants in a new way even if
it remained within the original normative framework. Mrs. Bell affected a new patterning
by opening up the system to a particular ontological context and offering a different, but
legitimated precedent with which to order the relationship and share power. If Derrick
Bell had aimed at ontological change, perhaps he eventually would have succeeded in
shifting meaning-making patterns and subsequently norms as well. Contrasting the
protests of mother and son reveals a tenant who by reframing a conflict, claimed and
legitimated her authority to act meaningfully within a particular institutional framework
and a son who acted outside the institutional framework altogether forcing him to
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confront the authority of a policy in a way that did not make institutional sense to his
faculty colleagues. While Derrick Bell confronted authority, Ada Bell authorized her own
confrontation.
Bell’s story and this analysis illustrate the interconnectedness of the social fractal
in four ways. First, Bell relied on precedents to inform his action at Harvard Law School.
The two operative action precedents came from very different levels of complexity within
the fractal. He imitated his mother from his home life and he imitated civil rights leaders,
very much in the public eye on a national and international stage. Second, his adoption of
these precedents illustrates the difference between the institutions of market economy and
education. Legitimate market economy action may or may not be salient in an
educational setting. Third, his adoption of civil rights protests as a precedent also
illustrates the ways actors move fluidly in and out of various institutional contexts,
importing precedents and metaphors that may or may not be salient in the new context.
The civil rights protests he was imitating were aimed at leveraging economic power for
political change. It is similarly interesting to consider the likely overlap between
Government/Law/Politics and Education in the context of a school of law. However, Bell
appealed to neither of these two institutional frameworks or their rich sets of precedents
in his protest.
Fourth, and importantly for the present discussion, Bell’s attempts to make
meaning in this situation were increasingly endothermic. Bell paid attention only to the
normative dimension of reality. His protests began by trying to manage policy,
identifying the lack of full diversity as a condition he wished to exile from the faculty
community. Scapegoating lack of full diversity caused him to scapegoat others who
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identified with that position. They responded with normative positions of their own
which regressed the system recursively. He then adopted a Paternalist posture by
elevating himself (or his continued teaching) as (a withheld) object of desire, his
leadership style eventually regressed into an authoritarian cycle of a rivalrous stand off
with a rival he could not ultimately dominate. He evoked mimetically a reciprocally
regressive response from his increasingly norm-entrenched colleagues until he was
dominated right out of the faculty. His mother’s protest did not devolve to that level.
Using a style that is probably most closely described as collaborator/hero, she asserted a
partnership of equals with the landlord to resolve her problem. She remains a hero to her
son and likely co-elevated her landlord who perhaps was also regarded as a hero in the
eyes of others whose steps he fixed without provocation.
Facilitators, collaborators, and servants privilege the ontological in their meaningmaking processes. More than that, however, they know how to navigate the middle
ground of balanced energy states, between norm-privileging and reality-privileging. That
is, they know how to make meaning through the transition of equilibrium. Even if they
choose to lead, or the system causes them to lead, at a less developed level of leadership,
they have developed far enough along to be able to weather the transition of equilibrium.
Likewise if, as servants, they drive a closed system to a homogenized end, they will have
the skills and experience necessary to guide the group members through the liminal
transitions that re-creation requires. This also holds true if a highly developed leader for
some reason exercises endothermic meaning-making skills and regresses the system into
a homogenized end on the other end of the spectrum.
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Initiated Leaders
This developmental difference in meaning-making ability among the various
charisms causes me to propose a new distinction which hearkens back to Victor Turner’s
observations. That is the distinction between initiated and uninitiated leaders. Initiated
leaders have endured liminal phases and are subsequently able to make sense in those
times of (albeit often ritualized) death of a social system.
Drawing on the work of the great student of great myths Joseph Campbell,
Warren Bennis and colleagues describe well the role that myth plays in guiding leaders,
“It has always been a central function of mythology to supply the symbols that carry the
human spirit forward, in counteraction to these other images that constantly hold us
back.” Quoting Campbell, they interject a developmental element, “‘We remain fixated to
the unexercised images of our infancy, and hence disinclined to the necessary passages of
adulthood.’ This disinclination can apply just as much to organizations as to
individuals.”473 Remaining grounded in Campbell’s model of the hero’s journey, Bennis
et al. continue, offering an itinerary for the journey that initiates leaders, describing in
some detail the liminal transition which is the current object of focus.
“Risking the loss of your old self” is the inward equivalent of the outward
risk-taking that accompanies business and personal enterprise. Whatever
ideas you pick up intellectually you have to develop the emotional
commitment to put both them and yourself to the test. In the process you
may become a different person, disassembled and reassembled, as a result
of the emotional wrangles you have undergone.474
On the other side of this liminal trial emerges the initiated leader. As a result the charisma
of exothermic progressive leaders can be described as initiated charisma. The difference
between initiated and uninitiated charisma is that the uninitiated leader, while able to
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articulate a vision and make meaning in the face of liminal threats, is not one that has
developed the personal capacity to endure the liminal himself or herself. Reflect back on
Frankl’s plight. He experienced what Turner might describe as communitas around the
edges of camp life. The hyper-structure of the camp regime crowded out any antistructure within its closed system of permissible life. Communitas or anti-structure was
only available around the edges of the hyper-structure. The camp regime synthesized the
normative and the ontological by imposing the normative on the ontological to the extent
that the ontological was eventually excluded in the closed system of the camp. The
system died in terms of its meaning-making ability with the homogenization of the two
dimensions. Therefore the ontological, anti-structure, and communitas were only found
outside of the camp regime in darkened bunkhouses, the quietness of the soup line, and in
what was left of one’s memories and imagination. The authoritarian leaders of camp life
were synthesizing the is and the ought, literally and figuratively to death, but they were
unable to endure the liminal with those whose lives they plunged headlong into antistructure.
Contrast this with St. Francis of Assisi and his orientation toward communitas. He
prescribed a life to which he himself was committed that maximized the experience of
anti-structure and communitas. The charism of the authoritarian camp leaders rested
solely in their ability to deploy power to coerce and force others into their closed system.
By contrast the initiated charisma of the Franciscan Rule was embodied more
authentically by a leader who, himself, was willing to endure the liminality his charisma
evoked.
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Whether discussing initiated or uninitiated leaders or charisma, one fact remains
in all of the cases examined thus far. The leadership styles examined to this point
presume that the systems they lead are closed systems and work hard to keep them
closed. This leads to very specific understanding of the life and death of the systems
relative to the energy available to synthesize meaning. Further, given the dominant
human myth, which according to Girard is reinforced by a misreading of the Gospel, the
leadership styles which presumed closed social systems deploy power with unconscious
attention to the mimetic violence and sacrifice encoded by this myth.
As discussed above, the necrosis of the social system translates through the levels
of social complexity by means of mimesis through the fractal-like relationships which
link persons to entire societies and vice versa. In the same way, these leadership postures
which presume closed social systems translate the violent meaning-making methods
throughout the system. Managerial techniques trading on scapegoating and execution are
imitated, changed, and perhaps intensified in a way that the dynamics of a corporate
board room, for instance, can influence global politics. The reverse is also true. However,
in order to acknowledge the connection between the board room and the White House’s
situation room where military conflicts around the globe are managed, I must make one
more epistemological shift. Despite assumptions to the contrary, the board room and the
situation room, as social systems are in fact, open systems. Deconstructionists contributed
this insight earlier. Taylor draws on Derrida’s reading of Kurt Gödel to make the point.
“Every system or structure includes as a condition of its own possibility something it
cannot assimilate. This ‘outside’ which is ‘inside,’ exposes the openness of every system
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that seems to be closed.”475 Imagine the scientist who discounts the degree to which his
or her body temperature alters the ambient temperature of the room in which an
experiment is being conducted. The watchword “negligible” reveals external influences
on an artificially closed system in the physical sciences. Scientists who regularly conduct
experiments in “closed systems” are careful to take such influences into account,
bounding the system as necessary to achieve the desired results or measurements, but
eventually the closing of the system relies simply upon a definition of a boundary, a
definition that describes the artificial assumptions created for the sake of the experiment
and one that by its very existence acknowledges that the boundaries are artificial and, to
some degree, porous. Most often we are oblivious to how interconnected all of these
influences are. But cultural systems are open systems despite attempts to close societies,
organizations, or groups to outside influence. It is particularly crucial for education to
understand social systems as open, because education is the portal to ontological context,
the access any society has to difference. But education needs to rehabilitate its own moral
language to avoid co-option by other social institutions. It must draw on religion as a
resource for understanding anew how to synthesize meaning and re-create its own moral
language. In this way, education and religion can have a mutually transformative effect
for one another and, together provide the institutional patterning necessary to keep the
institutions of the government and economy from colluding to close societies and their
processes of culture-creation which results in increasing and translating violence
throughout the social fractal.
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CHAPTER NINE
OPEN SYSTEMS CULTURES

The chapter four call upon education to rethink its moral purpose is a call to
understand education as the keeper of the gate of ontological context and to de-fuse its
moral language from that of other social institutions. A moral language which adopts a
transformative approach to opening systems is the key to re-writing society’s myths
which describe cultural systems as closed and inscribe violent methods to sustain the
viability of those mythically closed systems. The dissociation of religion and education
left religion without education functioning to open society’s meaning-making processes
to ontological context so that it could re-write the religion-governed myths of meaningmaking. Education’s prospects for functioning in this way for religion and thereby
society is limited because its own signification processes are regressing into utilitarianism
as a result of religion, the institution which prescribes modes of meaning-making, being
relegated to the realm of the private. Religion has very little, if any, standing in the
academy. Even in places where it does have standing, religion has been regressing itself,
so the meaning-making processes it encodes trend away from, not toward, openness.
Simultaneously, education needs to rehabilitate its self-understanding in order to
establish moral meaning on its own and thereby rehabilitate religion. Reciprocally and
simultaneously, religion needs to help education think through how to synthesize
meaning in a way that is native to and authentic to education and not pointed toward
262
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religious, governmental, or economic ends. Examining the relationship between
education and religion in the context of the following two examples provides insights into
the way education and religion can relate to one another without being subsumed by the
other. Further, it shows that a vibrant relationship between the two provides persons a
way of understanding public participation in society in terms that do not rely on the moral
language of government. This re-categorization of the understanding of public begins to
give religion and education stronger footing in a social milieu dominated by government
and economy.

Education and Religion
Robert Jackson examines the Warwick Religious and Education Research Unit’s
attempts to respond to the failure of programs designed to provide multicultural religious
education in their efforts to address adequately the problems of racism in England and
Wales. He frames the problem in this way. In “Religious Education’s Representation of
‘Religions’ and ‘Cultures,’” multicultural religious education came under attack by antiracists for, among other things, its notions of culture and religion as being closed systems
and for its lack of attention to the structures of power.476 While Jackson notes that
religious education has a history of helping to alleviate racial misunderstanding, he
agrees that the current conceptions of religion and culture are potentially inimical to the
goal of eliminating racism.477 Jackson traces notions of culture and religion through a
history of anthropological thought and lands at the ones employed by the Warwick
project which regard “concepts of religion and religions” as modern post-Enlightenment
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constructions and acknowledges the role of colonial power in defining the ‘other’ in
terms of discrete religions and cultures.478 He continues by commenting on how
important it is that a concept of religion be broad enough to accommodate several levels
of internal diversity even within identifiable membership groups.479
He essentially shows that the project does the same with the notion of ethnicity,
pointing out that “A sense of shared descent is a necessary but not a sufficient condition
of common ethnicity.”480 He draws on Geertz and others to explicate the implications of
this understanding on views of what culture is and is not, relying on a notion of culture as
patterns of meaning or symbol systems subject to being contested and renegotiated.481
Jackson argues against avoiding issues of religion and culture in the classroom, but
advocates careful reconsideration of notions of culture and religion that were being used
to frame conversations.482 Jackson’s insistence on teaching about cultures and religions,
in the classroom in the specific way he advocates doing so deploys education’s greatest
strength. It can expose the myths that religions and cultures are closed systems and show
how complex and diverse religions and cultures are or can be. In so doing, education acts
as an entry way to difference – different ideas and, ultimately, participation in the system
by persons once conceived of as different.
Reciprocally, religion can deepen the way education thinks about itself as shown
in Nancy Lesko’s study, Symbolizing Society, which examines life for girls at a
Midwestern US Catholic high school. Like Bellah et al., Lesko wishes to revive the
notion of “Public” and sees schooling, particularly private schooling, as having public
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significance. It acquires this relevance as a symbol characterized most poignantly by the
internal cultural structure.
Attention should be placed on the school as a site of meaning-making and
identity creation, rather than merely as a training or contest site….In the
interpretive structure of thought that underlay some of St. Anne’s school
practices was an orientation toward “something higher” or deeper, an
imperative to go beyond the surface actions to distill meaning and
understanding….Across differing interpreting principles, students and
teachers understood their lives, religion and literature in light of deeper or
higher principles.483
Lesko adopts notions of education and religion akin to Bellah et al.’s institutions and
identifies a common language for the school, which speaks to the tensions between
community and individual.
St. Anne’s High School can be understood as a myth, told in words and
actions. The subject of the myth is the conflict between two codes of
conduct, caring and contest, each of which embodies a distinct way of
thinking about, seeing and acting in the school.484
Ultimately, Lesko sees the myth of the school resolving in favor of “caring” as illustrated
in the school rituals she characterized as “love and fun.”485 Perhaps more to the heart of
this inquiry, one of the most significant defining moments in this myth-ritual complex
was a Catholic Mass during which the preference for “caring” relative to “contest” was
made explicit. The theme of the mass was “Give good gifts” and, ultimately, the “good
gift” to give was “Christian love.”486
Just as St. Anne’s opted for a culture of caring, The Good Society calls for a spirit
of “cultivation” versus one of “exploitation,” that is a “willingness to cultivate the
purposes of individual and common lives rather than be swept along in the fervor of
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exploitation.”487 William Tierney, in an examination of several educational settings,
identifies as a recurring theme for his research the Greek notion of Agape or “selfless
love” made explicit in the New Testament. “An organization that operates from the ideal
of agape operates in a fundamentally different manner from other organizations. The
underlying tenet here is that all life is interrelated” 488 Girard advocates the imitation of
Christ which is mimesis but not mimetic rivalry. It is, as Williams puts it, a “mimesis that
is good, a mimesis of love.”489
This seems contradictory with this analysis. I have gone to great lengths to
demonstrate that Christian mimesis, generally is not loving. It is violent. But here, Girard
and Williams offer a glimpse into something transformative about Christianity, a mythritual-tradition-custom-praxis set that could yield something other than violence. Are
there alternative ways to mine Christianity specifically and religion generally to
overcome the violent effects of people adopting what Huntington terms a meaningful
identity? Further, is religion’s symbol system robust enough in its myth-making potential
to inscribe a pattern of meaning-making for open systems? Can it provide a signification
mechanism for society’s other institutions that keeps them open and freely pattering their
own moral frameworks? Reading two explicitly religious paradigms alongside
educational research outlines proposed elements for patterns with the potential to make
meaning for open systems. While the elements can be explained and enacted in explicitly
religious terms in religious contexts, the elements of such a pattern need not be, in the
end, explicitly religious. Yet the relationship is more than one among analogues. Religion

487

Bellah et al., Good Society, 275.
William Tierney, Building Communities of Difference: Higher Education in the Twenty-First Century
(Westport, CT: Bergin and Garvey, 1993), 23.
489
Girard as paraphrased in Williams, 268.
488

267
functions to inscribe modes of signification. Enacting and writing myth in explicitly
religious terms encodes for societies ways of making meaning in other settings as well.
In the following examples, I turn again to a crossroads of religion and education
and the way that religious affiliation of a college can thwart openness to difference or as
it is experienced in these situations, human diversity. Contrasting a model in which
religion closes the system with a hypothetical paradigm which proposes mythical
elements available to any school regardless of religious affiliation can aid in opening a
system requires religiously-affiliated colleges, at least, do as Martin Marty suggests and
“excavate their own traditions for resources to address [a] diversity of publics – and thus
exemplify and contribute to public attitudes in other plural contexts far from campus.”490
What this exploration unearths is not a prescriptive myth or set of myths for open systems
but the elements with which such myths could make meaning for open systems.

Elements of Open Systems Myths
Religion can be understood as a factor which negatively influences students’
willingness to accept and embrace other students with different backgrounds or with
racial, ethnic, or sexual identities other than their own. Parochialism both connotes and
denotes the degree to which religious affiliation might be a negative indicator for
openness to difference or diversity. In some cases it might be understood as the main
factor resisting diversification of a student body, creating a climate inhospitable to those
who fall outside of whatever categories may be considered normal at an institution and by
failing to provide an environment that promotes campus-wide understanding of diversity
issues by reinforcing system closure and violent modes of meaning making.
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The apparent incompatibility, or at least incongruity, of diversity and religious
affiliation is acute around the issue of sexual orientation. In a 1998 article in the Journal
of Higher Education, Patrick Love discusses what he identifies as institutional barriers
facing Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual (GLB) students at religiously affiliated colleges.
While his study did not show the actual barriers created by the college's church
affiliation, it did show that GLB students and their allies perceived that the religious
identity of the college was a barrier.
Homophobia, heterosexism, the discomfort with issues related to
sexuality, the invisibility of sexual minorities, and the stigma associated
with homosexuality were all elements of the culture of the greater societal
context in which St. James existed. These elements interacted to reinforce
one another; they were intensified by the religiously affiliated elements of
the culture (i.e., perceptions of Catholicism, fear of typically peripheral
and external constituencies, lack of appropriate ways to discuss sexual
issues); and marginalized what was being done to address sexual
orientation.491
Ernest Pacarella and his colleagues documented the importance of diverse
learning environments. “Indeed our analysis suggests that exposure to a range of diversity
experiences in the first year of college may be particularly important for the development
of students’ critical thinking.”492 Any purposeful or even unintentional negative impact
on the diversity of a college’s student body, such as what Love describes, may have an
adverse affect on the learning experiences of the students.
The educational opportunities at religiously affiliated colleges and universities and indeed the development of cognitive skills among students - may be severely limited
if the college’s religious identity creates an environment inhospitable to diversity. In
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“Influences on Student’s Openness to Diversity and Challenge in the Second and Third
Years of College,” a study published in 2001, Whitt et al. show the importance of the
institutional environment in promoting student openness to diversity.
The combined impact of institutional commitments and expectations also
could encourage students to feel comfortable taking risks needed to
interact with persons different from themselves and to seek opportunities
to challenge previously held beliefs. And such experiences contribute to
increases in students' openness to diversity and challenge.493
How can religiously affiliated colleges create environments that foster openness
to and understanding of difference or diversity without compromising the integrity of
their religious identities? Must schools achieve a hospitable environment despite religious
affiliation? Or is there a way to understand religious commitments as particularly
supportive of openness to difference?
In what follows, I attempt to forward two explicitly religious paradigms to
legitimate systems as being open to difference. The purpose of this exercise is to show a
counter-example to what Girard describes as a misreading of the Gospel which leads to
violence. By showing a Christian and a Jewish paradigm, I move back to a functional
notion of religion. I will draw in great detail on the content of the particular traditions, but
by illustrating the point in two traditions at once, I intend to show that religion can
function to legitimate openness for multiple cultures. Even though one particular
theological interpretation or practice leads to violent modes of signification, others, from
within the same tradition, have the potential for opening systems up, helping others
within the systems value in a meaningful way encounters with difference which derive
from the inherent openness of their social structures.
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From a Catholic standpoint, one explicitly religious paradigm for diverse
individuals coming together for a common purpose is that of Holy Communion. Girard
would point out that there is a compelling and pervasive sacrificial theology of Holy
Communion which perpetuates the very violent patterns I am trying to avoid. In this
proposal, I offer a re-reading of Holy Communion in the non-sacrificial terms Girard
advocates. Holy Communion in the Catholic Church is the highpoint of the mass for
which there is much personal and corporate preparation. The preparation immediately
preceding the actual sharing of bread and wine, taken with Holy Communion itself, is
known as the Eucharist, literally “good gifts” in Greek. Although the ordering of the
activity of the Eucharist has varied from time to time and place to place, there are a few
discernable common movements, which have persisted since the earliest records of
Christian worship. Along with other actions and prayers, the Eucharist contains at least
the following: Offering of Gifts, Anamnesis, Epiclesis, Doxology, Fraction, Exchanging
Signs of Peace, Agnus Dei, and Communion. While a case can be made that each of these
movements is fundamental to the establishment of a community of diversity, I will focus
on Offering of Gifts, Anamnesis, Epiclesis, Signs of Peace, and Communion.
Similarly, an explicitly Jewish paradigm for exploring issues related to
encountering difference can be uncovered, as I have alluded to before, in a closer
examination of Jewish law or halalcha. Halacha may better be understood as practice
rather than law because it is more inductive in nature than what we, in the West, typically
think of as law. Halacha is also less rigid than it might appear to be on the surface. In
fact, fluidity inheres allowing it to adapt to new contexts, changing technology and
shifting historical realities.
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As previously discussed, halachic decisions about practice take into account three
main factors, category, precedent, and context. In order to know which precedent to use
to guide practice in a given situation, the decision-maker must determine which category
to invoke for the context. Different categories call on different precedents and different
contexts call for different categories of precedents. Another example of this decisionmaking method being applied to a situation which has very little to do with Jewish law
might be something like the following: An automobile driver approaches a red light on a
narrow, one-lane, one-way street at 2 a.m. As the driver pulls up to the light the category
“traffic signal” is evoked. The precedents upon which the driver draws instinctively are
driving through a green light, stopping at a red light and exercising caution when the light
turns yellow. The driver is followed to the intersection by an ambulance with its lights
and siren on. The light at the intersection is still red. Does the driver stop or pass into the
intersection slowly and with caution in order to make room for the ambulance to pass? If
the driver remains rigidly wed to the category, “traffic signal,” then he or she will only
call upon the precedent which would lead to the driver stopping. If however, the driver
chooses to understand the situation by using the category “emergency” then a different
set of precedents is invoked which might allow the driver to maneuver in a way that
breaks the law of “traffic signals” but makes way for the ambulance.
Now consider what would happen if another driver traveling on the cross street
saw the green light and heard the siren of the ambulance. If he or she employed the
categories of “traffic signal” and “emergency” together and drew upon relevant
precedents, he or she might chose to speed through the green light to clear the way or
might shift from “traffic signal” to the “emergency” category half-way through the
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intersection and stop dead center. In either case, the two cars might collide. The same
circumstance (context) might legitimately be read two or more different ways by two
different drivers. If both chose the category “emergency” in a timely manner, then they
would avoid collision and the ambulance would pass safely through the intersection.
Simplistic as it is, this example shows the fluidity and adaptability for the halachic
decision-making process and the collision course individuals may be on when they read
and respond to the same or similar contexts using a different set of rules. Note, however,
that even in the case of the first driver, two apparently conflicting activities, driving
through the light and stopping at the light could both be ruled legitimate responses to the
same situation. They would each be “legal” or “ruled” activity. Hardly rigid and hardly
linear or deterministic, such a decision-making process can dissect complex situations
and legitimate many actions. There are many different “ruled” ways to respond to the
intersection problem. Making sure each person understands how others with different
experiences interpret contexts, employ categories, and appropriate precedent can help
avoid collisions. It also can help us avoid missing the complexity of interactive decision
making and simply ruling that one practice is absolutely right and others are absolutely
wrong.

Coming Together
When individuals with diverse backgrounds and experiences come together on a
college campus, they must work to understand one another in order to form a community.
If successful, there ultimately will be one body formed out of many without losing the
richness of the diversity. The Eucharist offers an excellent model for understanding how
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diverse persons can come together and transform their relationships with one another
from previous relationships marked by hatred, suspicion, and ignorance to ones of deep
appreciation and love for one another. While what I am outlining will seem like a
sequential progression along a line to a destination, it is important to keep in mind that
even the movements of the Eucharist are juxtaposed in different ways in different
churches and have changed over time. This is not a prescription for progress but a
description of the various components that comprise community creation.
The first movement I will discuss is the Offering of Gifts by the individuals who
are coming together from diverse backgrounds. When any group of persons comes
together, their similarities and differences become apparent, either starkly so and
immediately or gradually over time. While initially this can cause feelings of superiority
or of being judged, students must be urged simply to note the similarities and differences
and use this as an occasion to understand and know who they are and what they bring to
the table. In other words what are the gifts with which they each have been endowed?
What stories and characteristics make up their personalities up to and including the
current moment? What are their strengths and vulnerabilities?
Once this sort of personal inventory has been done, a student must determine that
he or she is eager and willing to offer the gift of himself or herself to others. This requires
an acknowledgement of his or her inherent value as a person and courage to become
vulnerable with others, sharing what he or she has to offer. In the mass,
the substance of the offertory prayers for the bread and wine (offered
along with money) are found in the Didache, but are originally rooted in
Jewish Blessings. The new formula, [which begins with] “Blessed are you,
Lord” has a threefold idea: the bread and the wine are products of creation
and provide nourishment, and thereby symbolize our worlds and our life.
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They also signify the work of our hands and our daily labor, and thereby,
are an offering of ourselves.494
What the student brings to the table (or to college) is important. Most significant
is a student’s pre-college values regarding diversity. Whitt et al. were not surprised to
learn that “the most significant positive influence on a student’s openness to diversity and
challenge during the first three years of college was the student’s openness…before
college.”495
There are ways to effect this sort of self-assessment of pre-college values and
facilitate mutual sharing once students are on campus, including service learning.
Students engaged in service learning in a study conducted by Susan Jones and Kathleen
Hill “began to make a connection between understanding others and understanding
oneself. This process involved an awareness of their advantages and privileges.”496
This is the moment in which a halachic crisis can occur. Individuals who have
grown up in different communities have learned to navigate the world in different ways.
As the students come together, it is important to know if they see a hole in the ground as
a well or as a latrine. Students must begin to assess the category sets they have, most
likely unknowingly, created over a lifetime. Their practices and interactions with others
and the world will depend on what categories they employ to understand different
circumstances. Those categories will call upon different precedents and lead to different
decisions for action.
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Recalling and Sharing
Following the offering of gifts in the Catholic paradigm is the Eucharistic Prayer
which includes one or more elements known by the Greek term “Anamnesis” literally
meaning “unforgetting.” During this part of the prayer the priest recalls the history of
God’s saving and liberating relationship with humankind. While the English “remember” packs its own poetic punch if analyzed carefully, its common usage disarms it
somewhat. In addition, I think for the issue at hand, the process of unforgetting may be
more important. As people of difference come together, the group will surely be
comprised of those who are advantaged and those who are disadvantaged both in
resources and power. The power gradients present in our world today keep and have kept
some stories from being told or heard as Freire demonstrates. Once students have taken
stock of what they have to offer and have decided to share it with others and once
students have made a commitment to receive the gifts others bring, the stories must be
told and heard. Stories of oppression and discrimination have a particular urgency and
priority for the group determined to be a community. Those stories, as painful as they are,
must be unforgotten by those who have experienced them directly or indirectly and
incorporated into the anthology of community consciousness.
Developing a common anthology of stories extends experience from one member
of the community to others and begins to help each person reframe their notions of
reality. As one student working in an AIDS service organization and participating in the
Jones and Hill study commented, “It all occurred in such a non-threatening way that it
was, that’s great, that’s really cool…I guess just listening to some of the people talk
about their partners it struck me as sounding weird, abnormal, unusual to me just because
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I hadn’t heard it before, but now its like an everyday thing for me.”497 Jones and Hill
conclude that this type of interaction “led to an appreciation of diverse perspectives and
an understanding of life circumstances with which each was unfamiliar.”498
From within the halachic paradigm, once a student begins to become self-aware
of the category sets he or she uses to understand and navigate life, it is important that he
or she begin to share the implications of working from that category set has had in his or
her life or even to share what has occurred or recurred to reinforce his or her categorical
understandings and appropriation of precedent. Likewise, it is key to understand literally
where others are coming from. Learning how they use the stories of their lives as
precedents will foster common understanding and appreciation of why two persons have
such a hard time conversing with one another in the first place. In the story above about
partners, for instance, some students might have parents who are lawyers or business
owners and assume that the word “partner,” when used by a client of the service
organization, referred to a legal or businesses partner. The student may never have had
the (need to develop the) same vocabulary of the client he or she is now serving.

Transformation
The next Eucharistic movement I wish to describe is the Epiclesis. Calling upon
the Holy Spirit the celebrant asks that the gifts be transformed for the sacrament.
Likewise, the telling of the stories described above as a praxis in and of itself will either
cause a transformation to occur or make the need for transformation more evident. The
type of transformation that must occur in a diverse community - as it comes together - is
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one that takes the gifts brought to the table by members of a group and reorients them for
the work of community building. It is simultaneously a call for transformation of the
world around the community members and of the community members themselves.
Jones and Hill reported that study participants involved in community service
“learned to pay attention, to notice different things around them, and to appreciate diverse
life circumstances and perspectives. One student commented: ‘Now I know what it is
like…I view everything differently now.’”499 Not only are the individuals changed, but so
are the stories each brings to and receives from others. Ellen Broido discusses what she
calls “Meaning-making strategies” undertaken by those developing skills as social justice
allies. Using these strategies, students mingle what they bring to the table with the stories
they learn in their encounters with others. “The participants transformed information into
knowledge. They used their pre-college values and the information they had acquired as
the content for these meaning-making processes.”500
Halachically, once the stories of others have shown that there are other ways to
understand similar experiences and different ways to act sensibly in what otherwise might
seem to be the same situation, the students engaging one another can begin to “try on”
new categories and try to approach situations in ways they had never approached them
before. The world is new to a person who is seeing it through the eyes of another for the
first time. Halachically, this is evidence of shifting categories. Students encountering
difference realize that there are multiple categories available for use when understanding
appropriate practice and when they begin to understand why someone who sees a hole as
a latrine approaches it and uses it in a different way. More than that, the student may even
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begin to be able to move fluidly between his or her own category set and that of someone
else with whom he or she has shared stories.

Inter-subjectivity
Once the Eucharistic gifts have been transformed, worshipers must prepare
themselves for the encounter with, appropriation of, and use of the sacrament. In order to
do this, they offer each other Signs of Peace as an act of reconciliation. In the midst of
having become self-aware and being transformed by the telling and hearing of stories, the
differences, the growing relationships, the past (passive or active) enmities between
persons and the emerging shared worldview are all becoming more evident. These
realizations beg for intentional inter-subjectivity. Previously, understanding of other
came in the third person, learning about those who are different (that is if any such
learning had occurred at all). In a Eucharistic community, learning occurs face to face
with, from and for each other. The next step in overcoming divisiveness and charting a
new course is making peace.
In the same way, Jones and Hill noted: “Through their work at the community
service sites, students began to view community members and clients whom they served
as unique individuals, rather than categories of difference or only as members of
particular groups.”501 They continue, pointing out the importance of reciprocity in
relationships, “[In] reciprocal relationships…defined as those in which all partners are
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involved in the design of the activity, all learn from the relationship, and all benefit as a
result.”502
Halachic peace is speaking the same moral language, using the same categories
and employing the same precedents. Or, when not doing so, knowing the language of
others with whom you are in relationship. Halachic interaction must be inter-subjective.
There will be conflicts in the interactions, and when these occur the actors must actively
translate categories and precedents to one another or else they will be acting upon or in
spite of the other. This would make the other an object of the action, an object that fits
into a category and calls upon certain precedents to guide practice. Such objectification
may be harmful because it does not acknowledge mutual agency and does not lead to
interpersonal relationships or common community building.

Community
The culminating movement of the Eucharist is Communion itself. At this point in
the mass, worshipers share a meal together as one family. Divided and brought together
around one table, one loaf, and one cup, the church too is one. So too, divided student
communities, in a profound way can work through the differences and divisions and build
community.
Not only do such encounters form community, they deepen and transform ideas of
community for engagement of difference even beyond the community just formed. Jones
and Hill see the power of activities that engage students with persons they would not
otherwise have encountered. “The possibility of truly realizing the principle of reciprocity
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and appreciation of diversity depends upon the ability to sustain relationships and
develop ongoing partnerships.”503
Halachically, community cannot be conceived of as a state. It is not a place to
stay. Rather it is a time for work. If students do indeed come together with other students
or with community members, for that matter, they are not only versed at moving among
each other’s category sets and understanding how others are going to react differently to
similar situations, they have begun the work of common category maintenance and the
creation of new categories. Categories are formed through lived experience. As the
students experience life in community, they are developing their own library of
precedents together which ultimately will be categorized in similar ways. Holes in the
ground may become more often understood in the new community as places for planting
trees. Students may even lose touch with the fact that others in their home communities
still see a hole as a latrine or a well. Once students reach this stage, they must continually
touch base with other elements described above remaining self aware and aware of the
standpoint of others with whom they relate. They are indeed building a new community
which will require maintenance, but one which will also differ from the next community
they enter. After some work, they will have a precedent for encountering difference in a
new context – a precedent which will guide and which will be the gift he or she has to
offer to the new others he or she encounters.
An explicitly religious paradigm for establishing and maintaining an environment
are not without its difficulties. Many priests and rabbis hold beliefs and teach doctrine
that is clearly understood as hostile to some. It is here that the halachic approach is
particularly instructive. If explicitly religious models for creating environments that
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intentionally incorporate difference are implemented and work, they will become
precedents within ecclesial or rabbinical categories that might serve as legitimating
factors in transforming teachings or environments that might otherwise be hostile. This
provides for the possibility of a self critique of a re-opened institution of religion. Such a
model may bring to light substantive theological and moral critiques on stances taken by
religious authorities. The critiques, importantly, will be from within the institutional
framework of religion, because its potential for openness has allowed such difference into
the legitimated and legitimating system.
In religious or educational terms, the preceding exercise lifts up potential
elements of cultural myths on a societal level that could, indeed, help shape open
systems’ meaning-making processes. Whether approaching meaning-making process
from the standpoint of the Eucharist, halacha, or educational research, those elements are:
Coming Together, Recalling and Sharing, Transformation, Inter-subjectivity, and
Community.

Opening Systems
Both in institutional form and mythical content, religion and higher education
have something to contribute to one another. Rethinking and rehabilitating education and
religion require not only exposing the myth which conceals mimetic rivalry, but also the
myth which conceals the openness of the system. Servant leadership stands on the
threshold, the limen, of closed and open systems. As agents of transformation, then,
servant leaders must demythologize the closed system and ultimately demythologize
system closure altogether. However, the charism of servant leadership is also mythically
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inscribed. So servant leaders are capable only of demythologizing a system by privileging
the ontological at the expense of the normative. Opening systems requires that leaders
weave and advance new myth not by ignoring past meanings made, but by, using Marty’s
image, excavating them for normative patterns capable of making sense of new realities
in non-violent ways. These excavated patterns provide the starting point for opening
cultural systems which will then continue to re-weave myths like the one which prescribe
Coming Together, Recalling and Sharing, Transformation, Inter-subjectivity, and
Community. As an example, myths which embody these elements have the potential of
continually opening the cultural systems to difference and to model for other institutions
non-violent ways to make meaning. This avails the system to the energy of negentropy
freely available and always increasing for the sake of culture creation.
Leaders and cultures are mutually constitutive. Leaders depend on cultural
patterns to legitimate their meaning-making charisms, and culture depends on leaders to
shape and re-shape meaning-making patterns. A co-condition of the development of
leaders who can establish and sustain open systems cultures is the rehabilitation of the
institutions of education and religion. These institutions create patterns for cognitive and
moral development upon which the growth of open systems leaders depend.
Education inscribes the patterns necessary for cognitive development. A model
for growing leaders capable of opening systems and sustaining them meaningfully, then,
requires a more explicit understanding of the ways education creates more and less open
and therefore more and less violent patterns for learning and reasoning.
Education is about learning, and learning is about reconciling the general with the
particular. However, more than a tension between the general and the particular inheres
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in the process of knowing, according to Taylor. He suggests that the process of knowing
starts with the contextual, the particular, the perceptual.504 As Minnnich points out,
however, many notions of cognition begin with generalizations and proceed to the
particular. It is exactly this process that Freire seeks to reverse, again giving priority to
context. Halacha gives us a model of how that can actually work.
Voyles illustrates the necessity of not mistaking analytical isolation (of normative,
ontological, general, and particular, for instance) for the way life really works. Life is a
set of messier processes that relate is, ought, and meaning as well as general, particular,
and knowledge. These processes are going on at various levels at the same time in
different and differently understood contexts.505 I respect and agree with his
understanding of the complexity of these processes and how he balances that with his
faithfulness to Geertz’s enterprise of isolating cultural processes into analytical categories
in order to see how processes do relate dialectically rather than as “mere reflexes of one
another.”506
The priority of context, for Voyles, injects the freedom to access a number of
different possible solutions for problems related to behaving in the world. For Freire, the
priority of context puts the power to create reality in the hands of the people. When
priority is given to the universal, oppressed and oppressor alike behave by applying the
worldview to a given situation. Action, which starts in context and behaves in a way
different from the propounded worldview, is revolutionary in that it breaks from the
worldview and begins the process of shaping a new one.507
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It is this priority on context that gives the ontological dimension its openness to
new experiences, which, in turn, fuels the complex adaptive behavior of the worldviewcreation process for networks of persons. Persons and networks of persons know
something when they are able to reconcile the general with the particular. Growth in the
system depends on access to new data. In that sense, future knowledge is present in
contextualized experience. Past knowledge is stored in the patterns (nomoi) that govern
the schemata (precedents and categories) with which the system encounters new data.
This relationship between past and future as mediated through the present propels the
self-reflexive growth processes of the complex adaptive system.508 The problems of
application (applying the general to the contextual), then can be understood in cognitive
terms of privileging the past over the future. Patterns, then, will repeat but not just
stabilize around the last pattern created. Because the system is reflexive and has stored all
previous patterns, it will reflexively regress, recursively revisiting past patterns in place
of adapting and incorporating new data that impels system progress, i.e. cognitive
development. Openness to new data by means of privileging context, therefore, is
essential to cognitive development of persons and networks of persons.
Cognitive development is only part of leading open systems cultures, and the
ontological is only one dimension of the Moral Meaning Matrix. But what happens when
one system of cognitive and moral development is trying to make sense of another such
system, such as in the case when people of profound difference come in contact with one
another? What emerges as information, knowledge, and meaning in one system may be
read as noise by the other. Again network and chaos theories are helpful here:
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Constituting a structure bordering on the fractal, myths are networks of
networks made up of nodes within nodes. Never fixed, these networks of
symbols and myths must constantly adapt to each other. Though neither
programmed nor planned, such changes tend in the direction of ever
greater complexity. Like other complex adaptive systems, myths change in
response to what appears to be noise.509
How does one feed the complex adaptive process of signification of one
system into the complex adaptive process of cognition of another system in a way
that respects and preserves the openness of both systems? This requires not only
highly developed cognitive skills but also highly developed signification skills.
These skills aid the enterprise of re-mything an existing myth with respect to a
newly encountered - and equally plausible (as far as the new acquaintances are
concerned) - myth. How do Huntington’s civilizations with meaningful identities
informed by religion encounter one another in a way that results in mutual
transformation and not conflict? This requires even more than the
demythologizing charism of the servant as transformer. It requires the leadership
charism of visionary as strange attractor.
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CHAPTER TEN
CULTIVATING CULTURAL LEADERSHIP

Uninitiated leaders have charisms that enable them to move cultures to the brink
of liminality and re-order them with regressive and violent meaning-making codes and
rituals. Initiated leaders have charisms that enable them to move a closed system through
the liminality of equilibrium and reconstitute it with violent, yet progressive codes and
rituals. Servant-leaders, the most highly developed of initiated leaders, make meaning in
ways that diminish and eventually eliminate the meaningful distinctions and hierarchies
of the closed system. They respond to the threat of this undifferentiated edge of liminality
by privileging the ontological at the expense of the normative, keeping the system closed
to the stabilizing effects of past meanings made. Re-engaging the past as a key
component of creating future patterns in the present requires a different charism, one that
understands the inherent openness of the system and provides for an alternative attractor
to the ever-beckoning equilibrium state of a closed system. The new charism is not one
which empowers the leader to endure and move through liminality or guide the group
similarly, but one that is able to remain in a liminal state exposing the group to the
constant interplay of structure and anti-structure in communitas and the organizing fuel of
negentropy. Rather than understanding social arrangements as constituting a closed
system that is managed by staving off entropy and equilibrium, this type of leader
understands social arrangements, and indeed cultivates them, in ways more analogous to
286
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Prigogine’s dissipative structures, which exist far from equilibrium, are yet
stable, and thrive on a constant flow of negentropy. Such a leader, a visionary leader in
Hall’s terms, functions as a strange attractor, supplanting the equilibrium of the closed
system with initial conditions that set a complex adaptive system’s cognitive and moral
patterns in motion. In this way, a visionary leader adopts a posture relative to energy and
entropy that understands social systems as changing in irreversible ways, seeks out
difference rather than trying to wall it out, and cultivates the openness of the system in
order to incorporate difference and to stabilize the system with the ever-increasing flow
of negentropy available to it.

Writing Her Ass Off for Peace
Consider the visionary leader encountered by Brenda Sage, a graduate student at
Longstreet University, a large private research university in an urban setting.510 She is in
the graduate division of religion and is working in the area of history. She is working
with church historians as well as with faculty from the history department at the
university. At the time of my interview with her she had completed her coursework and
was ready to challenge her comprehensive examinations. She attended an evangelical
Christian college which she describes as offering a strong education. Although she never
had plans to be ordained, she attended seminary at Longstreet. Upon graduation, she
worked in the university’s ethics center for two years and then entered the Ph.D.
program.
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Middle East College
She first learned of Middle East College – an interfaith college in Israel/Palestine
– from a young man who leads tours to the Holy Land and is very interested in and
involved in the college himself. This piqued her curiosity. A contributing writer for a
Christian magazine, she wondered about the possibility of turning this curiosity into a
story. While exploring this possibility, she learned that one of her faculty advisors is on a
US advisory board for Middle East College. This gave her an additional contact with
Middle East College and the school’s founder, a Palestinian Christian Priest, in the
Melkite tradition, whom I will call Abuna (which is a transliteration of the Arabic word
for Father). Her contacts facilitated a meeting with Abuna during a visit in May 2002. In
fact she accepted an invitation to join Abuna, her faculty advisor, and other members of
the US board for breakfast. Her editors never commissioned her to write a story about
Abuna or Middle East College. She attended the breakfast anyway out of personal
interest and in hopes that there might be other publications whom she could interest in a
story about her encounter.
Clearly Brenda has a personal interest in Abuna and Middle East College, but she
framed her discussion of her interest in terms of writing about Middle East College. In
some ways her writing served to mediate her (at least initial) encounters with Middle East
College. She apparently relied to some extent on her role as a writer and the enterprise (or
activity) of writing a column or article to provide a public motive for wishing to meet
with Abuna and learn more about the college. Her pursuing the relationship despite the
fact that she did not receive any prior affirmation from her magazine editors betrays an
interest beyond simply getting the story or researching a column. Her desire to find other
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places to write about her relationship, however, may indicate that writing itself does more
than give her permission to build such relationships and is not the sole source of her
identity in these relationships. Her framing the encounter in these terms may indicate that
the activity of writing is important for her and potentially holds significance beyond the
economic benefit it provides.

Profile of a Prophet
Brenda described the most striking feature about her encounter with Abuna as
“his presence.” She felt like she was in the presence of a truly “great man” and a truly
“loving man.” She sensed that he had “lived and suffered” and, unlike many people,
seemed to “walk the talk” of loving the other. Being with Abuna did not make her feel
uncomfortable in any way. He seemed to take a genuine interest in her and she indicated
that she could have easily felt like a graduate student who had no reason to be there or a
writer who had no prospect of publishing an article. Despite the potential for feeling (or
being made to feel) out of place, she felt very much at home and very comfortable in the
group.
Feeling at home in the group was apparently important to Brenda. She related not
having a purpose or reason for being there to the idea of feeling welcome. Abuna and the
others apparently did not relate the two and welcomed her without her having an apparent
purpose or reason for being there. Was this an expression of Abuna’s ability to “walk the
talk” of loving the other? Did she contrast this character trait with herself or did she find
it resonant with her own character?
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Her walk is talk, so to speak. One of the things she does is write words (in a sense
talk), perhaps about loving the other. Does she view writing as “walk” or “talk?”
The coherence of walk and talk are, for Brenda, an important dimension of
creating a presence of greatness. Brenda went on to describe other dimensions of Abuna’s
presence. The first thing she told me was that he seemed to her to be very intelligent but
had the gentleness of humor. He took the issue of the Palestinian problem seriously but
he did not take himself too seriously. She contrasted this with other activists that she had
known who seemed to take themselves as seriously as they took their causes, and she
thought that Abuna acted in a different way that to her made him more welcoming and
more approachable.
He also seemed to regard each person as distinct and worth knowing in his or her
own right, and he invited her to become more involved in the cause of the college in a
number of different ways, including by encouraging her to attend a conference in Galilee.
His personal care and interest in her made her feel connected, and motivated her to
consider the possibility of becoming more involved.
Brenda moved from words about Abuna’s gentleness to describing him as
exhibiting a “righteous anger” when he talked about the Palestinian situation. During the
breakfast with the board, the conversation turned to finding funding for the school. One
member inquired about the number of Jewish students currently attending Middle East
College which prides itself on its interfaith commitments and student body. Abuna
indicated that the parents had taken all of the Jewish students out of the schools because
of the current crisis and conflict. The board then pressed Abuna to reclaim some of those
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Jewish students in order for the college to be understood and interpreted as a truly interreligious effort.
Abuna agreed in principle but he also asked who is working to try to get
Palestinians into the Jewish schools. Brenda characterized this response as reflecting an
attitude about “what is fair.” He did not express his anger in an anti-Semitic way but he
seemed always to want to side with fairness. This was important to Brenda.
She described Abuna as being able to see the tragedy and losses on both sides
clearly and that he was not polarized to one side of the conflict or another. He, in her
words, integrates the difficulties on both sides in his understanding of the situation. She
said that it is clear to her that his heart was more for the Palestinians because they still
have a land issue that has still not been resolved.

Inter-faith Violence and Education
Beyond getting to know Abuna, Brenda expressed a desire to see the college. Not
having experienced the college firsthand, the thing that strikes her as most compelling
about its mission is that it is truly inter-faith. This is unusual in its own right but even
more ambitious in a violent area such as Israel/Palestine where the religious differences
have so much to do with the conflict and breakdown of society.
The current violence in Israel/Palestine prevents her from taking what she judges
would be an irrational risk to visit the college. She still is working to maintain a
relationship with the college from a distance by having written an article about Middle
East College and its related elementary and high schools for a major regional newspaper.
Writing that article occasioned her doing additional research about the schools. Many of
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Brenda’s Jewish neighbors have mentioned her article to her and have engaged her in
conversations about it. She specifically described an encounter with one woman who had
heard Abuna speak at a synagogue in town. This woman fully supported the stance that
Brenda took in the paper, namely that education can help bridge differences and abate
violence.
Brenda is continuing to try to educate herself about Middle East College by
reading some of Abuna’s books. She remains open to being involved directly although
she does not know exactly what form that might take. She says right now there is a
financial barrier because she is just working part-time jobs while in graduate school, and
she can barely support herself much less support any kind of in-depth involvement with
the college. She is giving some thought to organizing students in support of Middle East
College or trying to find ways to write more about the college.

Brenda’s Path
Brenda desires to be connected with justice work in her life and wishes to be
active in doing something rather than simply researching and writing about matters of
justice. She indicated that she had done other things along this vein, such as work in
homeless shelters. She cares about people who have been “stepped on” and wants to do
something “hands on” to really help those people. One of the specific things that she
thinks that she can do is to write for a public audience in order to raise awareness.
By “stepped on,” Brenda is describing those who have experienced loss or death
in their lives or have some severe economic disadvantage. She speculates that everyone at
one point or another in their lives has been stepped on. In the instance of Israel/Palestine,
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it seems to her the Palestinians are the ones who have been stepped on and who are
suffering injustices. For Brenda, involving herself in matters of justice is all about
fairness. It is important to her that people be treated in a fair way and that such treatment
is reciprocated.
By writing, Brenda is able to watch how she changes. When she researches and
writes, it changes her. She can get outside of herself and understand that there is a bigger
world beyond. She hopes to turn minds toward issues that she thinks are important.
Interestingly, she related the idea of turning minds to her own evangelical background
and likened it to converting people or saving people from their own lack of knowledge.
This metaphor was a negative one for her and she prefers to make sense of what she does
by understanding her writing as a way to “provide space to learn about things [her
readers] wouldn’t have known.”
Brenda paraphrased Abuna when characterizing the most important thing for
others to know about what she has learned about Middle East College: Peace is built on
the desktops of school children. In her understanding, attitudes about difference start at a
very young age. Moreover, we could employ Abuna’s methods to affect the same kinds
of changes in attitudes about differences in the United States. She said even her
evangelical family could have learned about Catholics, for instance, here in the United
States and perhaps not have felt so negatively about a different religious group. She
quickly added that it is more than just adopting a philosophy of education for peace.
Abuna really models the way to live that out. In her words, he “works his ass off for
peace.”

294
What would it mean for Brenda to work her ass off for peace? What if Abuna
were to become a strange attractor or visionary leader in her life whose actions and
motivations she mimetically imitated? I will try to approach this question in light of the
questions I raise above and in terms of the Moral Meaning Matrix as Network repeated
below in Figure 15.

Abuna as a Visionary Strange Attractor
Figure 15: Moral Meaning Matrix as Network
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Brenda initially approached the context of meeting with Abuna around the idea of
writing about him and his mission. She may have referred to the activity of meeting
Abuna using the word interview and synthesized the word with the activity around the
praxis of conducting research for a column. This would have been a meaningful way to
engage Abuna as a columnist or journalist. As it was, her editors did not ask for the
article. The activity of meeting Abuna therefore was thrown momentarily into a state of
meaninglessness. Brenda indicated some discomfort with meeting him without a
prescribed reason or purpose. It was in discussing the context of the encounter that she
began to show a new way of making sense of the encounter. Abuna helped her know that
she was worth meeting without such a prescribed purpose or reason. She was reason
alone, and he indicated a deep interest in her. She described the activity in new terms of
comfort and acceptance yielding the meaningful praxis of becoming a part of the group.
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As a journalist, becoming part of the group may never have been available to her. Her
praxis or meaningful activity would have been understood in different terms and for a
different end. Because of the disruption of the circumstances surrounding the context of
the meeting, the relationship was built on much different terms than it might have been.
The encounter with Abuna itself either gave insight to Brenda about Abuna and
his mission or provided a metaphor for her to use to describe what he does and how he
does it. More importantly, as she understood herself through Abuna, her encounter
provided her insights about herself and how she uses her time and talents.
She linked his interest in her as a person to her desire to become more involved in
the college. She describes a desire to do something hands-on for those who have been
stepped on. In her estimation, everyone has been stepped on. While she cannot personally
relate to the plight of the Palestinians per se, as one of the stepped on ones she knows her
motivation for helping and the sense that it makes to her. The activity of Brenda meeting
Abuna sent her searching for a proper response. She searched for a precedent of “handson” involvement which she deems as much needed against the backdrop of the narrative
of everyone having been stepped on. She reconciles her narrative and her hands-on
approach by remembering, I suspect, her own story of being stepped on which provides
her a meaningful resource for helping others feel included, just as Abuna made her feel
included.
Brenda’s search for a hands-on activity leads her to mine precedents, that is
activity that she has undertaken in the past (such as volunteering for homeless shelters),
to help those who have been stepped on. The broader category of “stepped on” evokes a
number of precedents as potential responses. The category stands in relief against her
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own moral language which is one that seeks to describe the necessity for a normative
fairness. This language frames the narrative of everyone being stepped on. Insofar as the
experience of being stepped on is universal, it is fair in a distributive way. Insofar as the
notion of being stepped on requires a stepper and a "steppee," the norm of fairness is
illuminated by its contrast.
Because her memory knows what it is to treat and be treated fairly and what it is
to treat and be treated unfairly, Brenda actively recalls what it means to treat others fairly
which synthesizes her selection of the category of stepped on when thinking about the
Palestinians in terms of her moral language of fairness. She is keenly aware that it is
incumbent upon those in authority to treat others fairly. This insight is reflected in her
characterization of Abuna’s “righteous anger” about the school’s attempts to be inclusive
while Jews apparently fail to include Palestinians in their schools in Israel. Fostering a
tradition of fair treatment requires a customary awareness of the universal memory of
having been treated fairly and unfairly in order to create a context of inclusion and
acceptance.
Understanding the Israel/Palestine situation by selecting the category of “stepped
on” requires one to care deeply about others and their circumstances. Ordering life in
such a way that gauges the level to which others have been treated unfairly is indicative
of behavior being deemed legitimate only when it indicates a genuine personal interest in
the other. Living by the rule (or nomos) of personal interest in the other permits and
perhaps prefers the way Brenda chooses to characterize the Middle East conflict and
mission of Middle East College. It is also one of the compelling attributes she describes
about Abuna and his presence.
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Attractor as Symbol and Model
Even though Brenda’s – and consequently my – description of Abuna is idealized,
no doubt he was a flawed human figure. Nevertheless Abuna’s presence became a
symbol for Brenda. It was a general sense she had about him, but pointed to what she
termed his greatness, his love, his “righteous anger,” his fairness, gentleness and sense of
humor. It embodied his taking issues of justice seriously without taking himself too
seriously. In his presence, Brenda detected living and suffering, a quest for justice and the
juxtaposition of struggle and a longing for peace. In his presence was captured the
particularity of a Palestinian man and the Christian priest who embraced others of
different faiths.
In and through the ritual of breakfast, Brenda constructed a meaningful interaction
between following Abuna’s example of living life by taking a genuine interest in others
and the symbol of Abuna’s presence. Breakfast, then, models a tradition of fair treatment
which, in turn, calls upon the common memory of unfair treatment to engender praxis of
acceptance and inclusion.
The patterned practice of meal-sharing, perhaps most meaningfully aligned with
the institution of religion, offered Brenda more than physical nourishment. It enacted and
perhaps helped shape or refine her worldview which, I presume, acknowledges injustice
in the world. This ontological reality differs from her normative belief that the world
ought to be just.
What can possibly reconcile a “life isn’t fair” worldview with an ethos that holds
it ought to be fair? Knowledge. Brenda subscribes to a myth (not in the pejorative sense
of the word) that illuminating the contrasts between the is and the ought will compel
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people to move the is closer to the ought. Falling just shy of restating that the “truth shall
make you free,” Brenda wishes to help people connect with knowledge about injustice
and the resources to address it.

Writing as Transformative Praxis
While contrasting “hands-on" efforts with her own writing at various points
during our conversation, she returns to writing as a way for her to do something about the
Israel/Palestine situation. Writing changes her she says. It helps her get outside herself
and understand a bigger world. It can also turn people’s minds to what she thinks is
important and “provide a space to learn about things they wouldn’t have known.”
Writing, then becomes neither the walk nor the talk, but the synthesis of the two. As
praxis in the context of the Israel/Palestine violence, it is meaningful activity that will
help others feel included by drawing on and activating the common memory of being
stepped on. She can recall from that memory what it means to treat others fairly. Her
writing becomes the breakfast which nourishes others in the presence of her words which
take issues more seriously than the author takes herself and which exposes her sincere
interest in the reader.
Brenda’s theme demands that philosophical attitudes oriented toward peace and
justice be joined with practice. This synthesis, I contend, is the locus of meaning-making
for any individual. She sees the meaningfulness of Abuna’s words and life as he “works
his ass off for peace.” In the course of our conversation, Brenda re-scripted what writing
means for her. At first a failed entrée into a meeting, it is a way to synthesize the ought
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and the is, the philosophy and the practice. She could take this new understanding to
heart and hand and use it to write her ass off for peace.
Abuna’s mimetic model as strange attractor begins with working his ass off for
peace. Brenda encounters this and strives to imitate it. She makes sense of it in terms of
her encounters with Abuna in terms of her own Moral Meaning Matrix described in detail
above. The cognition and signification processes she employed had to be read beyond the
interpersonal level of social complexity. They eventually encountered the moral
languages inscribed by her experience of religion and education. As she re-writes the
Moral Meaning Matrix of her life she provides new data for transforming organizations
and social institutions by mimetically transferring what she learns and means throughout
the social fractal network of relationship of which she is a part. Abuna’s model privileges
context and activity, an openness to ontological context and, therefore entropy. In
privileging the ontological, he provides a model for signification for her that thrives on
entropy and not on re-establishing the order of a mythically closed system. Further, he
models a cognitive process for her that provides her the precedent for acting in context
first and making sense of it later.
In the symbol-model complex of the strange attractor, the normative and
ontological as well as the general and contextual collapse across the span of the Moral
Meaning Matrix. They collapse into a single point not in a way that obliterates the
difference among the dimensions and the levels but in a way that keeps the tensions
between each of the axes vibrant. The strange attractor functions as the initial condition
which puts the meaning-making pattern in motion for a complex adaptive social system.
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The influence of a visionary strange attractor is translated throughout the system
in a way that makes drawing distinctions among the levels of social complexity
irrelevant. In other words, Cultural Leadership is focused on the creation of meaningful
patterns that will translate throughout the networked social fractal regardless of the scope
of initial influence. Cultural Leaders, then, understand their project to be that of creating,
sustaining, and transmitting meaning rather than creating, sustaining, and transmitting
societies, institutions, or organizations. While it is important to attend to those levels
analytically to demonstrate the similarity of the meaning-making processes at each point,
to identify the particular signification processes on any of those levels, and to show how
institutions and other social artifacts interact and relate to one another, it is also important
to realize that Cultural Leaders, as the stewards of culture, engage the levels of social
complexity as artificial boundaries drawn around social systems, which are, in fact, open.
Even Weber’s “imperative co-ordination” was end-directed toward the the creation of
bounded groups of persons working together for common purposes. Such boundary
drawing is not without its merits, but it meets its limits when it tries to describe the
system as closed with respect to the influences than can create and evolve patterns of
meaning. Focusing on the cultural patterns rather than the organizational parameters,
Cultural Leaders keep social systems open and keep meaningful patterns evolving in
ways that influence and are influenced by all levels of the social fractal.
A visionary strange attractor’s response to liminal situations like the one Brenda
encountered in Israel/Palestine is rare. As this dissertation has shown, there are many
more precedents of very well-rehearsed cognitive and moral processes that prescribe
behavior to resist the entropy of the liminal by attempting to close off systems and sustain
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order in exothermic or endothermic – but ultimately violent ways. A visionary leader
stabilizes the system without resorting to violent endothermic or exothermic meaningmaking mechanisms. A visionary leader constantly opens the system to difference and
acknowledges the system’s inherent irreversibility. The visionary leader is never trying to
restore order, then, in the mythic ways prescribed by closed systems approaches to
energy, entropy and leadership. Rather, the visionary leader seeks stability in the
negentropic flow – the very flow that closed systems leaders deploy power to resist.

Oikos
It will take a commitment to cognitive and moral development of leaders to
reverse the regressive pull of mythically closed systems. Helping leaders progress is key
to revitalizing social institutions and society. To answer the call of The Good Society and
foster a spirit of cultivation, I propose a model that explicitly reflects the openness of
cultures as complex adaptive social systems and that intentionally cultivates the cognitive
and moral sensibilities of Cultural Leaders to sustain them.
The Oikos project, named for the Greek root word for economy, ecumenism, and
ecology will privilege the ontological dimension of context in order to remain open, and
in that sense must be educational in nature. 511 It must also attend to the ever-changing
learning, reasoning, and signification patterning of the ontological, normative, and
meaning dimensions of the social system while sustaining the meaning-making dynamics
of the system from freely available negentropy. For these reasons, it must be more than
educational in nature.
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In order to remain an open system, Oikos must be:
1. scale free allowing growth over time to shape the networked
connections which constitute it.
2. socially balanced, not privileging the moral language of any one social
institution over the others in a way that precludes the free-patterning of
each institution.
3. able to facilitate the personal growth of leaders whose vision will offer a
strange attractor alternative to closed-system equilibrium.
4. fractal-like in order to translate meaningful patterns to and draw
meaning from multiple levels of social complexity.
Therefore Oikos will be a scale-free network of persons and organizations whose
institutional commitments give them access to the moral languages of the normative
influences of Government/Law/Politics, the ontological openness of Education through
learning and research, the meaning-making skills of Religion and the resource
development power of the Market Economy. Oikos will pay attention to the balance of
institutional influences by giving each an equivalent seat at the table to help resist the
collapse of one institutional paradigm, and therefore one dimension of meaning-making,
into the other. Recall the association in chapter four of each of the dimensions of reality
with the particular institutions which inscribe patterns relevant to that dimension for
entire societies. This association is rehearsed in Figure 16.
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Figure 16: Social Institutions as Dimensions of Moral Meaning
Normative

Government/Law/Politics

Meaning

Public Church (Religion)

Ontological

Education

Dynamic

Political (Market) Economy

Oikos forms a networked community. Since it is a community that must be
intentionally open to the portal of behavior in ontological context, it must be a
community of actors. Following Taylor’s model, this network must harness the ability to
learn, know, and mean. Patterns of meaning will dynamically emerge and evolve as
knowledge recursively makes patterned sense out of the information learned. So the
network must intentionally increase its cognitive and moral capacities. Cognitive growth
will come from the consumption of more and more noise screened into information,
thereby increasing cognitive content. Evolving and maintaining a highly developed
ability to make meaning out of that content in non-violent ways requires an intentionally
increasing moral capacity.
The Moral Meaning Matrix shows that even an open complex dynamic system
will create myth to make sense of the discrepancies between the ontological and the
normative. With this in mind, recall the destructive power of the myth, even if a misread
myth, that currently dominates, at least, Western thinking. Hall’s work on strange
attractors and visionary leadership and Taylor’s work with complex adaptive systems
demonstrate that the emergent patterns, including the patterns of signification, will be
highly sensitive to the initial conditions of the vision set forth for the network. With an
assumption that mimesis inheres in any human relationship, it is important that Oikos
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intentionally de-mythologize violent corollaries to mimesis. While mimesis can be
constructive for learning, it does not have to entail rivalry. One way to thwart rivalry is
for Oikos to focus on the objects of desire and their just distribution, at least distribution
to the point where they meet minimum needs. A necessary component of just distribution
is depleting as few resources as possible. Finally, if successful, Oikos must intentionally
search for ways to defuse the energy of rivalries, should they occur, in non-violent ways.
Even though it may not be possible in a complex adaptive system to predict what
meaning-making patterns will emerge, it may be possible to set initial conditions on a
path to demythologize the current violent faith which grips the signification processes.
By doing so, the initial conditions will put the system on a path of re-mythologizing a
pattern which will be attentive to the three important areas outlined above: human need,
sustainability, and non-violence. Orienting the complex adaptive system to consume
information (or content) around these three areas sets the cognitive patterning off in a
necessarily re-mythologizing direction.
So a network that forms a community of actors around re-mythologizing content
needs to develop its moral capacity as well. Moral meaning-making occurs in
relationships and involves the deployment of resources. I have mapped out a vector for
more and less violent ways to be in relationship with others relative to the deployment of
resources. Developing capacity suggests a growth vector for the meaning and dynamic
dimensions of the Moral Meaning Matrix, a vector I have been discussing as leadership
development. The way leaders respond to and interact with others around the need for
resources and use of power is at the heart of leadership. Just as signification involves a
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synthesis of distinct ontological and normative elements, growing the capacity to make
that meaning requires a vibrant tension between distinct meaning and dynamic elements.
This new model of culture, therefore, creates community, seeks out new content,
and develops capacity. If the model, however, is to have a re-mythologizing effect on a
community, then the moral capacity must develop beyond an understanding of social
systems as closed. I propose there are two ways to effect this type of growth, and they
most likely will have to occur simultaneously. The first way understands development as
progressive and evolutionary. Within the framework of a closed system and among
leaders who understand social systems as closed, this model is particularly salient.
Incremental steps from authoritarian through servant evolve leaders to more and more
developed ways of understanding the system as increasingly open. This pattern of growth
also decreases the explicit role of rivalry, and, beyond facilitator, even the frequency of
sacrifice-based rituals for the meaning-making enterprise. As leaders near the servant
style of meaning-making, they begin to develop the ability to understand and appreciate
the value of ontological openness and are prepared to take the next step through the
entropic liminal into open systems, visionary leadership.
Adopting an evolutionary framework for growth, progressive and linear as it is,
might have salience for most who understand social systems as closed. Of course, my
analysis reveals that social systems, even if regarded as closed, are, in fact, open. Growth
does not happen in a linear and progressive fashion but in non-linear shifts and
patterning. Capacity, like meaning emerges over time. Here Hall’s image of visionary
leaders and the future as strange attractors combined with an understanding of the
contagious nature of mimesis describes a mechanism by which a visionary facilitates
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quantum shifts among others including other leaders with the potential of emerging as
visionary themselves. Witness the relationship between Brenda and Abuna.
The two attractors discussed above are equilibrium and strange. If leaders work
hard to close social systems, then they engage in endothermic or exothermic meaningmaking processes which are constantly moving to and through equilibrium. The leader’s
work involves staving off that equilibrium and disrupting it once it sets in. The strange
attractor of a vision or visionary is better described not as an endpoint but as a pattern
that emerges in non-linear form after recursive iterations of the initial conditions, which
set the patterning in motion in the first instance.
As discussed earlier, leaders can move in and out of higher cycles of leadership.
The systems in which they lead might require their operation at an earlier stage of
development. Or, the system itself might prohibit the leader from operating at that level
altogether and may pull the leader back into a less developed leadership style. This
shifting can be understood in linear terms as sliding along a continuum, but it is probably
best understood in non-linear terms as quantum shifts between attractor states. This calls
for a mechanism that can effect such shifts. For that mechanism, I propose Oikos turn to a
leadership development model known as Generative Commitment forwarded by Len
Leritz. There are discrepancies between Hall’s taxonomy and Leritz’s. Most importantly,
Leritz’s model is likely to collapse Hall’s collaborator, servant, and visionary into the
category of generative, Lertiz’s most advanced level of leadership. I will deal with that
discrepancy in my analysis because the point of reading Hall and Leritz together in this
way is, ultimately, to help leaders develop to the point of being able to open up systems
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and facilitate meaning-making processes that thrive on negentropy rather than on reinscribing violent signification myths.

Generative Commitment
Len Leritz asserts “Any organization is successful to the degree that its members
are committed and skilled at solving problems and reaching organizational goals
together.”512 Conversely, the major impediments or problems facing any organization
“can be traced directly to the lack of commitment and skill in facing and resolving
issues.”513 Leritz, of the Generative Leadership Institute, characterizes levels of
commitment along a continuum that is at once developmental in a linear progressive
sense and descriptive of shifting levels of commitment within individuals at different
times and within different relational contexts. The five levels of commitment are
characterized as follows: “Enforcer, Scorekeeper, Peacemaker, Rebel Producer, and
Generative.”514 The first four he describes as “conditional commitments” that lead to
undesirable and unhelpful interpersonal interaction and behavior such as “keeping score
to make sure we get our fair share, and giving pep talks and little lectures, rather than
listening to people’s needs and facing unpleasant problems.”515 “People operating from a
Generative commitment are primarily oriented toward facing the truth about
themselves.…Second, and just as importantly, people operating from their fullest
capacities listen to and accept others - their needs, strengths and limitations.”516
512
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Commitments on the generator level among individuals finding themselves in the
management of extreme crisis, for instance, would be, in Leritz's estimation, precisely the
ones equipped to handle such a situation. “Ultimately this commitment derives from the
trust that, individually and collectively, we are more than enough, that is, though we will
not act perfectly, we have everything we need to handle whatever comes up.”517
The problem with any problem-solving group addressing crisis is that even those
who have acceded to the generator stage at one time or another may not be operating at
that level of commitment when the crisis occurs. In fact the crisis itself could create
impediments that inhibit decision-makers from acting from that level of commitment.
Leritz contends that individuals do not leave stages behind. Rather, we have the capacity
to shift in and out of the various modes of commitment through which we have already
grown.
The goal, once aware of one’s generative capacities, is to be cognizant of the
“certain triggers [that] cause us to think and act from different levels” and to “raise the
level of our thinking, either developmentally over time or in the moment.”518 Each
moment of relationship, crisis, and decision-making is also a moment of internal effort to
gauge levels of commitment, fight off that which seduces us into the conditional levels of
commitment and frees us to operate as generators. If successful, we have clearer lenses
through which to peer into the commitment of the other(s) to whom we are relating.
A limitation of the Leritz model is it sets up a developmental dichotomy, between
what might be described as adult and child-like behaviors. Four of his relational modes:
Enforcer, Scorekeeper, Peacemaker, and Rebel-Producer, reflect stages of development
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in childhood that persons carry with them into adulthood. Life stories or “scripts” for
Leritz create attractor states in one or more of these stages. Leritz’s contention, however,
is that grown persons have, in addition to the capacities described above, the capacity to
operate at the generative level, exhibiting adult commitments to problem-solving and
relationships. On a moment to moment basis, persons can move between (one or more)
truncated and fully developed sets of behaviors and commitments. What Leritz’s model
lacks is any subtle distinctions within the adult generative mode itself. He does not
address whether there are more or less ways of being generative when one is acting with
adult capacities. Leritz’s generativity has the potential to correspond, in my terms, to both
closed and open systems leadership styles. Leritz’s model is likely to identify Hall’s
collaborator and visionary as generative in a way that does not offer a distinction between
the two.
Nevertheless, what Leritz does offer is this image of oscillation between (or
among) two (or more attractor) states. While this sort of non-linear movement is implicit
in Hall’s arrangement as well, Leritz’s model trades on the fluidity of movement more
fully. Combining the fluidity of the Leritz model with the explicit distinctions of the Hall
model and the differences between open and closed systems yields the possibility of
understanding leaders and systems that move rapidly among multiple levels of
development within a closed-system paradigm or between a closed-system understanding
and an open-system understanding. This latter shift imperils open systems with the threat
of equilibrium states as well as provides opportunities for growth around visionary
attractors to closed systems. This might occur in spurts, and an open system might
devolve again into closed system equilibrium dynamics.
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Activities
The question, then, becomes how to sustain generative levels of commitment
personally and socially, especially generative commitments that understand and respond
to social systems as open? In order to sustain generative commitments to open systems
and thereby cultivate cultural leaders, Oikos will facilitate engagement around the
development of content, capacity and community as described above.

Content
In order to actively re-mythologize social systems, Oikos participants must learn
about and research the areas of peace and non-violence, human need and ecological
sustainability. Broadly speaking these areas address the myths that reinforce the
conditions for and mythically inscribed the necessity of violence. Learning and reasoning
about theses areas in a way similar to that advocated by Jackson in the Warwick project
opens these areas up for constantly evolving new understandings. Opening up these areas,
in particular, is important. Learning and reasoning about peace holds the potential for
demythologizing the mechanisms, occasions, and assumptions that inhere in violent
conflict. Learning and reasoning about human need holds the potential for
demythologizing economic competition over the resources which provide the meaningmaking power and the desire for which fuels rivalry or the acquisition of resources at the
expense of others. Learning and reasoning about ecological sustainability hold the
potential for demythologizing the pre-condition of rivalry, which is the objectification of
natural and other resources viewed as consumable objects of desire.
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In order to develop the content knowledge around these three areas of future
leaders in various fields, Oikos established the Oikos Scholars program at one university
with the prospect of expanding it to another in the near future and with plans to extend
the reach by establishing similar programs at multiple colleges and universities around
the globe.519 The Oikos Scholars program intentionally involves students in servicelearning to privilege ontological context, living and studying abroad to expose students to
new sources of difference, and in coursework on peace, human need/social justice, and
ecological sustainability to achieve the learning and reasoning objectives described
above.

Capacity
In order to develop the cognitive and moral capacities of persons in positions of
leadership, Oikos will help its constituents grow through multiple insight-oriented
seminars and workshops on leadership development based on the work and insights of
Brian Hall. Hall’s work orients participants along a common vector for long-term
personal growth. Supplementing Hall’s work with Lertitz’s insight will provide a tool for
enabling any leader, uninitiated, initiated, or visionary to strive intentionally to lead at his
or her best as much as possible. Working to cultivate one’s own generative capacity at
whichever of Hall’s cycles helps the leader prepare for growth into further developed
cycles of leadership. Ultimately, leaders engaged in this intentional growth process will
come to understand cultural systems as open systems and how to live in the liminal in a
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way that can deploy the available negentropy for creating non-violent, yet meaningful
cultural patterns.
These leadership development activities will invite participants into an intentional
and discernable process of personal growth. The growth will trade on an increasing
awareness of personal values or norms and the extent to which those norms are or are not
shared. This invites deeper reflection into the way norms are created and shared and links
that process to the development of personal moral and cognitive capacities to the
complex adaptive systems described by the Moral Meaning Matrix. Finally, enabling
leaders to understand how they know what they know and mean what they mean and how
they participate in knowing and meaning on scalable levels within the social fractal, they
will have the tools to participate intentionally in the project of social construction and
influence the reformation of organizations and institutions to create patterns that inscribe
just, peaceful, and ecologically responsible relationships and behavior.
Engaged participants who commit to a lifelong process of personal growth and
development as described above, along with graduates of the Oikos Scholars programs
who make similar lifelong commitments will form the Oikos Leadership Network (OLN)
aimed at catalyzing cross-institutional collaboration, mentoring and co-counseling among
its members.520 By deploying internet-based social networking software, such a network
could provide members with instantaneous global access to a community of persons with
diverse experience, shared values, and a common commitment to personal growth and the
revival of the planet and its inhabitants. Social network technology is evolving rapidly
and could enable community participants to affiliate and communicate asynchronously
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and simultaneously with other participants who share interests, skills, institutional
sectors, or global regions.

Community
Few, if any, organizations or social institutions exist to support persons engaged
in highly sophisticated reflection and action relative to the complex realities which
challenge the world today. Simply replicating previous organizational structures created
to accommodate less developed interaction and to address the challenges of a world
which were, perhaps, less complex, will fail to satisfy the intellectual and emotional
needs of the persons engaged in this type of collaborative work. Particularly, locating
Oikos within the sphere of influence of any one organization or within the normative
framework of any particular social institution, such as education, government, religion, or
economy, will fail to provide the robust diversity necessary to deal with the challenges
posed by the interaction of those institutions and will fail to engage authentically multiple
organizations at once.
Further, in the twenty-first century, such a project must conceive of itself in
global terms in order to continually challenge the hegemony of any particular set of
cultural norms and assumptions, which will inevitably shape the work of the community
in provincial ways. Oikos, then, will include participants from multiple institutional
sectors. The organization has adapted Bellah et al.’s categories into: government, service,
education, religion, and economy. Service serves as a broad category to encompass some
of the areas The Good Society did not address such as the media, healthcare, nongovernmental organizations, etc. The participants must also come from diverse cultural
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settings and be capable of and interested in addressing issues of peace and non-violence,
human need, and ecological sustainability.
Growing Oikos, therefore, requires the intentional establishment of a series of
interpersonal relationships which form a self-organizing and self-propagating scale-free
network over time. Ensuring that the earliest relationships are global and transinstitutional in scope will provide the best prospects for achieving the envisioned
community.

Systemic, Sustainable, and Scalable
For Oikos to cultivate Cultural Leaders as set forth in this dissertation it needs to
be systemic, sustainable, and scalable. It derives an integrative systemic approach from
intentionally involving persons in the community from each of the four major social
institutions outlined by Bellah et al. as well as from a newly-described sector, service.
Sustainability depends on increasing the content knowledge around issues of ecology,
human need, and peace and non-violence. Finally, scalability requires careful attention to
each of the levels of social complexity: interpersonal, group, organizational, institutional,
societal, universe/global. Scalable in this sense indicates an effort to work at various
levels of social complexity but still within, confusingly, a scale-free network which
enables Oikos to behave as a complex adaptive system or real world network and not as
static or random network. In fact it is the scale-free properties which give the network the
opportunity to exploit its fractal-like topology to affect multiple levels of social
complexity at once. On each level, Oikos maps a vector of growth in order for the person
or groups of persons involved to develop the moral capacity to make meaning in
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increasingly sustainable and systemic ways and in ways that eventually are capable of
disregarding the artificially closed distinctions of the levels of social complexity.

Cultural Leadership and Peace
“I dream,” says Mark Taylor, “of educational institutions that do as much for the
imagination as Frank Gehry’s buildings do for the eye….It seems undeniable that the
currency of education has never been more valuable than in emerging network
culture.”521 The Cultural Leadership model attempts to respond seriously to the
epistemological revolution which provides an exceptionally more nuanced view of the
realities of the way we relate to one another. Any network informed by the Cultural
Leadership model would provide a forum to allow for the enterprise called for by the
observers who penned The Good Society.
Yet if we are fortunate enough to have the gift of faith through which we
see ourselves as members of the universal community of all being, then
we bear a special responsibility to bring whatever insights we have to the
common discussion of new problems, not because we have any superior
wisdom, but because we can be, as Vaclav Havel defines his role,
ambassadors of trust in a fearful world.522
Heeding Taylor’s dream and The Good Society’s call requires rehabilitation of the
institution of education, dislodging it from the grips of the economic and political
influences which have distracted its purpose from an intrinsically meaningful mission.
The rehabilitation of education, however, requires the re-emergence of the role of religion
in public life, re-establishing a mechanism for making meaning for other social
institutions. Religion, regressive and privatized as it has become, will be clumsy in this
role. But part of religion’s rehabilitation is a steadier flow of reality from the portal of
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education, encouraging religion and enabling it to adapt and progress into an open
systems mode of signification. “The culture of people,” according to Clifford Geertz, “is
an ensemble of texts, themselves ensembles.”523 Assembling those texts and, indeed
writing them, rather than simply reading them, is the role of religion. But it must first
have new information granted it by education to inscribe on those pages.
The systems, however, have no hands, minds, and voices, complex and adaptive
as they are without the persons who enliven and conscientize the processes of learning,
reasoning, and signification on all levels of human interaction. As Samuel Huntington
frames it, “The futures of both peace and civilization depend upon understanding and
cooperation among political, spiritual, and intellectual leaders of the world’s major
civilizations.”524 Peace depends on it, because our ways of making sense of difference
and noise are grounded in violent myths about how power is used to make meaning.
These myths have increasingly destructive weapons at their disposal. Re-writing the
myths of closed systems and dislodging the violent mechanisms inherently deployed to
keep such systems alive is essential on the interpersonal and the global levels. “In the
emerging era, clashes of civilizations are the greatest threat to world peace, and an
international order based on civilizations is the surest safeguards against world war.”525
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On September 11, 2001, terrorists used global communication and transportation
networks to carry out their attacks. In so doing they demonstrated the dangers of a world
in which people, who decades before would have been isolated from one another by
geography, now live in increased contact. The Good Society observed ten years prior to
the attacks the perilous dimensions of an increasingly interconnected globe of people who
are ill-prepared to cope with this evolving social proximity.526
For several centuries now the great society, particularly in the form of
division of labor and the exchange economy, but even, ironically, through
the increase of international violence, has been pushing more and more of
human society toward an interconnected whole. The process has been
anything but smooth, causing repeated crises of moral meaning and
solidarity, as well as breakdowns into extraordinary violence and anger, as
the units and conditions of life develop unevenly.527
The September 11 attacks challenged the notion that human society is singular, is
on a path toward an “interconnected whole,” or has any common referent with which to
define or discern “crises of moral meaning.” However, the attacks alone are not sufficient
evidence that there is any fissure in a global cultural fabric, if in fact such a fabric exists.
Indeed outlaws and law-abiders operate within common cultural frameworks. The ability
to enforce social and legal sanctions defines both outlaw and law-abider as two agents
within the same culture on some minimal level at least. What is evident in the 2001
attacks, however, is that there are circles – very large ones – in the world in which the
terrorist actions are understood by sympathizers, not as crimes, but as legitimate
activities.
The attacks were visible manifestations of conflicts occurring around the globe on
a daily basis. As individuals live in ever closer and increasingly diverse communities,
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interpersonal conflicts escalate to a global scale just as the effects of the globally visible
and violent attacks of September 11, 2001 ripple into interpersonal relationships. Such
interpersonal and global violence stems from dysfunctional relationships among social
institutions, including education and religion, which broadly influence behavioral
patterns and the processes of meaning-making on personal, interpersonal, organizational,
and societal levels. Reciprocally, personal patterns of behavior, organizational structures,
interpersonal relationships, and inter-organizational dynamics influence the broader
behavioral patterns and processes of meaning-making which shape social institutions,
society and global relationships. Influencing the positive development of healthy social
institutions, therefore, may lead to more pacific ways of relating to one another on an
interpersonal and global level
An understanding of leadership as drawing on educative and religious processes
for the deployment of power in order to make meaning with or on behalf of groups of
people at any level of social complexity suggests that leadership is informed by and can
inform institutional patterns of behavior and signification just as it informs cultures on
any level. Understanding leadership style on a developmental continuum between more
and less violent modes of deploying power simultaneously offers insight into the origin
of violent social relationships and into a process for creating more pacific ways of
making meaning. Therefore, providing a path of personal cognitive and moral
development along this continuum for organizational, institutional, societal and global
leaders offers one approach to influencing the development of social institutions which,
in turn, influence the development of leaders, along a mutually formative path toward
interpersonal and global peace.

CONCLUSION

How would cultural leaders make the world more peaceful today? Faced with
deteriorating conditions in Iraq in which two sects within a single Huntingtonian
civilization fight for political power and control over precious oil reserves, the United
States continues its attempts to rescue its foisting of Western-crafted norms of freedom
and democracy on a reality from which those norms did not emanate and a reality which
those norms cannot understand. The endothermic means by which the so-called lone
remnant superpower of the twentieth century imposes its will on Iraq rapidly depletes
what is left of its global political capital while it runs up record budget deficits by the
minute. Since before the war, the frontier of US diplomacy has been silent on almost all
fronts – not just on Iraq. The US has led with military force and wallows in a military
mindset from which it cannot seem to free itself.
Responding to the unprecedented liminality of the 2001 attack, the US responded
with leadership styles that modulated between parental and autocratic. Just a day before
the attacks New York’s mayor was best known for his heavy-handed tactics in
eradicating crime as well as a sketchy – at best – record for dealing constructively with
issues of diversity. One morning changed all that. America needed to be rushed out of a
burning building – autocracy was the charism of the day. The reviled mayor became the
revered leader because he had the gifts needed to command and control.
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But with the taking of a few breaths and the passing of a few days, all involved
had the opportunity to bring perspective to an evolving and extremely complex situation.
Cultural Leaders would have had the wherewithal to invoke autocratic charisms in times
of need and crisis but would intentionally move into an open style leadership model that
would have attempted not to control or contain the situation over and over again, but to
understand that what was unfolding was complex and dynamic. Further Cultural Leaders
would have set a course for resolution that did not look to scapegoating terrorists and
dictators as if a few people were the sole source of a complex set of problems that have
swirled into violent patterns for decades if not millennia. Al Qaeda’s nimble network
proved to be the pattern that needed to be understood and the world got a glimpse of the
dynamics of open systems alongside of and interrelated to emerging internet and mass
media technologies. Now acquainted with terms like cells and network, the United States
could not respond in kind. Avoiding the complexity of the system, the US
institutionalized and codified various modes of now legitimated scapegoating through the
USA PATRIOT Act, palpably closing down US society even more.528
As 2007 opens, the United States, having regressed about as far as it can in terms
of Hall’s leadership cycles and faced with what is being broadly described as chaos, the
certainty that liminality is emerging evokes the only response a fully regressed leader can
employ – more dominance. More troops may indeed restore order, asserting the
dominance of the United States in the multi-lateral rivalry that is the violent landscape of
Iraq. In that sense the troop increases may well be effective, but they encode even more
closed-system thinking on one of the most visibly open systems problems. “Yet,” Bellah
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et al. observe, “it is easier to repeat old formulas, to comfort oneself with the
community’s familiar practices, than to risk trusting a new response to new
conditions.”529
Cultural Leaders resist the pull into closed-systems thinking. Avoiding the zerosum mentality enables Cultural Leaders to search for intersubjective ways to build
partnerships and community. Cultural Leaders dismiss the myth of border security and
focus energy and attention not on keeping international students out of domestic
classrooms but look for ways to promote exchange and understanding.530 Like Abuna
they build schools for the children of their enemies rather than refuse to talk with them or
their allies. This type of leadership requires risk, deep risk on the part of the persons
involved and requires the surrendering of amassed power to the energy that comes from
engaging others in authentic and genuine ways.
Cultural Leadership requires the development of cognitive and moral capacities.
Certainly Osama bin Laden has demonstrated a cognitive facility for understanding open
systems, but he has exploited that understanding by acting out in myriad ways a dynamic
of rivalry and sacrifice. The same charge might be accurately levied against multinational corporations or world financial markets. Many who influence these systems
understand their openness and are, daily, faced with ethical choices about how those
corporations and markets affect the livelihoods of millions round the globe relative to
their own personal financial position.
The twenty-first century is serving up a sufficient number of open systems
problems that are outstripping any society’s ability to deal with them in a progressive and
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non-violent manner. The patterns which have encoded our behavior for so long are in
much need of reform. As Bellah et al. argue even from the standpoint of the twentieth
century:
It is tempting to think the problems we face today, from the homeless in
our streets and poverty in the Third World to ozone depletion and the
greenhouse effect, can be solved by technology or technical expertise
alone. But even to begin to solve these daunting problems, let alone
problems of emptiness and meaninglessness in our personal lives, requires
that we greatly improve our capacity to think about our institutions. We
need to understand how much of our lives is lived in and through
institutions, and how better institutions are essential if we are to lead better
lives. In surveying our present situations we need to discern what is
healthy in them and what needs to be altered, particularly where we have
begun to destroy the nonrenewable natural and nearly nonrenewable
human resources upon which our institutions depend.531
As an institution, religion is key to the moral development of Cultural Leaders’ abilities
to not only understand the open systems but to craft meaningful responses to the
problems they pose.
We can indeed try to attend to the world around us and to the meanings we
discover as we interact with that world, and hope to realize in our own
experience that we are part of a universal community, making sense of our
lives as deeply connected to each other. As we enlarge our attention to
include the natural universe and the ultimate ground that it expresses and
from which it comes, we are sometimes swept with a feeling of
thankfulness, of grace, to be able to participate in a world that is both
terrifying and exquisitely beautiful. At such moments we feel like
celebrating the joy and mystery we participate in. Religions at their best
help focus that urge to celebrate so that it will include all the meanings we
can encompass.532
Cultural Leadership must draw on religion and education in order to foster the
cognitive and moral development necessary to grasp and respond to increasingly complex
challenges. Oikos provides one model of understanding the inter-relatedness of social
institutions and a method for cultivating personal cognitive and moral development in
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order to engage those institutions more fully and in a systemic manner. Such an
experiment – or many – must be launched. To simply analyze and theorize would only
regress the system of engagement and cultivation into past meanings made. New and
meaningful responses require real engagement with context.
It is in the ontological dimension of reality and in context as Freire and Voyles
point out that we encounter the differences we need to fuel the patterning work of the
interlocking complex adaptive cultural systems, which Taylor’s work so vividly
describes. Open systems thinking provides a radical and necessary departure from the
classically-informed notions of social systems as being closed. The systems do not need
opening but leaders must refrain from attempting to close them with mythic institutional
patterns that legitimate social, political, economic, and military sanctions employing
various overtly and subtly violent means. Insidiously, even some of our best management
practices encode scapegoating on a routine basis so that our sensibilities are dulled by the
practices of our working lives when scapegoating occurs on broader and more destructive
scales. Hall’s taxonomy read in light of Girard’s theory of mimetic violence shows us
how common notions of leadership inscribe such violent patterns to the point that the
patterns, the myths, become hidden from our conscious understanding of the way we
interact in the world.
Barabasi and others demonstrate how a real world network can translate such
violent patterns of meaning making throughout a web of relationships that form a social
fractal, which connects seemingly disconnected parts of our social universe. This makes
it profoundly important to pay attention to the charismatic gifts leaders use to evoke
change and respond to the threat of entropy brought on by the loss of differentiation in
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the system or the equilibration of endothermic and exothermic energy transfers. More
than just a Weberian ideal type of authority, charisma mixes into the leadership style of
any leader that is able to demonstrate credibly his or her ability to respond to crises.
These crises, by and large are only perceived crises. My theory of thermodynamics of
culture and leadership shows how mythically closing a system sets up entropy and
disorder as threats rather than the fuel of negentropy in myths that understand cultural
networks as open systems. It is the increasingly developed charisms of initiated leaders
who can endure the liminal and demonstrate the greatest chance of effectiveness in
weaving and interpreting myths that legitimate life in the liminal states of Prigogine’s
dissipative structures. It is there, Turner tells us, that communitas allows for anti-structure
and structure to give new meaning to life. And meaning, as Geertz emphasizes, is what it
is all about. As The Good Society concludes, “Meaning is the living fabric that holds us
together with all things. To participate in it is to know something of what human
happiness really is.”533
Leadership is meaning-making and those meanings are preserved and transmitted
through cultures. The violent ways we have made meaning in the United States have
translated into violent patterns of meaning across the world, not only in World War I as
Gruber demonstrates, but through most of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first.
The United States exports good things too, but we do not account for violent modes of
signification in our trade deficits. In an unusually prominent place in the world and with
access to military, media, and economic might that outstrips by far what any other society
can draw upon, our institutional patterns are translated and enforced globally.
US hegemony is by and large a normative hegemony – one that crushes the other
533

Ibid., 286.

325
dimensions of reality as shown in the Moral Meaning Matrix into a collusion of
governmental policies and economic power. The dynamic fuels the onset of the
normative, and the two social institutions in the United States responsible for encoding
meaning making and ontological engagement are subsumed. Religion, relegated to an
untouchable private sphere and education devolving into utilitarian ends that can, on its
best days, be described in the terms of its institutional subordination as a means to
produce citizens (in the narrowest sense of the term of taxpayer) or workers for the
government and economy respectively.
The Emory crisis taught us the process for an institution which fails to develop its
own moral language. In the vacuum other intuitions are quick to reach in and replace the
normative framework with foreign norms and thus exert the coercive isomorphism the
neo-institutionalists so aptly named.
Education, alas, is left with few resources to help it inscribe new meanings,
because our “socially organized ways of paying attention can become socially organized
ways of distraction. [And] nowhere is the dilemma of institutionalization more acute than
in the realm of religion.”534 Berger’s sacred canopy is no longer aiding the process of
society creation. In fact, it seems to be inimical to the process altogether. Not only does
its absence in public discourse keep it from informing progressive ways of making
meaning for education and the other institutions, its privatization, as described by Bellah
et al., keeps it from being reformed itself. In the United States, at least, this means that
the misread myths that Girard demonstrated as being so powerfully violent seem beyond
the reach of, even the ailing influence of, education to transform.
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Berger’s sacred canopy increasingly takes on the character of Frankl's deceptive
dream and the numbness with which the veiled myth anesthetizes us legitimates, if not
even makes holy, the cannibalistic frenzy that is religious violence. It is best, it seems, to
stay lost in the deception of our mythic dream because the reality is too stark and harsh.
Like Frankl, we are left culturally and existentially naked staring at the showerheads
protruding through the ceiling of our sacred canopy wondering what they might effuse
next. What becomes important for Cultural Leaders is not what happens next. It is what
we do in that moment - before next. In that moment of terror and opportunity, Cultural
Leaders release their gaze from the showerhead and scan the room. Cultural Leadership
begins with the profound realization that we are not alone.
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